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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF IDAHO 
WENDY ICNOX and RICHARD DOTSON, 
Plaintiffs 1 Appellants, 
-VS- 
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C.L. OTTER, 
Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of 
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney 
General, 




1 SUPREME COURT # 35787 
1 






Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bingham. 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, presiding. 
Counsel for Appellants: Curt R. Thornsen, THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC: 
2635 Channing Way, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Counsel for Respondents: Attorney General, Civil Litigation Division, PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0 
David F. Hensley, Counsel to the Governor, PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0034 
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STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C. L. OTTER, ) 
Governor; BEN YSURn, Secretary of State; ) 








NOTICE: This Case is assigned to 
Darren 5. Simpson, District Judge 
Fee Category: G.1 
Fee: $88.00 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs above-named, and for cause of action against the defendants, 
allege as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs in this action challenge the constitutiollality ofIdaho Code $5 67-429B 
and 67-429C, enacted by Proposition One during the November 5; 2002, general election. Plaintiffs 
contend that Idaho Code $ 8  67-429B and 67-429C violate the Idaho Constitution, Article Dl, 9 20. 
1 - COMPLALNT FOR DECLARATORY AND OTHER RELIEF 
2. Plaintiffs Wendy Knox (hereinafier "Knox") and Richard Dotson (hereinafter 
"Dotson") are and at all tinies material were residents and citizens of the Bingham County, Idaho. 
3. Defendant C. L. Ofler, the Governor ofthe State of Idaho, is charged with upholding 
the Idaho Constitution and faithfully executing the laws of the State of Idaho, il~cluding Article 111, 
20 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code $5 18-3808 and 18-381 0. Mr. Otter is sued solely 
in his official capacity. 
4. Defendant Ben Ysura, the Idaho Secret~uy of State, is charged with the administration 
of elections in Idaho pursuant to Title 34, Chapter 18, Idaho Code. His predecessor canvassed the 
voting on Proposition One and concluded that Proposition One received a majority of the votes at 
the November 5,2002 election, resulting in Idaho Code $5 67-429B and 67-429C. Mr. Ysura is sued 
solely in his oacial capacity. 
5 .  Defendant Lawrence Wasden, Attorney General for the State ofIdaho, is also charged 
with upholding the Idaho Constitution and faithfully executing and prosecuting the laws ofthe State 
of Idaho, including Article ID, $ 20 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code $ 8  18-3808 and 18- 
38 10. Mr. Wasden is sued solely in his official capacity. 
6. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Idaho's Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act, Title 10, Chapter 12, Idaho Code, and Article V, $ 20 of the Idaho Constitution. 
7. Venue is proper pursuant to LC. 5 5-402(2) because this cause, or some part thereof, 
arose in Bingham County. Venue is also proper pursuant to I.C. 5 5-404 because the State of Idaho 
is not a resident of any particular county in the State of Idaho. 
2 - COMPLATNT FOR DECLARATORY AND OTHER RELIEF 
0 0 4 
8. Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action because they each have suffered injuries 
in fact, because there is a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or 
redress their injuries, and because their injuries are different from those suffered by the general 
public, as established by the lbllowing facts, inter alia: 
a. After enactment of Idaho Code 53 67-429B and 67-429C and subsequent 
installation of slot machines at the Fort Hall Casino near Blackfoot, Idaho, both Plaintiffs became 
compulsive gamblers, driving the short distance from their homes to gamble on the slot machines 
(euphemistically called a "tribal video gaming machine") at the Fort Hall Casino, about 3 to 4 times 
per week. 
b. Plaintiffs gambled al~nost exclusively at Fort Hall Casino because of its very 
short distance from their respective residences, compared to the next nearest places to gamble, 
hundreds of miles away. 
c. Of all .the different types of gambling available at the Fort Hall Casino, 
Plaintiffs played only the slot machines. 
d. Because ofIdaho Code §§ 67-429B and 67-429C and subsequent installation 
of slot machines at the Fort Hall Casino, Plaintiffs both developed clinical and devastating addictions 
to gambling at the Fort Hall Casino. Plaintiff Knox estimates her slot machine losses at Fort Hall 
Casino at about $50,000.00, and Plaintiff Do.tson estimates his slot machine losses at Fort Hall 
Casino at about $30,000.00. 
3 - COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND OTHER RELIEF 
005 
e. Because of the slot machines allowed at the Fort Hall Casino in violation of 
Idaho law and Idaho Constitution and their consequent gambling addiction, both plaintiffs suffered 
not only large monetary losses, but also incurred additional debt they otherwise would not have 
incurred, were subjected to intrusive and humiliating collection efforts, stress, anxiety and marital 
and family strife, and tremendous emotional distress. Dotson lost his house and job, and was 
convicted of the crime of forgery in order to obtain gambling funds, all because of his gambling 
addiction precipitated by Proposition One, Idaho Code 55 67-429B and 67-429C and subsequent 
installation of slot machines at the Fort Hall Casino. 
g. Both Plaintiffs have sought, obtained, and continue to receive treatment for 
their destructive gambling addictions, through Gambler's Anonymous. Dotson has also obtained 
counseling from a private Iicensed counselor for his gambling addiction. 
f. If the defendants had originally upheld the Idaho Constitution and statutes 
prohibiting slot machines against Proposition One and Idaho Code $$67-429B and 67-429C, slot 
machines would not have been installed at Fort Hall Casino and neither Plaintiff would have suffered 
the harm set forth above. 
g. If this Court declares Proposition One and LC. $3 67-429B and 67-429C to 
be in violation of the Idaho Constitution, Fort Hall Casino will be forced to remove its slot machines, 
and such casino style gambling will be much less readily available to Plaintiffs. This will malce their 
recovery much easier and will prevent or minimize further harm to the Plaintiffs of the kind set forth 
above. 
9. Plaintiffs have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedj? to halt the harm they are 
suffering, other than the remedies sought herein. 
4 - COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AJVE OTHER RELIEF 
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10. The constitutional issues raised in this proceeding concern Idaho State law only, 
11. Axticle 111, $ 20 of the Idaho Constitution, as amended in 1992, expressly prohibits 
gambling in Idaho. It provides, izle? alia: 
( I )  Gambling is contrary topublicpolicy and is strictly prohibited except 
for the following: 
a. A state lottery which is authorized by the state if conducted in 
conlbrmi3 with enabling legislation; and 
b. Pari-mutuel betting if conducted in conformity with enabling 
legislation; and 
c. Bingo and raffle games that are operated by qualified charitable 
organizations in the pursuit of charitable purposes if conducted in 
conformity with enabling legislation. 
(2) No activities permitted by subsection (1) shall employ any form of 
casino gambling including, but not limited to, blackjack, craps, roulette, 
poker, baccarat, keno and slot maclzines, or employs any electronic or 
electromechanicalimitation or simulation. of any form of casinogambling. 
(Emphasis added). 
12. The Idaho Legislature has, by statute, likewise prohibited gambling, making it a 
crime, see I.C. 5 18-3801 and 18-3802, and probibited slot machines in particular. See LC. 5 18- 
3810. 
13. Idaho Code $ 5  67-429B and 67-429C purportto authorize gambling on Indian lands 
in Idaho in violation of Article 111, $ 20 of the Idaho Constitution. 
14. The gambling activities ostensibly authorized by I.C. $3 67-429B and 67-429C do 
not fall within any of the three exceptions in subsection (1) of Article 11, Section 20, Idaho 
Constitution. 
5 - COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND OTHER RELIEF 
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15. Idaho Code $5 67-429B and 67-429Cpurport to autl~orize forms of casino gambling 
which subsection (2) of Arlicle IU, 5 20 of the Idaho Constitution, expressly prohibits. 
16. Idaho Code 8 67-429B, enacted pursuant to Proposition One, purports to authorize 
the use of "tribal video gaming machines" on Indian lands. 
17. The Attomey General's Certificate aclcnowledged that the tribal video gaming 
machines as defined by I.C. 5 67-429B "would be construed as slot machines or imitations or 
simulations of forms of casino gambling." 
18. Plaintiffs agree with the Attorney General's statement quoted above, and further ' 
allege that the doresaid "tribal video gaming machines" are "electronic or electromechanical 
imitations or simulations of any form of casino gambling." 
19. Idaho Code $5 67-429C, enacted pursuant to Proposition One, authorizes the 
unilateral amendment of state-tribal gaming compacts between the State of Idaho and the various 
tribes, to incorporate and permit the illegal gambling purportedly authorized by I.C. 5 67-429B, in 
violation of Article 111, Section 20 ofihe Idaho Constitution. 
20. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that LC. $5 67-429B and 67-429C are 
unconstitutional and in violation of Article 111, 20 of the Idaho Coxlstitution. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs respectfully pray the judgment, order and decree of the Court as 
follows: 
1. Declaring that Idaho Code $8 67-429B and 67-429C are unconstitutional, unlawful, 
and invalid under the prohibition on gambling contained in Article TIT, $ 20 of the 
Idaho Constitution; 
2. Enjoining the defendants from enforcing I.C. $8  67-429B and 67-429C; and 
6 - COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND OTHER RELIEF 
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3. Requiring the defendants to uphold and enforce Article IIl, 5 20 of the Idaho 
Constitution and Idaho Code $ 5  18-3808 and 18-381 0. 
DATED this & day of Mach, 2008. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
7 - COMPLAWT FOR DECLARATORY AND OTHER RELIEF 
RPR.14.2006 11:48irlM ID iTY GEN,NRT RES 
LAWRENCE G, WASDEN 
Attorney General 
STEVEN OMEN 
Deputy Attorney oeneral 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
MICHAEL S. GILMORE 
ISB #lb25; rnike.gilmore@,a,a~.idd~o.~ 
CLAY R. SMITE3 
ISB #63 85; clav.smith@ae,idah~. EOV 
Deputy Attorneys Oenersl 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 854-8072 
DAVD F. kENSLE,Y 
ISB W 6600, dhensley~).~ov.idnho~eov 
Counsel to the Governor 
Office of the Govemor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0034 
Telephone: (208) 334-21 00 
Facsimile: (208) 334-3454 
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V. ) DEFENDANTS' 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
STATE OF IDAHO, ex re], C. L. OTTER, ) (Supporting Brief to Be Submitted Pursuant 
Governor; BEN YSURSA, Secretary of 1 to I.R.C,P. 7@)(3)(C)) 
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN, 1 
Attorney Gencral, 1 
Defendants. i 
1 
Defendants State of Idaho et al. respectfuIly request that the complaint in this matter be 
dismissed pursuant to I.R.C,P. 12(b), 
O B O  
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS-Page 1 
RPR. 14.200B 11 : 48RM 
AND AS GROUNDS THEREFOR state that (I) dismissal under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) is 
appropriate because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate whether certain 
gaming machines operated by the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes comply with state law 
requirements; (2) dismissal under I.R.C.P. 12@)(6) is appropriate because the complaint fails to  
state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and (3) dismissal under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7) is 
appropriate because the complaint f d s  to join necessary and indispensable parties as defendants, 
A supporting brief will be frled within 14 days in accordance 4th 1.RC.P. 7(b)(3)(C). 
WIBUFORE, the  complaint should be dismissed under I.R.C.P. 12@). 
DATED this 14th day of April 2008. 
LAWR.EX%X G. WASDEN 
ATTOWEY G m E M  
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
MICHAEL S. GILMORE 
Deputy Attorney Creneral 
Civil Litigation Division 
DAVID F, HENSLEY 
Counsel to the Governor 
Office of the Governor 
By: 
Dcputy Attorney General 
Natursl Resowces Division 
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO DISMISS-Page 2 
FIPR. 14.2008 11: 48RM ID ;TY GEN, NRT RES 
~ ,~ .&  @$) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 14th day of April 2008 1 caused to be served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing upon the following party by the method listed below; 
CURT B. TI-IOMSBN, BS'Q. 0 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
T. JASON WOOD, ESQ. 0 Rand Delivery 
THOMSEN STEPKENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC I3 Federal Express 
2635 CHAMVING WAY X Facsimile: 208-522-1 277 
IDAHO FALLS' ID 83404 Statehouse Mail 
012 
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Article 111, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution reserves to the people the right of 
initiative-i.e., "the power to propose laws[] and enact the same at the polls independent of the 
legislature." In November 2002, Idaho citizens used this power to pass Proposition One, also 
known as the Tribal Gaming Initiative. The Initiative authorized compacts entered into between 
the State and federally recognized Indian tribes pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
("IIGRA"), 25 U.S.C. $5  2701-2721, to be amended to allow a compacted tribe to operate "tribal 
video gaming machines" subject to certain conditions. Section 67-429B, Idaho Code, describes 
the permitted form of tribal video gaming machine, while the companion 5 67-429C specifies the 
conditions and procedures for any tribe that desired to modify its existing compact to accept the 
Initiative's terms without further negotiation. The complaint in this matter seelcs a determination 
that $5 67-429B and -429C conflict with the gambling prohibition in Article ILI, Section 20 of 
the Idaho Constitution and an order to compel defendants to take actions to enforce this 
constitutional provision. See Compl. 7 20. No monetary relief is requested. 
The complaint should be dismissed under I.R.C.P. 12(b). The injury-in-fact alleged by 
plaintiffs-the proximity of their homes to tribal video gaming machines at a Fort Hall Indian 
Reservation casino and their compulsion to gamble on such machines-cannot be redressed 
without the underlying tribal-state compact with the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes ("SBT") being 
modified or otherwise invalidated in part. That tribe, however, is immune from unconsented suit 
and thus cannot be joined as a defendant. The relief sought by plaintiffs additionally would 
prejudice the rights of three other tribes with which Idaho has IGRA-based compacts authorizing 
the use of tribal video gaming machines. These basic facts, when combined with clear-cut legal 
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principles, lead inescapably to the conclusion that this Court lacks authority to enter the only 
relief-making tribal video gaming machines unavailable at the Fort Hall Casino-that will 
redress plaintiffs' alleged injury. The unavailability of such relief is based on two distinct 
grounds: 
a The SBT and the thee other Idaho gaming tribes are necessary and indispensable 
parties that cannot be joined. Dismissal is therefore required under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7). 
0 Even if this action could proceed forward without the tribes' joinder as 
defendants, this Court cannot enter the relief requested by plaintiffs for three interrelated reasons. 
First, IGRA preempts the field of on-reservation gaming and in large measure leaves to States 
and tribes, through tribal-state compacts, the determination of what types of casino-lilte, or "class 
In," gaming can be offered and the procedures for resolving disputes over whether particular 
forms of gaming are pe~missible under a compact. Second, Idaho and the SBT have entered into 
a compact which, as definitively construed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, allows tribal 
video gaming machines. The compact further specifies an exclusive process for adjusting 
controversies between the parties over its application that ultimately concludes, if necessary, 
with litigation in federal court. Third, whether to initiate the compact's dispute resolution 
process is a matter committed to the Governor's discretion, and this Court lacks authority to issue 
relief compelling him to exercise that authority in a particular manner. Dismissal is therefore 
required under I.C.R.P. 12(b)(6). 
STATEMENT 
1. COMPLAINT'S ALLEGATIONS 
Plaintiffs allege that $ 5  67-429B and -429C authorize gaming proscribed under Article 
111, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution and are therefore unconstitutional. Compl. fjlj 1, 13- 15. 
068 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, Page 2 
They claim injury from the operation of tribal video gaming machines at the SBT's Fort Hall 
Casino because of its proximity to their residences and their addiction to gambling on those 
machines. Id. 'I[ 8.a & b. Plaintiffs state not only that they have lost substantial amounts of 
money as a result of this gambling and suffered emotional distress but also that plaintiff Dotson 
was convicted of a crime related to his efforts to acquire gambling funds. Id 71 8.d & e. They 
contend that "[ilf the defendants had originally upheld the Idaho Conslitution and statutes 
prohibiting slot machines against the Tribal Gaming Initiative and Idaho Code $$ 67-429B and 
67-429C, slot machines would not have been installed at Fort Hall Casino and neither Plaintiff 
would have suffered [such] harm." Compl. 'j/ 8.f. Most importantly for present purposes, they 
further allege: 
If this Court declares Proposition One and I.C. §§ 67-429B and 67-429C to be in 
violation of the Idaho Constitution, Fort Hall Casino will be forced to remove its slot 
machines, and such casino style gambling will be much less readily available to 
Plaintiffs. This will make their recovery much easier and will prevent or minimize 
further harm to the Plaintiffs. 
Id. 1/ 8.g. Plaintiffs seek as relief a declaration that the two provisions are unconstitutional, an 
injunction agai~lst heir enforcement, and an order requiring defendants "to uphold and enforce 
Article 111, $ 20 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code $ 5  18-3808 and 18-3810." Id. 
Wherefore 77 1-3. Defendants are the Governor, the Secretary of Stale and the Attorney General 
in their official capacities. Id. 17 3-5. To place these allegations in context, a brief review of 
TGRA's provisions and its implementation in Ida110 is necessary. 
11. FEDERAL INDIAN GAMING REGULATION 
Congress enacted IGRA in 1988 to regulate gaming by federally recognized tribes on 
"Indian lands." Pub. L. No. 100-487, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. $ 5  1166-1168 
& 25 U.S.C. $8 2701-2721). Those lands include Indian reservations. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4). 
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IGRA separates gaming into three classes and imposes differing regulatory requirements as to 
each. Id. 5 5  2703(6)-(8), 2710(a), (b) & (d); see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 48-50 
(1996) (summarizing IGR4's regulatory scheme). "Class 111 gaming" is a residual category for 
all gambling activity not encompassed by the class I and class II gaming categories. 25 U.S.C. $ 
2703(8). Class 111 gaming includes lotteries and electronic facsimiles of lotteries and most forms 
of machine-related gambling, including slot machines and more modem electronic or 
electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance. See, ee.g., 25 C.F.R. $ 5  502.7, 502.8 
(National Indian Gaming Commission regulations defining, respectively, an "electronic, 
computer or other technologic aid" deemed part of class I1 gaming and an "electronic or 
electromechanical facsimile" deemed class I n  gaming). IGRA requires that class I11 gaming be 
conducted pursuant to a tribal-state compact approved by the Secretary of the Interior or pursuant 
to "procedures" adopted by the Secretary when a State has not negotiated in good faith for a class 
111 gaming compact. 25 U.S.C. 5 2710(d)(l)(C) & (d)(7)(B)(vii). A condition precedent to 
@ Secretarial approval of a compact is that the authorized class I11 gaming be permissible in the 
involved state. Id §§2710(d)(I)(B) & 2710(d)(8)(B)(i). 
Idaho Governors have entered into class I11 gaming compacts on the State's behalf with 
four of the five Idaho tribes, all of which compacts were ratified by the Legislature under Idaho 
Code $ 67-429A and approved by the Secretary under IGRA. See 58 Fed. Reg. 8478 (Feb. 12, 
1993) (Coeur d'Alene Tribe compact approval notice); 58 Fed. Reg. 59,926 (Nov. 10, 1993) 
(Kootenai Tribe compact approval notice); 60 Fed. Reg. 57,246 (Nov. 14, 1995) (Nez Perce 
Tribe compact approval notice); 65 Fed. Reg. 54,541 (Sept. 8, 2000) (SBT compact approval 
notice); 68 Fed. Reg. 1068 (Jan. 8, 2003) (Coeur d'Alene Tribe compact addendum approval 
notice); 68 Fed. Reg. 1068 (Jan. 8, 2003) (Kootenai Tribe compact amendment approval notice); 
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68 Fed. Reg. 1068 (Jan. 8, 2003) mez Perce Tribe compact addendum approval notice).' The 
three compact modifications approved by the Secretary in 2003 involved the tribes' exercise of 
their rights under the voter-approved Tribal Gaming Initiative. See Clay R. Smith Aff. ("Smith 
Aff"), Ex. 1 (Miren E. Arliach ~ f f . 1 . ~  
In relevant part, S, 67-429B authorizes the use of "tribal video gaming machines" by an 
Indian tribe if specifically allowed under a tribal-state compact and if compliant with certain 
technical criteria identified in subsection (1). It further declares in subsection (2) that a S, 67- 
429B-authorized machine "is not a slot machine or an electronic or electromechanical imitation 
or simulation of any form of casino gambling" under Idaho law. Section 67-429C sets out a 
procedure allowing a tribe to amend an existing compact to provide for gaming through these 
machines by filing with the Secretary of State a resolution "siguifjing [its] acceptance" of 
several conditions. Id. $ 67-429C(2). Those conditions include limitations on the permissible 
number of machines, contributions of five percent of "annual net gaming revenue for the support 
of local educational programs and schools on or near the reservation[,]" and agreement "not to 
conduct gaming outside of Indian lands." Id. S, 67-429~(l)(b)-(c).~ 
The SBT, however, followed a different course to offer gambling through tribal video 
gaming machines. Its class I11 compact with Idaho authorized "any gaming activity that the State 
of Idaho 'permits for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity,' as the phrase, is 
' Section 67-429A in its original form was enacted in 1993 (1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 408) and authorizes the 
Governor to represent the State in class I11 gaming negotiations but subjects any proposed gaming compact to 
ratification by both Houses of the Legislature through a concurrent resolution. It additionally requires gaming 
authorized under a proposed compact to be pe~mitted under Idaho law. Idaho Code $67-429A(2)(a). 
2 A pre-election challenge to the Tribal Gaming Initiative's constitutionality was dismissed on standing and ripeness 
grounds. In  re Petition to Dcte~mine Comtihrtionalify of Indian Gaming Initiative, 137 Idaho 798, 53 P.3d 1217 
(2002) ("lndiarr Gaiiting Iizitiative"). A post-election challenge filed before the Supreme Court also was dismissed 
because the Court lacked original jurisdiction. In re Petition to Determine Constitutionality of Idaho Code Sections 
67-429B aizd 67-429C, No. 29226 (Idaho S. Ct. June 2, 2003) (order dismissing petition), reh'g denied (Oct. 16, 
2003). Smith Aff., Exs. 2,3. 
Section 67-429C(3) permits any tribe to negotiate "for an initial compact or a conlpacl amendment regarding lribal 
video gallling maellines or any other matter through a procedure othes than the procedure specified in subsectioil (2) 
above or which contains terms different than those specified in subsection (1) above." 
621 
BRIEF IN SWPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, Page 5 
interpreted in the context of the lndian Gaming Regulatory Act." Smith Aff., Ex. 4 at 5 4.a. 
The SBT compact provided for either or both parties to file an "initial declaratory judgment 
action" in United States district court to determine "wliat gaming the Tribes may conduct under 
the Act and what restrictions on the operations, if any, may be imposed by the State." Id., Ex. 4 
at § 5 .  The SBT and the State filed separate declaratory judgment actions in 2001 in the United 
States District Court for the District of Idaho, which were then consolidated. Shoshone-Bannock 
Tribes v. Idaho, No. CV-01-052-E-BLW (D. Idaho); Idaho 1). Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 
No. CV-01-171-E-BLW (D. Idaho). Following passage of the Tribal Gaming Initiative and 
Secretarial approval of the modifications to the Coeur d1A1ene, Kootenai and Nez Perce 
compacts, the consolidated action's focus i~arrowed to whether the SBT compact, most 
particularly its most-favored-nation provision, allowed the SBT to offer gambling through tribal 
video gaming machines as identified in § 67-429B without compliance with the conditions 
specified in § 67-429~(1).~ 
The district court said yes. Smith Aff., Ex. 5. It held that Section 4 of the compact 
encompassed the newly-authorized tribal video gaming machines, since such gaming was being 
conducted by other hibes, and construed Section 24.d as "merely [an] administrative provision[] 
requiring the Tribe to serve upon the Idaho State Gaming Counsel a brief amendment clarifying 
that that Tribe is authorized to operate tribal video gaming machines." Id. at 14-15. The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment but gave the compact a somewhat 
different reading. Idaho v. Shoshone-Banrzoclc Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2006). It 
construed Section 24.d as "leav[ing] no room for negotiation" because "it mandates an 
amendment to permit one thing-the operation of the same games conducted by other tribes 
4 Section 24.d of the SBT compact provides in part that "[iln the event any other Indian tribe is permitted by 
compact or final court decision to conduct any Class 111 games in Idaho in additioll to those games permitted by this 
Compact, this Compact shall be amended to permit the Tribes to collduct those same additional games." 
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under their compacts." Id. at 1099. The court of appeals rejected the State's position that Section 
24.d required the SBT to adhere to the conditions contained in 5 67-429C and accepted by the 
other Idaho tribes. Id. at 1101 (while "[tlhe other tribes agreed to accept the statutory package of 
amendments that were not included in their compacts[,]" the SBT "chose instead to rely on [its] 
Compact's existing provisions to confer the necessary permission to operate the video gaming 
machines"). The SBT thus was "entitled to a mandatory amendment of the Compact stating that 
[it is] authorized to conduct tribal video gaming." Id. at 1102. 
APPLICABLE I.R.C.P. 12 STANDARDS 
The general standard for determining motions under I.R.C.P. 12 is the same as under 
I.R.C.P. 56. Gallagherv. State, 141 Idaho 665, 668, 115 P.3d 756, 759 (2005). A district court 
thus must "view[] all facts and inferences fiom the record in favor of the non-moving party . . . 
[and] ask whether a claim for relief has been stated," since "ItJhe issue is not whether the 
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is 'entitled to offer evidence to support the 
claims."' Bradbuvy v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67, 28 P.3d 1006, 1010 (2001); 
accovd Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). This Court, 
however, may consider matters of public record susceptible of judicial notice at any stage of a 
proceeding. I.R.E. 201(f); see Crawford v. Dep't of Corrections, 133 Idaho 633, 636 n.1, 991 
P.3d 358, 361 n.1 (1999); cJ: Lee v. City ofLos Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[a] 
court may take judicial notice of 'matters of public record' without converting a motion to 
dismiss into a motion for sununary judgment"). 
ARGUMENT 
The Supreme Court has reiterated the core jurisdictional principle that a litigant must 
possess staiding to invoke judicial intervention. Idaho law, in agreement with federal law, has 
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adopted a three-part standing analysis. As the Court explained almost two decades ago in the 
seminal Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989), two of three 
considerations are injury-in-fact and causation: 
"The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's 
jurisdiction has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to 
assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the court 
so depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.' As refined by 
subsequent reformation, this requirement of 'personal stake' has come to be understood 
to require not only a 'distinct palpa'jle injury' to the plaintifE but also a 'fairly traceable' 
causal connection between the claimed iijury and the challenged conduct." 
116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl, Study Group, 
438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (citations omitted)). A litigant also must identify the availability of 
judicial relief that redresses the injury. Young-, 137 Idaho at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159 ("[tlo satisfy 
the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must 'allege or demonstrate an injury 
in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed 
injury"'); accord Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316, 318, 92 P.3d 1063, 1065 (2002); 
Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006); Indian Gaming 
Initiative, 137 Idaho at 800, 53 P.3d at 1219. The Supreme Court additionally has made clear 
that the injury alleged must be specific to the complainant and, therefore, more than a 
generalized grievance shared by the public at large-ie., "a concerned citizen who seeks to 
ensure the government abides by the law does not have standing." MilEs, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 
P.2d at 763; accord Koch v. Canyon County, 177 P.3d 372, 374 (Idaho 2008). Existence of each 
element of standing-injury-in-fact, causation and redressability-constitutes a "preliminary 
question to be determined by [a] C o w  before reaching the merits of the case." Young, 137 Idaho 
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Here, plaintiffs seek to establish the requisite injury-in-fact through their alleged 
compulsive gambling at the Fort Hall Casino. They ask this Court to enter relief that makes it 
easier for them to avoid the temptation to gamble on "slot machines" by eliminating the 
availability of such gaming activity near their homes. In so characterizing their harm, they seek 
to avoid alleging a "generalized grievance" shared by citizens at large over the claimed 
inconsistency of $ 5  67-429B and -429C with Article 111, Section 20. Plaintiffs' attempted end- 
run around a "generalized grievance" nevertheless raises substantial difficulties under the 
redressability prong of the standing test, since their asserted harm can be eliminated only by the 
SBT actually ceasing to operate tribal video gaming machines at the Fort Hall Casino. Even 
were it assumed for the sake of argument that this Court determined the machines authorized 
under 5 67-429B and operated by the SBT constitute gambling proscribed under Article ID, 
Section 20, such ruling would not terminate the challenged gaming at the SBT casino or 
elsewhere in Idaho. 
It is instead plain that the use of tribal video gaming machines on the SBT casino can be 
affected only through n~odification of the SBT's gaming compact. This Court, however, cannot 
provide that relief for both procedural and substantive reasons. Part I below addresses the 
procedural hurdle: The SBT and the other Idaho gaming tribes must be joined as defendants to 
provide effective relief to plaintiffs. Part I1 below addresses the substantive constraint: the 
Court lacks authority to effect such a modification given IGRA's and the SBT compact's 
comprehensive regulation of tribal gaming within the Fort Hall Reservation. 
0 2 5 
BRIEF n\T SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, Page 9 
I. THIS COURT CANNOT ENTER RELIEF REDRESSING PLAINTIFFS' 
ALLEGED INJURY IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GAMING TRIBES' JOINDER 
AS A DEFENDANT, AND SUCH JOINDER IS PRECLUDED BY THEIR 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Federally-acla~owledged indian tribes are immune from suit by Idaho or its citizens in 
any court absent their consent or congressional abrogation of that immunity. E.g., Kiowa Tribe 
v. Mfg. Techns., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); Olclahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tvibe, 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991). Plaintiffs have not named the SBT or the 
three other Idaho gaming tribes and, in light of tribal sovereign immunity, could not do so even if 
they so desired. They nonetheless seek relief that, to be effective, must adversely adjudicate the 
SBT's right to operate tribal video gaming machines under its compact. The issue accordingly 
becomes whether this Court may award such relief consistently with LR.C.P. 19's requirements 
concerning joinder of indispensable parties. 
Rule 19(a) is derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). Federal courts, whose 
decisions are given substantial weight in determining the Idaho rule's proper application,5 have 
adopted a three-step test to determine whether an absent party should be joined and, if so, 
whether the action should be permitted to continue when joinder is not feasible: 
Application of Rule 19 involves "three successive inquiries." [m First, the court 
must determine whether a nonparty should be joined under Rule 19(a). We and other 
courts use the term "necessary" to describe those "[plersons to [b]e [jloined if 
[fleasible." . . . [q If an absentee is a necessary party under Rule 19(a), the second stage 
is for the court to determine whether i t ' is  feasible to order that the absentee be 
joined. . . . [li] Finally, if joinder is not feasible, the court must determine at the third 
5 As the Supreme Cout explained in Chacon v. Speny Corp., 11 1 Idaho 270,723 P.2d 814 (1986): 
Part of the reason for adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Idaho, and interpreting our own 
mles adopted from the federal courts as uniformly as possible with the federal cases, was to establish a 
uilifonn practice and procedure in hoth the federal and state courts in the State of Idaho. We recently 
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence as the niles of evidence in Idaho in order to obtain uniformity in 
the trial practice in both the state and federal courts. Lack of uniformity ill the rules ofprocedure, as well 
as iules of evidence, creates problems for hoth the courts and the practitione1.s. These problems can be 
avoided by inte~eipreting our iules of civil procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon 
the same rules by the federal coults. 
1 l l Idaho at 275,723 P.2d at 819. 
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stage whether the case can proceed without the absentee, or whether the absentee is an 
"indispensable party" such that the action must be dismissed. . . . Rule 19 uses "the 
word 'indispensable' only in a conclusory sense, that is, a person is 'regarded as 
indispensable' when he cannot be made a party and, upon consideration of the factors 
[in Rule 19(b)], it is determined that in his absence it would be preferable to dismiss the 
action, rather than to retain it." 
Wilbur v. Loclce, 423 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation ~ m i t t e d ) . ~  Rule 19 issues 
frequently arise in connection with Indian tribes. E.g., YashenJco v. Hurrah's NC Casino Co., 
446 F.3d 541, 551-53 (4th Cir. 2006) (tribe was indispensable party in terminated employee's 
suit against casino management company); Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015 
(9th Cir. 2002) (tribe was indispensable party in suit challenging governor's authority to renew 
compacts); see generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Comparative Rights of Indispensable 
Sovereigns, 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 2 (2004-2005) (discussing application of Rule 19-related joinder 
where rights of Indian tribes may be affected). 
Wilbur and American Greyhound are particularly instructive concerning the proper 
application of Rule 19 under the circumstances here. The Wilbur plaintiffs sought to enjoin the 
Washington governor and various state revenue department officials from implementing a 
cigarette tax compact with a tribe on the ground that arrangement would violate the Indian 
Commerce Clause and various federal statutes. 423 F.3d at 1104-05. The Ninth Circuit had no 
difficulty concluding that the absent tribe was a necessary party, since it had a legally protected 
interest in the involved compact's benefits and since the plaintiffs were required to show "the 
illegality of the Compact in order to succeed on the merits of any of their claims." Id. at 11 12. 
Recognizing that the compact was contract~~al in nature, the court pointed to various decisions 
standing for the "'fundamental principle' that 'a party to a contract is necessary, and if not 
The present formulation of 1R.C.P. 19(a) includes as separate subparagraphs what is set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 
19(a) tluough (a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(l) is therefore identical to I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), but the 1-eferences in Wilbur to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) fu~d thek corolla~y in I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2). 
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susceptible to joinder, indispensable to litigation seeking to decimate that contract."' Id. at 1113. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that state officials could represent the tribe's interests 
adequately, noting that "the Tribe and the state have been adversaries in disputes over the subject 
of the [compact] in the past (indeed, resolution of a 'long-standing disagreement' regarding 
cigarette taxation was one of the purposes recited in the Compact's preamble)" and that "the state 
owes the Tribe no trust duty that might ensure vindicatio~l of the Tribe's interest." Id. To accept 
the plaintiffs' adequate-representation argument, the court added, would negate the "general rule" 
that all parties to a contract-there the tribal-state compacts-are necessary parties to an action 
whose a& is to compromise a contract in some material respect. Id. at 11 14. 
The Wilbur court turned then to the Rule 19(b) considerations and held the tribe 
indi~~ensable .~ It noted the obvious impairment of the tribe's interest if the compact were 
determined to be unlawful and the impossibility of shaping protective provisions in a judgment 
given the fact that plaintiffs "want nothing less than nullification of the Compact." 423 F.3d 
at 1114. The lack of any avaiIabIe shaping relief also canied with it the conclusion that an 
adequate judgment couldnot be entered because any decree would prejudice the tribe's interest in 
the compact's integrity. Only the fourth consideration-"whether [the plaintiffs] will have an 
adequate remedy if the action is dismissedu-weighed against an indispensability finding, but the 
court observed that "we have 'regularly held that the tribal interest in immunity overcomes the 
7 Rule 19(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., reads: 
When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be joined, the 
court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the 
existing parties or should be dismissed. The factors for the court to consider include: 
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might prejudice that person or the 
existing parties; 
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: (A) protective provisions in the 
judgnlent; (8) shaping the reiiee or (C) other measures; 
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence would be adequate; and 
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder. 
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lack of an alternative remedy or forum for the plaintiffs."' Id at 11 15. Finally, it rejected the 
plaintiffs' reliance on the "public rights exception," reasoning that the doctrine does not apply 
where the litigation could "destroy the legal entitlements of the absent parties." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs' claim sought precisely that result, since "[tjhe Tribe 
would lose valuable contractual benefits if the Compact was held invalid." 
While Wilbur involved a tax agreement, Amen'can Greyhound arose from a suit filed by 
racetrack operators challenging a statute that empowered the Arizona governor to negotiate new, 
or to extend existing, class IPI gaming compacts with various tribes "[njotwithstanding any other 
law." The district coua enjoined the governor from engaging in either action because, in its 
view, the state statute which authorized her to negotiate the compacts embodied an unlawful 
delegation of legislative power insofar as it exempted such compacts from compliance with other 
state statutory constraints on gambling. An?. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F.  Supp. 2d 
1012, 1066-67, 1069-72 (D. Ariz. 2001), rev'd, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002). The district coug 
further held that various types of "casino" gaming were unlawful under Arizona law. 
Id. at 1063-66. 
In reversing, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the substantive issues because it concluded 
that the absent tribes were necessary and indispeilsable parties under Rule 1.9. The court of 
appeals found that the tribes were necessary parties under Rule 19(a)(2)(i) because, as a practical 
matter, the relief entered by the lower court impeded the tribes' ability to protect their contracted- 
for compact interests; i.e., "[bjefore this litigation, the tribes had a riglit to renewal if the 
Governor was willing to leave tlie compacts in effect; after the litigation, termination was the 
only option." 305 F.3d at 1023. It added later: 
The district court's ruling that state law prohibits casino-type gaming, and its 
consequent ruling that such gaming by Indian tribes violates IGRA, present another 
0 2 9 
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problem. Although the district courl enjoined only the execution of futurecompacts or 
the extension of existing ones, its order amounts to a declaratory judgment that the 
present gaming conducted by the tribes is unlawful. It is true that the tribes are not 
bound by this ruling under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel because they 
are not parties, but their interests may well be affected as a practical matter by the 
judgment that its operations are illegal. . . . Tile sovereign power of the tribes to 
negotiate compacts is impaired by the ruling. . . . Moreover, enforcement authorities 
may consider themselves compelled to act against the tribes. 
Id. at 1024 (citations omitted). The court of appeals next addressed the Rule 19(b) factors and 
held that (1) the tribes would suffer "enormous" prejudice from the required compact 
terminations; (2) the prejudice could not ameliorated through remedial shaping; (3) any judgment 
in the tribes' absence would not be adequate from the plaintiffs' perspective unless it 
compromised tribal interests; and (4) the tribes' immunity from suit took precedence over the 
unavailability of any other forum for the plaintiffs' grievance in the event of dismissal. Id. at 
1025. It also found the plaintiffs' invocation of the public rights exception unavailing. Although 
recognizing that "[tlhe general subject of gaming may be of great public interest," the court 
deemed dispositive the fact that "[tlhe plaintiffs souglit th[e] injunction to avoid competitive 
harm to their own operations." Id. at 1026. "[Tlhe rights in issue between the plaintiffs in this 
case, the tribes and the state," in short, "are more private than pnblic." Id. 
Wilbur and American G~eyhound leave no doubt about the necessary and indispensable 
party status of not only the SBT but also the three other tribes whose compacts permit tribal 
video gaming machines. First, no legitimate question exists that the principal relief sought by 
plaintiffs-a declaration of $ 5  67-42913 and -429C's unconstitutionality and that the games 
actually operated by the SBT are in violation of the Idaho Constitution-could "as a practical 
matter" impair the tribes' contractual interest in offering such gaming. I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l). IGRA, 
as explained above, conditions Secretarial authority to approve a class 111 compact on its being 
"located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or 
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entity." 25 U.S.C. 5 2710(d)(l)(B); see, e.g., Rumsey Indian Rancheria v. Wilson, 41 F.3d 421, 
425 (9th Cir. 1994) ("where a state does not 'permit' gaming activities sought by a tribe, the tribe 
has no right to engage in these activities, and the state thus has no duty to negotiate with respect 
to them"), amended, 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994) and 99 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Coeur 
dxlene Tribe v. Idaho, 51 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curium). A detemiination that the 
gaming sanctioned under $ 67-429B is proscribed under Article 111, Section 20 thus could lead to 
controversy over the tribal video gaming now authorized under the various compacts. See Sun 
Pasqual Band of Mission Indians v. California, No. 06cv0988-LAB, 2007 WL 935578, at "1 1 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2007) (where one tribe sought determination concerning permissible number 
of gaming devices under a "model compact" provision largely identical to provisions in other 
model compacts, tribes signatory to model compacts were necessary parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
19(a)(l) because, inter alia, "a determination of the maximum number of licenses available 
.collectively to all the 1999 Compact tribes is uniformly applicable to all through a formula 
common to all those Con~pacts"); c j  Sruder v. Yerant, 964 P.2d 82, 90 W.M. 1998) (tribes were 
indispensable parties under state procedural rule identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 in action seeking 
to compel enforcement of state gambling prohibitions with respect to pre-compact tribal gaming; 
"[tlhis requested relief would halt the exchange of money upon which the tribes rely for business 
at their casinos"). The tribes have an obvious interest in any judicial proceeding that has as its 
goal declaring unconstitutional a voter initiative that not only sanctioned a form of gaming for 
their specific use and benefit but also has been serving that objective for years. 
Plaintiffs concede their intent to visit prejudice directly on the SBT, and indirectly on the 
remaining tribes, since it is only through cessation of the video gaming that their alleged interest 
in controlling compulsive "slot machine" gambling can be hrtllered. Necessary party status for 
03 1 
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the four tribes plainly exists. The State, moreover, would be exposed to a "substantial risk of 
incurring . . . inconsistent obligations" within the reach of I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l) because plaintiffs 
seek relief that would impose obligations on defendants which conflict with the Ninth Circuit's 
judgment authorizing the SBT to add tribal video gaming machines to its IGRA-sanctioned class 
111 gaming compact. The same risk of inconsistency exists as to the other tribes' gaming 
compacts, which are valid under IGRA now and would remain so regardless of how plaintiffs' 
claim is resolved. 
Second, any reasonable assessment of the four I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2) considerations requires 
the conclusion that the tribes are indispensable. The threshold consideration-the possibility of 
prejudice to the absent party-has been discussed and strongly counsels indispensability. There 
additionally appear no "protective measures" that could mitigate this prejudice; again, plaintiffs 
unabashedly seek to shut down video gaming at the Fort Hall Casino on grounds that would cast 
legal doubt on the identical gaming permitted under the north Idaho tribes' compacts. Any 
meaningful judgment rendered in plaintiffs' favor to address their purported injury would require 
the SBT to cease operating tribal video gaming machines; anything less leaves them in precisely 
the same practical position as they are now, i.e., living in proximity to allegedly available "slot 
machine" gaming. Here, absent the SBT's joinder, plaintiffs simply cannot secure a judgment 
that redresses their asserted injury-in-fact. See Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 553 ("any judgment 
entered without joining the Tribe would be inadequate because it would bind only Yashenko and 
Hanah's; the Tribe would remain l?ee to enforce the tribal preference policy on its reservation 
and through its contractual relations"). As is often the result where tribal immunity from suit is 
the basis for the infeasibility of joinder, plaintiffs may have no alternative forum, but the lack of 
one simply means that they must employ non-judicial means to control their claimed gambling 
032 
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compulsion. They are situated no diflerently in this respect than the complainants in Wilbur and 
Amevican Greyhound. 
Last, the public rights exception has no play here. Plaintiffs advance a sui generis theory 
of injury for the precise purpose of avoiding the "generalized grievance" characterization. But 
for their purported and quite individualized addiction to "slot machine" gambling, plaintiffs 
would not be before this Court. The complaint, therefore, should be dismissed under I.R.C.P. 
11. THIS COURT CANNOT GRANT PLAINTIFFS RELIEF AFFECTING THE 
FORT HALL CASINO'S OPERATIONS EVEN IF IT COULD PROCEED 
FORWARD WITHOUT THE IDAHO GAMING TRIBES AS PARTIES 
This Court lacks authority to enter the relief requested by plaintiffs even if the SBT and 
the other compacted Idaho tribes were not indispensable parties under I.R.C.P. 19: (1) IGRA 
preempts plaintiffs' request that defendants be compelled "to uphold and enforce Article 111, 3 20 
of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code $8 18-3808 and 18-3810" (Compl. Wherefore 1 3); 
(2) the exclusive process for addressing any disputes over gaming provided at the Fort Hall 
Casino is prescribed in Section 18.a of the SBT conlpact; and (3) the Court has no power to 
require the Governor to initiate the Section 18.a dispute resolution process. IGRA, in other 
words, fully occupies the field of gaming within Indian reservations and leaves to States and 
tribes determination of, inter alia, the types and conditions under which class III games may be 
offered and the methods by which disputes under tribal-state compacts are resolved. The SBT 
and Idaho have used that authority not only to authorize tribal video gaming machines under 
their conlpact but also to lay out quite specific processes for dispute resolution. Plaintiffs may 
not interpose themselves into a federal law-sanctioned sovereign-to-sovereign relationship either 
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through the relief actually sought in the complaint or, alternatively, through efforts to control 
gubernatorial discretion in administering the State's interests under the compact. 
A. IGRA's Preemptive Scope 
No factual dispute exists that the Fort Hall Casino is located within the Fort Hall 
Reservation set aside for the SBT's occupancy and that its operations are subject to regulation 
under IGRA. See Smith Aff., Ex. 4 at 8 2.h & j (SBT compact's definitions of, respectively, 
"gaming facility" and "Indian lands"). Relevant case law equally leaves no dispute that IGRA 
occupies the field of Indian lands-related gaming. The leading decision in this regard is Gaming 
Gorp. ofAmerica v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 544 (8th Cir. 1996). The Gaming Corp. 
litigation arose from various federal- and state-law claims by a casino management company that 
a law firm had engaged in improper conduct while representing a tribe in a license application 
process before a tribal gaming commission. The case began in state court but was removed to 
federal district court and then remanded back to state court after the federal claims were 
dismissed. 88 F.3d 539-41. The court of appeals reversed the remand order, agreeing with the 
defendant law firm that IGRA "completely preempts the field of Indian gaming regulation." Id. 
In so holding, the Gaming Corp. court examined "the text and structure of IGRA, its 
legislative history, and its jurisdictional framework" and reasoned that, absent agreement in the 
compact itself, no room existed for independent operation of state law: 
It is a long- and well-established principle of Federal-Indian law . . . that unless 
authorized by an act of Congress, the jurisdiction of State g o v e m e ~ ~ t s  and the 
application of state laws do not extend to Indian lands. . . . [y] The legislative history 
indicates that Congress did not intend to transfer any jurisdictional or regulatory power 
to the states by means of IGRA unless a tribe consented to such a transfer in a tribal- 
state compact. . . . [Y] Congress thus left states with no regulatory role over gaming 
except as expressly authorized by IGRA, and under it, the only inethod by which a state 
can apply its general civil laws to gaming is through a tribal-state compact. 
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88 F.3d at 545-46. The Eighth Circuit reiterated the complete-preemption rule several years later 
in Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999), where it 
explained that, in Gaming Corp., "[wle concluded that at least some of the [state law] claims 
were preempted because they potentially interfered with the Tribe's casino licensing process, a 
process mandated and regulated by the IGRA." Id. at 1108. The suit that was removed in Nixon 
stood on a different footing, since it was unclear whether the involved state-law claim-an action 
by the Missouni attorney general to enforce state statutes against a tribal Internet gaming 
operation-related to conduct not on Indian lands and thus not subject to IGRA. See id. ("[olur 
conclusion in [Gaining Corp.] that the IGRA preempted claims interfering with tribal gaming 
must be viewed in the context of an IGRA-regulated licensing of casino gaming that was 
indisputably conducted solely on Indian lands"). Other courts have reached the same conclusion 
with respect to state law-grounded claims that relate directly to the conduct of IGRA-sanctioned 
gaming. See CounQ) of Madera v. Picayune Rancheria of Chulcchansi Indians, 467 F .  Supp. 2d 
993, 997 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (state court has no jurisdiction to consider county's contention that 
casino did not comply with county environmental requirements because compact contained no 
provision for county's exercise of such authority).* 
Here, plaintiffs' professed goal is to eradicate a form of gaming authorized under the SBT 
compact. Compl. T/ 8.g. The holding in Gaming Covp. dictates that their request for a mandatory 
injunction compelling defendants to enforce Article 111, Section 20 and Idaho Code $ 5  i 8-3808 
Sracier v. Yerant, supra, does not support a different conclusion in a post-conlpact euviromlent. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court held there that IGRA did uot preempt state gambling statutes because, in relevairt part, "gaming 
compacts are the vehicles that give force to IGRA1s potential preemptive power." 964 P.2d at 88. "Without some 
clear manifestation of an intention to surrender jurisdictiol~ within its territorial jurisdiction, alleged vioIations of 
New Mexico law remain wiiilin this Court's control." Id. The Idaho Legislature, however, ratified the SBT 
conlpact. See Pt. I1 ilzfiu. The federal courts have held, moreover, that the compact expressly permits tribal video 
gaming machines, and, in any event, the State has no criminal jurisdiction under Section 17 with respect to the 
SBTS Haming activities. 
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and -3810 with respect to the use of tribal video gaming machines at the Fort Hall Casino falls 
squarely within IGRA's preemptive a~nbi t .~  Even if defendants had direct enforcement 
responsibility under $4 18-3808 and -3810-and they do not-this Court laclcs authority to direct 
them to exercise that authority as to IGRA-regulated gaming on the Fort Hall Reservation. State 
gaming law, in short, has no independent application to the tribal gaining operations. 
B. SBT Compact's Remedial Exclusivity 
On April 12, 2000, the Governor signed into law the Idaho Legislature's ratification of 
the Shoshone-Bannock Compact and waiver of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit in Federal Court regarding certain issues under the Compact. See 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 
220. Section 1 of that session law explained why the parties had not designated State court or 
Tribal court as fonuns to resolve issues of legality of games under the Compact: 
It is the strong public policy of the state of Idaho to forbid all forms of 
gambling, including casino-style gambling except a state lottery, pari-mutuel betting, 
and charitable bingo and raffle games. Nothing contained in this act can or should be 
construed in contravention of that policy. The tribes believe that they are entitled to 
conduct gaming operations beyond what the state believes is legally permissible. 
It is necessary to have a neutral judicial forum available to resolve these issues 
and to provide a framework for the resolution of future issues that may arise with 
respect to tribal gaming. To that end, the parties have agreed to resolve these legal 
disputes in federal court. The resolution of such disputes in federal court requires 
legislation authorizing the state to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit 
by the tribes in federal court. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes have agreed to adopt a 
tribal ordinance authorizing the waiver of their claims of sovereign immunity with 
respect to such disputes. [Emphasis added.] 
The compact, in turn, contains three provisions requiring arbitration or suit in federal court to 
resolve which gaming activities are permitted under state law or to resolve other compact-related 
9 Section 18-3808 directs '"elvery prosecuting or county attorney, sheriff, constable or police officer, [to] inform 
against and diligently [to] prosecute persons whom they have reasonable cause to believe offenders against the 
provisions of this chapter, and every such officer refusing or neglecting so to do is guilty of a misdemeanor.'' 
Section 18-3810 makes it a misdemeanor, with certain exceptions for antique slot machines, "for any person to use, 
possess, operate, keep, sell, or maintain for use or operation or otherwise, anywhere within the state of Idaho, ally 
slot machine of any sort or kind wl~atsoever." Section 67-429B(2) excludes tribal video gaming machines from tlle 
reacl~ of this provision 
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disputes. 
As a threshold matter, Section 6.b of the compact authorizes either or both the State and 
the SBT to file an initial declaratory judgment action in federal district court to resolve the 
parties' legal disputes about what games the SBT may lawfully operate. The parties employed 
that process to resolve the compact-amendment disagreement arising in the wake of Proposition 
One's passage. Next, Sectioll 6.c provides for arbitration or additional suit in federal court, if 
necessary, to impleme~it any decision arising from the initial declaratory judgment action. The 
fact that tribal video gaming machines are being operated at the Fort Hall Casino indicates that 
resort to the Section 6.c process proved unnecessary. Last, Section 18.a sets out a "General 
Dispute Resolution" process that "shall apply exclusively for the resolution of issues &sing 
under the provisions of this Compact." (Emphasis added.) The upshot is that when a dispute 
over the compact's application exists, the parties must engage in informal dispute resolution 
(Section 18.a(l)), and, to the extent necessary, arbitration (Section l8.a(2)) and federal court suit 
(Section 18.a(3)). 
Instantly, if the State desired to argue that the Tribal Gaming Initiative's authorization of 
tribal video gaming machines conflicted with Article 111, Section 20 and thereby affected the 
SBT's right to operate those machines at the Fort Hall Casino, the procedures in Section 18.a for 
informal dispute resolution, arbitration and federal court resolution provide the only remedy. 
The compact's process, again, is exclusive and recognizes no distinctions based on whether the 
dispute has a compact, statutory or constitutional source. The parties' choice of process is, as 
with other components of a tribal-state class I11 gaming compact, the product of IGRA-derived 
and -protected choice. IGRA accordingly provides that a tribal-state compact "may include 
provisions relating to . . . the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and 
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the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of . . . laws and regulations." 25 U.S.C. 
5 2710(d)(3)(C)(ii). After a compact has taken effect, in other words, state authority over tribal 
gaming is determined by the compact. See Hatcher v. Hurrah's NC Casino Co., L.L.C., 
565 S.E.2d 241, 243 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) ("Congress has expressly left certain questions of 
jurisdiction to be decided by the tribe and the state"). 
That the compact-derived procedure enjoys precisely the same insulation from state law 
jurisdiction as the claims at issue in Gaming Corp. is reflected in various federal and state court 
decisions. Examples include: 
e Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 154 P.3d 644, 654 (N.M. 2007) ( IGM authorized a 
tribe to consent to state court jurisdiction with respect to casino-related personal or property 
injuries; "instead of Congress allocating jurisdiction between the tribes and states, the compact 
provision allowed the tribes and the states to negotiate and decide for themselves the division of 
civil, criminal, and regulatory responsibility"). 
* Hatcher v. Hurrah's NC Casino Co., L.L.C., 610 S.E.2d 210, 214-15 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2005) (state court was bound by a compact's allocation of civil and criminal jurisdiction 
between the State and the tribe, and a state court lacked jurisdiction over a casino patron's claim 
of improper denial of winnings in the absence of a compact graz~t of authority). 
0 Kizis v. Morse Diesel Int'l, Inc., 794 A.2d 498, 503-06 (Conn. 2002) (where a 
compact with the tribe provided a mechanism to resolve tort claims arising out of tribal gaming 
facilities, a state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for such tort claims because the State 
had agreed that a tribal gaming disputes court would be the exclusive forum for such claims). 
Great W: Casinos, Inc. v. Morongo Band of Mission Indiaizs, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
828, 840-42 (Ct. App. 1999) (IGRA preempted former tribal casino manager's wronghl 
@38 
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termination suit against tribal gaming operations and deprived the state court of subject-matter 
jurisdiction). 
For present purposes, these decisions mean that the sole method available for adjudicating the 
types of gaming that may legally be offered at the Fort Ilall Casino is through Section 18.a 
processes. Plaintiffs' action here is not provided for under the Section 18.a process. 
C. Lack OfJudicial Authority To Enter Mandatory Injunctive Relief 
Plaintiffs' request that defendants be directed "to uphold and enforce Article 111, 4 20 of 
the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code 55 18-3808 and 18-3810" with respect to the use of tribal 
video gaming machines at the Fort Hall Casino asks this Court to require an action inconsistent 
with federal law for the reasons discussed in Past 1I.A. Direct application of those provisions to 
the casino operations is foreclosed by IGRA. Their request m e r  asks the C o w  to ignore the 
Ninth Circuit's determination that, since "[tJhe Coeur dJAlene, Icootenai, and the Nez Perce 
Tribes all legally operate tribal video gaming machines" by virtue of the authorization in $4 67- 
429B and -429C, the most-favored-nation provision in Section 24.d entitled the SBT to engage in 
the same form of gaming. SBT, 465 F.3d at 1098. Consequently, whether measured by its literal 
terms-which results in IGRA-based preemption-or with reference to IGRA's requirements as 
embodied in the SBT decision, the mandatory injunction relief sought by plaintiffs plainly is 
foreclosed. 
Although the mandatory injunctive relief as currently pled in the complaint is 
unavailable, the result here would not change even if plaintiffs had taken into account the 
limitations imposed by federal law on this Court's remedial authority. The exclusive process for 
the State to assert a dispute over the use of l~ibal video gaming machines, as explained above, 
lies in Section 18.a. The question thus becomes wlletller mandatory injunctive relief could issue 
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against the Governor compelling him to initiate that process for the purpose of modifying the 
compact. See Idaho Code 5 67-429A. lo  Under settled standards, such relief "will issue to a party 
who has a clear legal right to have an act performed if the officer against whom the writ is sought 
has a clear duty to act and if the act be ministerial and not require the exercise of discretion." 
Savier v. Richey, 96 Idaho 413, 415, 529 P.2d 1285, 1287 (1974)." The Supreme Court 
additionally has held that where a decision-maker possesses discretion, mandamus may be 
available in unusual circumstances-i.e., where it is shown both that "such abuse [is] clearly 
apparent" and that "'such officer. . . has so far departed from the line of his duty under the law 
that it can be said he has in fact so far abused such discretion that he has neglected or refused to 
exercise any discretion."' Kolp v. Bd. of Trustees, 102 Idaho 320, 323 n.l, 629 P.2d 1 153, 1156 
n.1 (1981). The Court thus stressed that "the standard of proof is high and this exception to the 
rule is severely limited." Id.; accord Rogers v. Goodingpub. .Jnt. Sch. Dist., 135 Idaho 480,483, 
20 P.3d 16, 19 (2001); Brady v. City ofHomedale, 130 Idaho 569,571-72,944 P.2d 704,706-07 
(1997). Here, even were this Court to determine that $5 67-429B and -429C conflict with Article 
111, Section 20, the Governor would have no clear, nondiscretionary duty to invoke the dispute 
I0 Neither the Secretary of Slate nor the Attomey General has any statutory duties relevant to compact-enforcement 
decisions. No relief, whether declaratory or injunctive in nature, may issue against them. 
" The Idaho Supreme Court does not appear to have reached the issue, but other courts recognize that where a court 
is asked to require a public officer or ageucy to perform a specific function for the purpose of altering the status quo, 
mandamus standards apply. See, e.g., AlliedSignal, hzc. v City ofPhoenix, 182 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1999); Or. 
NatumlRes. Council v Harrell, 52 F.3d 1499, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995); FaNini v. Ifonel, 783 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cis. 
1986); Naf? Wildlfe Fed'n v. UnitedStates, 626 F.2d 917,918 (D.C. Cis. 1980); see generally 43A CJS Injunctions 
5 4 (2002) ("[MJandamus, and not an injunction, is ordinarily the proper remedy where nothing is sought but the 
enforcement of a legal duty. Under some circumstances, however, a mandatory injunction will issue to compel the 
performance of a duty of this character if, for any reason, mandamus is not available. Thus, a mandatory injunction 
is equivalent to mandamus and governed by the same considerations") (footnotes omitted). The key consideration is 
whether the injunction seeks to restore or maintain the status quo or whether, as is the situation here, the 
complainant seeks to undo it. 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injuncfio~zs 5 6 (2004) ("While injunction is a remedy to restrain the 
doing of injurious acts or, in its mandatory form, to require the undoing of injurious acts and the restoration of the 
status quo, mandamus commands the performance of a particular duty that rests upon the defendant, or respondent, 
by operation of law or because of official status. . . . A court may nonetheless sometimes issue an injunction that is 
mandatory in form and that may be equivalent to, or more nearly approach, the common law writ of mandamus, 
such as when an injunction directs an officer or board to perfo~m an act required of the person or entity by law") 
(footnotes omitted). 
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resolution process in Section 18.a. Several considerations dictate that conclusion. 
First, regardless of how the merits of plaintiffs' claim are decided, under the SBT 
compact with the State, tribal video gaming machines are a lawful form of gambling at the Fort 
Hall Casino. The Secretary of Interior approved the compact under IGRh  in 2000, and the 
federal court litigation terminated with a judgment allowing the SBT to modify that agreement to 
include video gaming machines. This Court possesses no power to undo either the Secretarial 
approval-which is subject to challenge, if at all at this time, ollly pursuant to the judicial review 
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $ 701-706-or the Ninth Circuit 
judgment insofar as it established the legality of the tribal video gaming machines under the 
compact upon amendment. The Governor has no obligation to seek amendment of an otherwise 
lawful agreement. 
Second, a final judgment in the federal court litigation holds that tribal video gaming 
machines are a permissible form of gaming under the SBT compact. Res judicata in the form of 
federal-common-law claim preclusion would apply to any legal controversy between the State 
and the SBT over that issue because "the earlier suit: (1) reached a final judgment on the merits; 
(2) involved the same cause of action or claim; and (3) involved identical parties or privies." 
Leon v. IDXSystems Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2006). That the validity of the Tribal 
Gaming Initiative provisions under Article III, Section 20 was not an issue in the prior litigation 
makes no difference in this regard, since the "claim" in question was whether the SBT was 
entitled under the compact to offer 3 67-429B-authorized gaming. E.g., Sidney v. Zah, 71 8 F.2d 
1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1983); see genevally Restatement (Secondj of Judgments 3 25 (1982) 
("Having been defeated on the merits in one action, a plaintiff sometimes attempts another action 
seeking the same or approximately the same relief but adducing a different substantive law 
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premise or ground. This does not constitute the presentation of a new claim when the new 
premise or ground is related to the same transaction or series of transactions, and accordingly the 
second action should be held barred") 
Finally, there are public policy issues that must play an integral role in any determination 
to invoke the Section 18.a process and underscore the discretionary nature of the attendant 
decision-making. One issue stands out immediately. The Ninth Circuit relied on the most- 
favored-nation provision of the SBT compact for its holding. The unavoidable logic of its 
rationale is that, before seeking termination of tribal video gaming at the Fort Hall Casino, the 
State must first secure similar termination of such gaming by the Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai and 
Nez Perce Tribes. Not ~nly~significant legal difficulties exist in achieving that condition 
precedent, but very significant policy consequences-including disruption of settled economic 
expectations and planning premised on those expectations-also could play an important role in 
the Governor's decision. It is precisely these types of discretionary policy choices that have led 
the United States Supreme Court to reject, on prudential grounds, efforts to have ihe ledera1 
judiciary control prosecutorial or other statutory enforcement discretion. Heclcler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or 
criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion"); see also 
Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2001) (declining to review agency decision 
not to take enforcement action under the Clean Water Act because, inter alia, "[tJo leave 
enforcement decisions to the discretion of the Administrator is not to relieve the [Environmental 
Protection Agency] of its mission to achieve compliance with the Act; it simply means that the 
EPA must decide, within the limits set by Congress, the most effective way to accomplish the 
objectives of the Act as a whole"); Clementson v. Brock, 806 F.2d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986) 
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("[als a general rule, when an agency determines not to start enforcement proceedings, there is a 
presumption against judicial review of the decision"). The Governor is entitled to weigh the 
costs and likelihood of success of such suits and cannot be compelled by mandamus to order the 
pursuit of such suits. 
Under these circumstances, the prerequisites to issuance of a mandatory injunction are 
absent. Any decision concerning whether to seek modification of the SBT compact through the 
procedures in Section 18.a is unquestionably discretionary in nature, and a determination to leave 
otherwise legal gaming activities in place, particularly in light of years of litigation over and final 
federal court judgment concerning the permissible scope of those activities, can hardly be 
characterized as "depart[ing] from the line of.  . . duty under the law." 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted. 
DATED this 24th day of April 2008. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
MICHAEL S. GILMORE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Civil Litigation Division 
DAVID F. HENSLEY 
Counsel to the Governor 
Office of the Governor 
By: 
Deputy Attorney General 
Natural Resources Division 
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T. JASON WOOD, ESQ. Hand Delivery 
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IDAHO FALLS ID 83404 17 Statehouse Mail 
CLAY R. SMITI-I 
0 4 4 
BRIEF l[N SUPPORT OFDEFEhQANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, Page 28 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
STEVEN OLSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
MlKE GlLMORE 
ISB #1625; mike.gilmore~ag.idaho.gov 
CLAY R. SMITH 
ISB #6385; clav.smithiii),ag.idaho.gov 
Deputy Attorneys General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
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Attorney for Governor Otter 
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v. CLAY R. SMITH 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C. L. OTTER, ) 
Governor; BEN YSURSA, Secretary of 1 





I, CLAY R. SMITH, being of lawful age and first duly sworn, state as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLAY R. SMITH-Page 1 
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1. I am employed as a Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho. I am 
assigned to the Natural Resources Division of the Attorney General's Office and represent the 
defendants in this matter. 
2. Attached as Exhibits 1 through 5 are documents referred to in the Brief in Support 
of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed simultaneously with this affidavit. Each exhibit has been 
talcen from judicial records, is a true and accurate copy of the document that it purports to be, and 
contains facts subject to judicial notice under Idaho R. Evid. 20 1 (b). 
a. Exhibit 1: Affidavit of Miren E. Artiach dated February 18, 2004 (filed on 
February 20, 2004 in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. State oflduho et al., 
Nos. CIV 01-52-E-BLW & CIV 01-171-E-BLW (D. Idaho)). 
b. Exhibit 2: Order dated June 2, 2003 (filed In re Matter of the 
Petition/Action to Determine the Constitutionality Idaho Code Sections 
67-429B and 67-429C, Enacted in the Indian Gaming Initiative, 
Proposition One, No. 29226 (Idaho S. Ct.)). 
c. Exhibit 3: Order dated October 16, 2003 (filed in In re Matter of the  
Petition/Action to Determiize the Constitutionality Idaho Code Sections 
67-429B and 67-429C, Enucted in the l~zdian Gaming Initiative, 
Proposition One, No. 29226 (Idaho S. Ct.)). 
d. Exhibit 4: The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the State of Idaho Compact 
for Class I11 Gaming dated February 18, 2000 (filed on January 3 1,  200 1 
in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. State of Idaho el al., Nos. CIV 01-52-E- 
BLW & CIV 01-171-E-BLW (D. Idaho)). 
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e. Exhibit 5: Memoralldum Decision and Order dated April 9, 2004 (filed on 
April 12, 2004 in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v.  Slate ofldaho el al., Nos. 
CIV 01-52-E-BLW & CIV 01-171-E-BLW (D. Idaho)). 
This concludes my affidavit. 
DATEI) this 23rd day o f  April 2008. 
CLAY R. SMITH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Natural Resources Division 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 23rd day of April, 2008 
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CURT R. THOMSEN, ESQ. X U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
T. JASON WOOD, ESQ. U I-Iand Deiivcry 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC U Federal Express 
2635 CNAMVING WAY CI Facsimile: 208-522-1277 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404 U Statehouse Mail 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MIREN E. ARTIACH DATED FEBRUARY 18,2004 
(filed on February 20,2004 in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. State of 
Idaho et al., Nos. C N  01-52-E-BLW & CIV 01-171-E-BLW @. Idaho)) 
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JEREMY C. CHOu (ISB NO. 5680) 
Deputy Attorneys General 
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P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-00 10 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
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SHOSHONE-BANNOCK 1'RIBES; and 1 
the FORT HALL BUSINESS COUNCIL; ) 
and the SFJOSHONE-BANNOCK 'I'RTBAL ) 
CiAMWG COMMISSION, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
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*STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
1, Miren E. Artiach, being first duly sworn, depose and say: 
1. 1 am employed as a Dcputy Secretary of Stale for the Idaho Secretary of 
State's Office. 
2. Pursuant to Idaho Code 9 67429C(2), any tribe in the Statc of Idaho which 
wishes to anlend its cxisting state-tribal ganing compact must deliver to thc Secretary of 
State a tribal resofution signifying the tribe's acceptance of the ternis of the amendment. 
1 am the custodian of those records submitted to the Secretary of State's Office under 
Tdaho Code § 67-429C(2). 
3. A.ttached heroto are truc and correct copies of the following records in the 
Secretary of State's Office: 
n. Exhibit 1: November 6, 2002, letter &om Ernest L. Stensgar, 
Chairman, Coeur d'Alene Tribe, to idaho Sccretary of State with enclosed Coeur d'Aicne 
Tribe Rcsolutian 37-03 and Amendment to 1992 Class 111 Gaming Compacl By and 
Between the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and the State of Idaho. 
b. Exhibit 2: Novenlber 6 ,  2002, letter f?om Gary Aitkcn, Sr., 
Chairman, Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, to Idaho Secretary of Statc with cncloscd Kootcnai 
Tribc Resolution 03-03 and Amendment to 1993 Class I11 Gaming Compact By and 
Between the Koatenai Tribe of Idaho and the State of Idaho. 
c. Exhibit 3: November 6, 2002, Ielter from Samuel N. Pcnney, 
Chairman, Nez Pcrce Tribal Bxecutive Committee, to Idaho Sccretary of State with 
enclosed Nez Perce Tribe Resolution 95-595 Amended and Addendum to 1995 Class 111 
Gaming Compact By and Betwecn the Nez I'erce Tribe and the State ofldaho. 
l l l  
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This concludes my affidavit. 
&@& 
Miren E. Artiach 
mo this @ay of February, 2004. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MIREN E. AR'SLACIi - 3 052 
REFERENCE: 
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE 
0150 A STREW 
P.O. BOX 408 
PLUMMER. IDAFIO X3851 
(208) 686-1800 Fax (208) 686.1 182 
, . Idalla Secretary of State 
Slatchotrse, Room 203 
Boise, Ida110 83720-0080 
1 :  Cocur d'Alenc Trilpc's Amclldrnc~lt o 1092 CCss 111 Gaming Compact 
i'ltrsuani tu Proposiliun Onc 
snc]osed herewith i s  a copy of C!oucr d'Alene Tribe Resoiulion 37-03 and an Amebdnlent to ihc 
current 1992 Ciass 11'1 Gan~jng Com,pact By and Between the Coei~r d'Alane Tribe and the Stille 
of. Idaho, aimending the above-referenced ganting ~t>~llj>act in accordance with the terms us set 
Forth in  Section 4 of Proposition One, codified ns Idaho Code 67-429C, by the addition i.o the 
comnpact of a new section -, Article 6.8. 
The compact amcndment is deemed effective up011 ihc aulflorizcd sig~~amre hy the Cveur 
d ' ~ l e n e  Tribe which isafixed to i ke  Amendment and Resolution cnclosed. Pursuant to Idaho 
Code 67-429C(2) this ci>mpact arncildment adding a new section Arlicie 6.8 is deemcd effective 
i~ntnediately upon delivery of the cnclosed rcsolt~tion to the Secretaly of State. 
With this delivery, the terms and conditions of Idaho Code 67-429C are hereby mct and tile 
'Tribe's currel>t Ciass IIT (laming Compact is dcemed im~nediately amended by the addition of 
new,scction Article 6.8 and is deemed immediately approved by the State of Idaho pursuai~l to 
Idaho Code 67-429A. There is no need for any furtllcr signature or action by the executive or the 
legislative br~nchcs t~fstate government to effectuate ibis amendment. 
v 
Erncst I.. Stensgat 
Exhlbit 1 
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GAMlNG/CASXNQ 
APPROVINE AMENDMENT TO 
GAMING COMPACT AS PROVIDED 
BY PROPOSITlON ONE CDA RESOLUTEON 37(2003) 
6.8.3 Not withstanding any other provision ofthis compact, and to the extcnt 
such contributions are not already reauired under the tribe's existing 
comvacl. the ttibe anrees to contribute 5% ofits annual net  gamin^ income 
for the supoorf of local educational oroprams and schods on or near the 
reservation. The tribe may elect to contribute additional sums for tbesgs  
pther educational puxuoses. Disbursements of these funds shall be at the 
sole direction of the tribe. 
6.8.4 Nothwith~tandinr. anv other arovision of this compact. the tribe agreos not - 
to conduct aaminn outside of Indian lands; 
PROVlDED THAT, Proposition One, having been passed by a majority of the voters OF the State 
of Idaho is not hereinafter substantially amended or repealed; and 
BE IT FURTmR RESOLVED, that this Compact Amendment is deemed effective upon the 
signature by the Coeur d'klene Tribe on November 6, 2002, and approval by the Secretary of the 
Interior or her designated representative if necessary, as pursuant to Idaho Code 67-429C(2). 
There is no need for further signature or action by the executive or the legislative branches of 
state government to effectuate this Amendment. 
CERTIFICATION 
Thefore~oing resolution was adopted at a mooting ofthe Coeur d'Alene Tribal Council held at Tribal 
Administration Building, 850 A Street,. Piummer, Idaho on October 31, 2002, with the required 
quorum present by a vote of 6 FOR 0 AGAINST 0 ABSTAIN, 
@55 
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l'bc 1992 Class 111 Cirinling Co~~ipact Uy a~)'l I~C~WUCII  the Coeur d7Alenc l'ribc tuntl the 
Stalc of Idahu h & ~  kc11 approved for amc?ndmcnl by Idaho ballot memure i'ropositinn One, the 
Indian Gaming tnd Self-Rcliance Act, which received a majority of the votes in the November 5 ,  
2002 Idaho slale election. I'roposition Onc is the law of tho stale of Idaho, and as set forth in 
Section 4 of Proposition One and us codified at Idaho Code § 67-429C, the 1992 Class 111 
Gaming Compact By and Betweon the Cocur d'Alcne Trjbc and the State of Idaho is hereby 
anlendcd bv the addition of g n:w Article 6.8 as filows: 
Article 6.8 Gaming Machines Permitted; fi:mansion Limitation: Education Punditrg I 
6.8 1 Notwitfistandlnn my other provision of this compact, the tribe i s  pcrnlitted 
to conduct namina using tribal video machines as described in 
Section 67-429B, Idatlo Code. 
6.8.2 not withstand in^ any other nrovision of this compact. in the 10 years 
following incorooration of this term into its compact. the number of tribal 
video gaming machines thc tribe may possess is limited Lo the nurnbcr~f  
tribal vidw gaming machines nc)ssessed by the tribe as of Januam 1.200L 
plus 25% of that number: provided, however. thnt no increase in any.&& 
year shall exceed 5% of thc number as of January 1.2002- 
Thereafter, the tribc may operate such additional tribal video earning 
machines as arc agreed to ,,ursuant to good faith nepottations between the 
6.8.3 Notwithstanding anv other oyovision of this compact. and to the extent 
suc11 contributions arc not already reauired under the tribe's existing 1 
comnact, the tribe agrees to contribute 5% ofits annual pot rramina income 
for the sun~ori of local & i t ~ c ~ t i ~ ~ & ~  p g r a m s  and schools on or near Ole 
I 
reservation. The tribe may elect to contribute additional sums for these or 
other educational pumoses Di$bursemcnts of these funds shall be at the 
i 
-- - 
sole direction of the Gibe. 
6.8.4 Notwithstandinn any  herpr provision of this compact, the tribe agrees not 
to conduct mimine; outside of Indian lands; 
This Amendment is deemed eflective upon the signature by the Coeur d'Alcne Tribe, and 
approval by the Seorotn~ of the Interior or her designated representative. Pursuant to Idaho 
Code 67-429C(2) there is no need for further signature or action by the executive or the 
Iegislative branches of state govcrnmenk to effectuate this Amendment. 
Errlest L. Stnlsgnr 
Dated this &>lay of Novemhes, 2002. 
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November 6,2002 
Secretary of State 
Statehouse, Room 203 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0080 
RE: Kootenai Tribe of Idaho's Amendment to 1903 Class I l l  Gaming Compact 
Pursuant to Proposition One 
Dear Mr. Becreta~: 
Here is a copy of the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho's Resolution 03-03 adding an Amendmerlt 
to its 1893 Glass 111 Gaming Compsct with the State of Idaho. The amendment adds a 
new section, Article 6.8, to the compact in accordance with the terms of Section 4 of the 
- recently passed Proposition One. 
Siricerely, 
u 
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R E S O L U T I O N  
KQOTENAI 03-03 
WHEREAEi, the Kootenai Tribal Council has b w n  empowered to act far and on behalf 
oftbs Kootenai Tribe of ldaho pursuant to the Constitution and Bylsws ratified by the  
adult members of the Kootenai Tribe of ldaho on April 10, 1947 and spprovedlsigned 
by the acting commissioner of lnd~an Affairs on June 16, 1947; and 
WHEREAS, the Kootenei Tribe of ldaho has participated in tribal efforts l o  develop and 
promote proposition One, the Indian Gaming and Self-Reliance Initiative for inclusion 
on the November 5, 2002 ldaho general election ballot to clarify ldaho law regarding 
tribal gaming; and 
WHEREAS, Proposition One received a majority of the affirmative votes in the 
November 5, 2002 ldaho state election; 
WHEREAS, Proposition On.@ amends existing ldaho Code to confirm the right of tribes 
to use tribal video gaming machines as defined in ldaho Code 674288 and authorizes 
the Tribe to amend Its ID93 Class ill Gaming Compact By and Between the Kootenai 
Tribe and the State of ldaho pursuant to the terms of the initiative by tribal resolution 
submitted to the ldaho Secretary of State; 
NOW, THEREFORE BE iT RESOLVED, that the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho hereby 
amends its 1993 Class I l l  Gaming Compact pursuant to the terms set forth in Section 4 
of Proposition Qne, codified as ldaho Code @ 67-4296,-which shall thereafier become 
effective by operation of law, by adding to the compact a new section Article 6.8 as 
follows: 
Article 6.8 Tribal Video Gaming Machines: Expansian Limitation; Education Funding 
.I Not withstanding any other provision of this compact and as 
clarified by this compact amendment, the tribe is permitted to 
conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines as descFibed 
in Section 67-4298, ldaho Code. 
.2 Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, in the 7 0 
years following incoiporation of this t e n  into its compact, the 
number of tribal video gaming machines the tribe may possess is 
iirniied to the number of tribal video gaming machines possessed 
by the tribe as of January 1, 2002, plus 25% of that number; 
provided, however, that no increase in any single year shall exceed 
5% of the number possessed as of January I, 2002. Thereafter, 
the tribe may operate such additional tribal video gaming machines 
asare a g W  to pursuant to goad faith negotiations between the 
state and the tribe under a prudent business standard. 
Page 7 of 2 
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.3 Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, to the extent 
such contributions are not alrealJy required under the tribe's 
existing oompact, the  tribe agrees ta contribute 5% of its annual net 
gamipg income for t he  support of local educational programs and 
Schar;ils on or near the resenration. The tribe may elect to 
contribute additional sums for these or other educetionat pulposes 
Disbursemants of these funds shall be at the  sole discretion of t h e  
tribe. 
4 Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, the tribe 
agrees not to conduct gaming outside of Indian lends.; 
CERTIFICATION 1 
The Foregoing resolution was duly adopted at a Tribal Council meeting duly called, 
cangiiuted and held at the Kootenai Trjbal Complex, near Bonners Fany, Idaho on the 
3lst day of October, 2002; with t he  required quorum present by a vote of a for and 
2 against, and fiabstention. 
Kootenai Tribal Council 
ATTEST: 
Secretary, Tribal Council 
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AMENDMENT 
. , The Class Ill Gaming Compact By and Between the Koot.enai,Tribe of 
.Idaho end the State of ld3ho,, dated September 23, 1993 and approved pursuant 
to kdeml law by the @ppointed:'repreentative of the Assistapt Secretary, Indian 
AFairs. Department of the Ititerior, on October 29, 1993, is hereby amended. 
Idaho ballot measure Proposition One, the Indian Gaming and Self-Reliance Act, 
which tiaving received a majority tyf the votes in the November 5,2002 ldaho 
state election is the law of the state of Idaho. The terms set Forth in Section 4 of 
Proposifian One are now codified at Idaho Code 3 67-429C and create a new 
sedbn, Article 6.8, which is hereby added to the Cornpa& and states as follows: 
Article 6.8 Tribal Video Gaming Machines; Expansion Limitation; Education 
Funding 
.? Notwithstanding any other provision of this compact.and as 
clarified by this compact amendment, the tribe is permitted 
to conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines as 
described in Section 674296, ldaho Code. 
.2 Not withstanding any other provision af this compact, in the 
10 years following incorporation of this t e n  into its compact, 
the number of tribal video gaming machings the tribe may 
possess is limited to the number of tribal, video gaming 
machines possessed by the tribe as of January 1,2002, plus 
25% of that number: provided, however, that no increase in 
any single year shall exceed 8% of the number possessed 
as of January . , \. I ,  2002. Thereafter, the tribe may operate 
such additional tribal vidso gaming machines,.ss.are agreed 
to pursuant to gaod faith negotiations between the state and 
the tribe under a prudent business standard. 
.3  N i t  withstanding any other provision of this compact, to the 
extent such contributions are not already required under the 
tribe's existing compact, the tribe agrees to contribute 5% of 
its annual net gaming income for the support of local 
educational programs and schools onor near the 
resewation. The tribe marelect to contribute additional 
$urns for these or other educational purposes. 
Disbursements of these funds shall be at the sole direction 
of the'tribe. 
.4 Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, the 
tribe agrees not to conduct gaming outside of Indian lands. 
Exhiblt 2 
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, , . .. This Am@r?drnsnt is effective upon the apprcyal by tle Secretary of the 
Interior or herdesignated representative. Pursuant to ldaho Code 6714?9C(2) 
. . .. there is no need for fuither signature or action b y  the executive or the legislative 
branches of state government to effectuate this Amendment. 
KOOTENAI TRIBE OF iDANO 
Gary  itk ken, Sr., Chairman 
Dated this @ day of Novamber 2002. 
Amendment to Class I l l  Gaming Compact 
Kootenai Tribe of IdahofSCate of ldaho - 2 
Exhlbit 2 
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NP 75-59!? 
Amended 
WHEREAS, the Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committse hos been empowered to act for and 
on behalf of the Nez Farce Tribe pursuant to ?he Revised Constitution ond By-Lows, 
adopted by the General Council of the Nez Perce Tribe, on May 6, 196 1 and approved 
by the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs on June 27, 1961; and 
WHEREAS, &oposition One, the Indian Gaming and Self-Reliance, has received a 
majority bf the affirmative votes in fhe November 5, 2002 ldaho hate 
election; and I 
WHEREAS, Proposition One automaticaJly amends existing ldaho Code~o  authorize the 
use of tribal video gaming machines as defined in Idaho Code 67-4298 
and authorizes 1.h~ Nez Perce Tribe to amend its current 1995 Class Ill 
Gaming Compact By and Between the Nez Perce Tribe and the State of 
ldaho by Tribal Resolution submitted to the Idaho Secretary of State; I 
NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, fhat the Ner Perce Tribal Executive Committee 
(NPTECJ hereby amends its 1995 Class 111  ami in^ Compact pursuant to the 
terms as set forth in Sedion 4 of Proposition One codified as Idaho Code 
5 67-429C, by the oddition to the compad of the new section Ariicle 6.4 
'as follows: 
Article 6.4 Tribal Video Gaming Machines; Expansion Limitation; Education Funding 
. I  Not withstanding any other provision of this compad and as clarified 
by this cornpod amendment, the tribe is permitted to conduct gaming 
using tribal video gaming machines as described in Section 
67-1295, ldaho Code. 
.2 Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, in the 10 years 
f~llwwing incorporation of this term into its compact, fhe number of 
tribal video gaming machines the tribe may possess is limited to the 
number of tribal video gaming machines possessed by the tribe as of 
January 1,2002, plus 25% of that number; provided, however, that 
no increase in ony single year shall exceed 5% of the number 
possessed as of January I ,  2002. Thereafter, the tribe may operate 
such odditional tribal video gaming mochines as are agreed to 
pursuant to good faith negotiations between the state and the tribe 
under a prudent business standard. 
Page 1 of 2 
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NP 95.595 
Amended I 
.3 Not witllstanding any other provision of this compact, to the extent 
such ~ontributions are not uiready required under ihe tribe's existing 
compact, the tribe agrees to contribute 5% of its annuol net gaming 
income forthe support of local educational programs and schools on 
ar near the reservation. The tribe may elect to contribute addirional 
sums forthese or other educational purposes. Disbursements of these 
funds shall be at the sole direction of the tribe. 
.4 Not withstanding any other provision of this compacf, the tribe agrees 
not to conduct gaming outside of Indian lands,; I 
PROVIDED THAT, Proposition One, having been passed by a majority of the voten of the 
State of Idaho is not hereinafter sub~antially amended or repealed; and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, fhat this Compad Amendment is  deemed effective upon the 
signature by the Nez Perce Tribe on November 6,2002, and approval by 
the Secretary of the Interior or her designated representotive if necessary, as 
pursuant to ldoho Code 67-429C(2) there is no need for further signature 
or action by the execufive or the legislative branches of stote government to 
effectuate ?his Amendment. 
C E R T I F I C A T I O N  
The foregoing resolution was duly adopted by the Nez Perce Tribal Execufive Committee 
meeting in Special Session, October 22,2002, at the Richard A. Halfmoon 




A. ~avis-whdelar, Secretary 
ATTEST: 
xYi2Lm-w 
Samuei N. Pennay, cha iAun 
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The 1995 Class IT1 Gaming Conijact By and fietween the Nez Pcrce Tribe and the Statc 
of Idaho, on August 22, 1995, find approved by Ada E. Deer, Ashistairt Secretary of Indian 
Affairs, Depnrtment of tile Interior, on October 20,1995, and amended onDecember L2, 1998, i s  
hereby amdnd& by Idaho bgllot mcasure Proposition One, thc'111dian Ganling and Self-Rcliancc 
AG~,  whicli b&ing rcceived a majority of the votes in the November 5,2002 Idaho state eiecliun 
is the law ofthe statc oflcieho, us set forth in Section 4 ofPraposition One as codified at Idaho 
Code 5 67-429C, by thcatldition of n new conlpact section Article 6.4 as follows: 
Articie 6.4 Tribal Vidco Ca~ning Machines; Expansion Limitation; Education Funding 
.1 Not withstanding any other provisioil of this compact and as clarified by 
[hi:, compact amcndmcnt, tile tribeis permitted to conduct gan~ing using 
tribal video garning tllflchincs as described in Section 67429B, Idaho 
Code. 
.2 Not withstanding any other provision of tl~is compact, in the I0 years 
following i~~corporatioti of illis tcrm into itr, compact, the number of  tribal 
video gaming ~nachin~a the ttibe may possess is limited to tilo number of 
tribal video gatning machines possessed by the tribe as of January 1,  2002, 
plus 25% of that nunlber; provided, however, that no increasc in any 
single year shall exceed 5% of the number possessed as of January 1, 
2002. Tilereafter, thc tribe may opcrate such additional tribal, video 
gsming machinks as are agrcerl lo pursuant to good faith negotiations 
between the statc and the tribe under a p~udent business standard, 
.3 Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, to the extcnt such 
contributions are not already required under the tribe's existing conlpact, 
the.trih..agrees Lo contribute 5% of its annual net gaming incallle for the 
support of local educational programs and schools on or near the 
reservation. The tribe may elcct lo contribute additional sums for these or 
other educatiohal pitrposes. Disbursements of these funds shall be at the 
sole direction of the tribe. 
.4 Not withstanding any other provision of this compact, the tribe agrees not 
to conduct gaming outside o.f Indian lands. 
This Amendrnenf i s  deemed effective upon the signature by the Nez Force Tribc, and 
approval by the Secretary of fhe Interior or her designated representative. Pursuant to Idaho 
Code 67429C(2) there is no nced for furil~er signature or action by tile executive or the 
legislative branches of state government to effectuate this Amendment, 
NEZ PERCE TIUBE 
Datcd this ,&' ddeyof l.iovember, 2002, 
Exhibit 3 
CERTIEIC TE OF SERVICE 
1 HCKERY CERTI~Y that on thls A. U% ay o I' February, 2004, I caused to be served a m e  
md coneot copy of thc foregotng by the folollowb~lg method to: 
Brtlndellc Whitworth @ U.S. Mail 
Office ol'Reservation Attorney C] Hnrtd Delivery 
Shoshone-Bm~ock Tribes a Cerhfied Mail, Return Recwpt Requested 
PO Box 306 C] Ovemigl?: M&l 
Port Hall, 11) 83203 Facsimile: (208) 239-9276 
Scott D. Crowell 
Crowell Law Offices 
1670 10th Strcet West 
Kirkland, WA 98033 
@ US. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Rcquesled 
Overnight Mail 
153 Facsunile: (425) 828 9978 
Conly J. Schulte U.S. Mail 
Montcau, Peebles and Crowell C] Hand Delivery 
12100 West Center Road, Suile 202 Certified Mail, Rctuni Receipt Reqiiestcd 
Omaha, NE 68 144-3960 Oveniigllt Mail 
@ Facsimile: (402) 333-4761 
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The Petitioners have filed a petitionlaction asking this Court to exercise original 
jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of Idaho Code $9 67-429B 
and 67-429~. The Petitioners assert several grounds upon which they contend that this Court has 
original jurisdiction to hear their petition. 
First, they contend that this Court has original jurisdiction based upon that portion of 
Idaho Code 9 34-1 809 that provides: "Any qualified elector of the state of Idaho may, at any 
time after the attorney general has issued a certificate of review, bring an action in the Supreme 
Court to determine the constitutionality of any initiative." This Court's original jurisdiction is 
set forth in the Constitution. The legislature has no power to extend this Court's original 
jurisdiction. Neil v. Public Utilities Comm 'n, 32 Idaho 44, 178 P. 271 (1919). The Petitioners 
contend, however, that pursuant to Article JII, 9 1, of the Idaho Constitution, the legislature has 
the power to grant this Court original jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of initiatives. 
The portion of Article DI, $ 1, upon which the Petitioners rely states that "legal voters 
may, under such conditions and in such manner as may be provided by acts of the legislature, 
initiate any desired legislation and cause the same to be submitted to the vote of the people at a 
general election for their approval or rejection." They contend that this provision authorizes the 
legislature to grant original jurisdiction to this court in matters regarding initiatives. There is 
absolutely nothing in the wording of this provision that could reasonably be so construed. It 
merely authorizes the legislatxre to determine the conditions and manner in which the voters may 
exercise the power to propose laws by the initiative process. 
The Petitioners next contend that this Court has original jurisdiction to hear their petition 
pursuanl to that portion of Article V, $ 9, of the Idaho Constitution, which provides: "The 
Supreme Court shall also have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, 
prohibition, and habeas corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its 
appellate jurisdiction." They argue that by their petition they are requesting a writ of prohibition. 
A writ of prohibition "arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or 
person, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of  such tribunal, 
corporation, board or person." h o  CODE $ 7-401 (1998). The Petitioners seek a declaration 
that Idaho Code $ 5  67-429B and 67-429C are unconstitutional. They are not seelcing to arrest 
the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person. 
The Petitioners next contend that this Court has original jurisdiction under the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgment Act. This Court has jurisdiction to grant a summary judgment only in 
connection with the proper exercise of its original jurisdiction as granted by the Constitution. 
See Mead v. Amell, 117 Idaho 660,791 P.2d 410 (1990). We do not have original jurisdiction to 
hear actions seeking a declaratory judgment that are unconnected with our jurisdiction under 
Article V, 5 9, "to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus." 
Finally, Petitioners contend that this Court has original jurisdiction to hear this 
declaratoryjudgment action pursuant to Article V, $2,  of the Idaho Constitution, which 
provides: "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a court for the trial of 
impeachments, a Supreme Court, district courts, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme 
Court as established by the legislature." It is $$ 9 and 10 of Article V, however, which define 
this Court's original jurisdiction. Dewey v. Schreiber Implement Co., 12 Idaho 280, 85 P. 921 
(1906). Indeed, if 6 2 were construed to provide that this Court has original jurisdiction in all 
cases, then $ 3  9 and 10 would be superfluous. Under neither section do we have original 
jurisdiction to hear the Petitioners' petitionlaction. Therefore, after due consideration, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitionlaction to determine the constitutionality of 
ldaho Code 5 3  67-429B and 67-429C, enacted in the Indian Gaming liutiative, Proposition One, 
be, and hereby is, DISMlSSED without prejudice because this Court does not have original 
jurisdiction to decide the matter. 
DATED this z & d a y  o 2003. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
ATTEST: 
I, .Stephen W. ,~e,nyon, C le l~ ;~ f :~~~upmme. .&ur t  
of the Slate of Idaho, do hereby certify Met the 
above is a true and conwt copy of t h e - f k k ~  
entered in €he. above entitled cause and .now on 
cc: Counsel of Record record in my offim. 
YlTNESS my hand and the Seal of this ~ w r t L C I ~ o g  
4: -k&dAkh- *% Deputy 
EXHIBIT 3 
ORDER DATED OCTOBER 16,2003 
(filed in In re Matter of the Petition/Action to Determine the 
Constitutionality Idaho Code Sections 67-429B and 67-429C, Enacted in 
the Indian Gaming Initiative, Proposition One, No. 29226 (Idaho S. Ct.)) 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION1 
ACTION TO DETERMINE!. THE 
CONSTITUTIONALlTY OF IDAHO CODE ) 
SECTIONS 67-429B AND 67-429C, 
ENACTED EY THE INDIAN GAMING 1 
LNITIATIVE, PROPOSITION ONE. 
.......................................................... ? 
MAXWE T. BELL; el al., ORDER DENYING PETITION 
1 FOR REElEARING 
Petitioners, 1 
) NO. 29226 
v. 1 Ref. No. 03RH-25 
1 
PETE T. CENARRUSA, in his capacity as Idaho 1 
Secretary of State, et al., 
) I, Stephen W. Xenyon, Clerk of the Supreme ~ & r l  
) of the State of Idaho, .&,.hireby certify that the 
Respondents, ) above i6.a true and c ~ & , ~ o p i  of the- 
) entered in t h e , a h  entitled",mu@ and now on 
word in myoffice, and. 
) ;~/~R&Ess myhand end m.Ssal.of *ls !Ajtrt!&!oog 1 
BRUCE NEWCOMB and ROBERT L. STEPHEN fff. KENYON 
GEDDES, ) Clerk. 
? 
Intervenors. BY: .. , %uaw 
-il 
On June 2, 2003 the Court issued an ORDER dismisskg the PETITIONIACTION T6 . 
DETERMINE T m  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IDAHO CODE SECTIONS 67-429B AND 
67-429C, ENACTED IN THf? INDIAN GAMING INITKTIVE, PROPOSITION ONE without 
prejudice because this Court does not have original jurisdiction to decide the matter. The 
petitioners filed a PETITION FOR REHEARING and supporting BR.IEF on  June 19, 2003 and 
the Intervenors filed a BRIEF EY SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING August 15, 
2003. The Court is fully advised; therefore, after due consideration, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's PETITION FOR REHEARING be, a id  
hereby is, DENIED. 
DATED this /bG day of October 2003. 
0 7 2 cc: Counsel of Record 
.,. 
EXHIBIT 4 
SHOSHONE-BAiVNOCK TRIBES AND THII STATE OF IDANO 
COMPACT FOR CLASS m GAMING DATED FEBRUARY 18,2000 
(filed on January 31,2001 in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. State ofIdaho 
et al., Nos. C N  01-52-E-BLW & CIV 01-171-E-BLW @. Idaho)) 
THE SHOSHONE-BAMNQCK TRIBES 
and the 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COMPACT FOR CLASS III GAMING 
TILlS TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT made and en:nlered into by and hetween the 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes (Itereinafter the "Tribes"). a federally recognized Indian Tribe. 
arid the State of Idaho (hereinaficr the "State") pursuant to the provisions of the indim 
Ciaming Regulatory Act (hereinafter the ",Aci"). Pub. L. 100-497. 25 I.I.S.C. 5s 1701. cr 
scq.. and 18 U.S.C. $8 1166-1 168. 
I, Titie 
'This document shall be rererred to as "'The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the 
Stale ol'ldaho Compact for Class III Gaming." 
7 . Definitions 
For purposes of this Compact: 
a. "Act" menns the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Pub. L. 100-497. 35 
I.I.S.C. $$2701.~.iseq..and I S  U.S.C. $9 1166-1168. 
b. "Business Council" means the Forr Kall Business Council. which is the 
elecled governing body of'the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. 
c. "Class 111 gaming" rneans all forms of gaming set Sorth in Sections 4 and 5 
of this Compact tha~ a x  nor Cltlss I or Class II as defined in Seclions 4(6) and 4(7) of the 
Act. 25 U.S.C. Ef: 3703(6) and (71. 
d. "Compact" mcms the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the Slate o f  ldaho 
Cornpacr for Class I1J Gaming. 
e. "Distribuior" means n person who distributes my machines or devices of 
my kind used for any gaming activity in the gaining facility. 
A 
i: "Finding ol'r;uitabili~)~" mans  an approval gmled to a person or enterprise 
directly or indiroctiy involved with the gaming operation and rclates only to Lhe specified 
involvemenr for which it  was made, if  tile nature OF the involvement changes Sro~n that 
for which the applicant is found suitable. the Tribal Gaming Azency may require the 
person or enterprise to submit for a determination of suitability in the new capacity. 
f. "Gaming employee" means my person employed in the operation or 
management of' the gaming operation. whether employad by the Tribes or by any 
cntcrprise providing onsite services to the Tribes within tbc gaming facility. 
)I. "Gaming facility" or "gaming facilities'. means the land togelher with all 
buildjngs, improvements and facilities used or maintained in connection with Ll~e conduct 
of CIass I11 gaming on Indian 1,ands as provided by this Compuct. 
I .  "Gaming operation" lneans the Tribes' operation of Class 111 gaming in my 
gaming facility. 
.I "Indian Lands" metins thost: kinds within the Tribts' jurisdictional limits 
that meet the definition ol' "lndian lands" as defined in  the Indian Omin_rReguiauor~, 
Act. 
k. "License" inems an approval or certifica~ion isstled by the Tribal Caning 
Conmnission ro my person or enrity involved in the gaming operntjon or in the providing 
of gltming services to the gaming operation. 
1. "Licensee" means any person or enxity who has been approved, licensed, 
certified or found suitable by the Tribal Gilmlng Co~lunission to he involved in the 
gaming operation or in the providing of gaming services in the gaming operation. 
m. "Net gaming revenue" means gross revenues of an Indian gaming activity 
less arnounts paid out as. or paid for. prizes and rota1 operating expenses, cxcluding 
management fees. 
n. "NIGC" means the National Indian Gaming ~omnission estilblisl~ed 
pursuant to 15 IJ.5.C. $8 7704. 
P- /-,, 
1 , > : 
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0. "Ordinance" meacts the ordinance adopted by the 'Tribes and approved by 
the NICK. 
P- "Srate" means the Slate oi' Idaho. irs authorized officials, iigents and 
representatives. 
4. "Stake Gaming Agency" incans the Idaho agency desipated by the State by 
wriaen norice to the Tribes as the singe stare agency primarily responsible fbr fulfilling 
the obligations of this Compact. 
r. "Tribal Gaming Cornmission" nleans rhe agency of the Tribes primarily 
rcsponsiblc For regulnlory oversight of Clws 111 gunins. 
S. "Tribal law enforcement agency" ~ n w n s  the police Sorce of the Tribes. 
es~ahlished and tnaintained by tile Tribes. pursuant to the Tribes' powers of selfr 
government. to camJ out law enforcetnent on India11 Lands. - 
t. "Tribes" or "Tribal" means of or stemming from the Shoshone-Bmnock 
Tdbes. its authorized officials. agents and representatives acting on the Tribes' behalf' 
pursuant to Trihnilnw. 
3. Recitals 
n. WI-TEREAS. the Trihcs and the State recognize and respect the laws and 
authorin, oftlie re:spcctive parties: and 
b. WIEREAS. it  is the intent of the Tribes and the State thal the provisions of 
this Compact, including but riot limited to the resolution process outiined hErein: apply to 
and control only the issues arising from the terns md provisions of this Compact.. 
h. WXEREAS, the Congress of the United States has enacted into law thc Act. 
Pub. 1. 100-497. 25 U.S.C* ji$ 1701. at seq., rtnd 18 L1.S.C. $ 8  1366-3 168. which 
provides in part that o iribal slate compact may be negotiated herween n tribe and a state 
to govern the conduct of certain Class III gaming actjvjties on Indian Lands of tribes 
within the stale: and 
c. WHEREAS. tile Tribes and the State have negotialtd the fenns and 
condirions of this Compacl in good faith so as to provide fi)r mutual governmental 
purposes and to provide a regulatory framework for rbc operation of certain Class I11 
aming. ~vhicl, is iniended to: la) ensure !he fair and honest opem1:ion of such gaming . 
acrivities: (h) maintain the intepjry of all activities conducted in regard to such gaming 
octivilies: (c) prevent unsavory and unsuitable persons from having any direcr or indirect 
involvomcnt with gaming activities at any time or in any capacity; (d)  establish and 
~naintain responsible accounting practices and procedures: (e) maintain effefec~ive control 
over the financial practices rclated 1 0  gaming aciivities. including cstahlishing the 
minimum procedures for internal fiscal arfairs and thc saleparding of assets and 
revenues and reliable recorctkeeping: (f) prevent cheating and fraudulent practices: and 
(g) pwecr ihc llealth. welfare and safety of the citizens of the Trlbcs and ofthc State: and 
d. WHEREAS. the Act provides that an indian tribe may co~lduct Class III 
~a in ing  us provided in IGRA: and 
e. WHEREAS. the Shoshone-Bannock Tr ib~s  and tile State of Idaho have 
mutually agreed tf~at the conduct of Class )I1 gaming under the terms and conditions set 
forth hclvw will benefit the Tribes and protecl the citizens of the 'I'ribes and o f  the Stale 
consist en^ with the objectives ofthe Act: and 
i: WHEREAS. the parties hereto deem it to be in hei r  respective best 
intcreuzs to enler into this Compact; and 
E. WHEREAS. a principal goal of i'ederal Indian polic): is to promote tribal - 
economic developmenr, tribal selEdetermination and a strong government to government 
relationship: and 
I WHEREAS. the State recognizes the Tribes' sovereign rights to control 
naming activities on hdian Lands as provided by the Act and this Compact: and e 
i .  WI-IEREAS. i t  is t l~e  policy ofthe Tribes to exercise and retain its ridlts to 
regulate gaming acrivi~ies upon its lands and reservation fbr the purposes ol'enco~*raging 
. . . . . . 
r" . r'\ .. , . . . '  LI 
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Tribal employment, economic and social development. and finding csS Tribal .services 
while cnsuring the fair and lawful operation of gaming and the prevenrion of conypt and 
criminal influences. 'I'he 'I'ribes will utilize net revcnues generated by gaming to h n d  
progains that provide in~portanl governmental serviccs to 'Tribal members and reservntion 
residents. These progams include education. health and human resources. housing 
development, road construction and maintenance. sewer and water prqjects. police. fire. 
,judicial services. economic dcvelopmen~. and any other purpose authorized under the Act; 
and 
j ,  WHEREAS. il is a sml ofthis Cotnpaa that positive ccoi~oinic effects of' 
such gaming will extend beyond lndian 1,ands to the 'Tribes' neighbors and surrounding 
corninunities and help lo foster mutual respect and undersrandjng among Indians and non- 
Indians: and 
k. WHEREAS, this Compact shall govern the licensing. regulation and 
operation of Class 111 gaming conducted by the Tribes on Indian Lmds located within the 
State: and 
I .  WHEREAS. the State and ihc Tribes are empowered to  enter into this 
Comp~ict due to their inherent power lo contract and pursuant to tile lndian Gaming 
Regulatory Act: iuld 
m. WIGIEAS. il is also understood that prior to hecoming eflective the State 
shall obtain legislative authorization LO wtive its immunity as provided under the 
Elevventh Amendment of' the United States Consrirtition and the Tribes sllall obtain 
authorization ;o waive their sovereign immunity. The signatories will certify that this 
authorizalion has been obtained: and 
n. WI-JEREAS. the parties have heen unable to a g e e  upon the types of Class 
Ill games permitted hy the Act to be pitdyed by the Tribes: and 
o. WFfEXEAS. The Stare takes the position that the Indian Gaming Replatory 
.4ci au1horiz.e~ Class TI1 gaming acriviries on Indian Lands only if such activities are 
/%, r., , . , " .< I 
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provided for in a compact such as lhis and if other persons or enrities in rhe Stctte of ldaho 
are pennittod by state law to engage in sucll activities. Accordingly, the only rribai Clws 
111 gamjng activilies that are legal in Idaho under federal law are those Class III gaming 
activilies permitted by article 3. secljon 30 of'the ldaho Constitution and not otherwise 
conrrary to the cri~ninal laws of the State of Idaho. Therefore. pursuant to federal law. 
. tribal Class 111 gaming in idaho i s  contrary to public poiicy and is strictly prohibited 
excepl lbr a lottcy. pari-mutual betting and bingo or raffle games conducted in 
confonniry with enabling iegislarion. Furthermore. no gaming activity shall employ any 
I'orm of casino gambling includii-rg. but not limited to. blackjack. craps. roulene, poker, 
baccarilr. keno and slot machines, or employ m y  elecrronic or clecuomechanic~rll 
imitation or simula~ion of any fbnn of casino gambling: and 
p. WHEREAS, il is the position of the Stale that the electronic gaming 
currently conducted by the Tribes in Idaho is an imitatiol, of casino games and prohibited 
h?~  id&o and federal law: and 
q. WEREAS, the Tribes ~ a k e  ihe position that under f'ederal law. the Tribes 
are enritled to offer any gaming activily thal is otherwise permitted by any person. 
orgniza~ion. or entity for any purpose. 'Given the range and scope of gaming aclivities. 
wirh tin emphasis on a multi-faceted state-sponsored entity? thc State of idaho cannot 
establish [hat any gaming activity, properly regulated to ensure the in~egi ty  of the game 
and proioct the gilll~ing patron. contravenes the State of Idaho's public policy for gaming. 
Further. in light of~rilditjonal understandings of the context and legislative history of AcL 
the State cannot establish t h a ~  i t  bns reasonably characterized the relevant state laws as 
completely prohibiting a distincl form of gaming. Accordingly; the Tribes are entitled to 
offer and regulate all Ibnns of gaming except sports-betting; and 
r. WEEREAS, the Tribes take the ultemative position that if the State does 
establish that it has inw the above-stared burden through the application of the ldaho State 
Consritulion. article 3. section 20, the Tribes are entitled to offer electronic facsimiles of 
. . . . (p. .\ . . . . , * < "?>, 
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any lotten; game which can be reasonably defined us gaming owned and operated by 
government entities. or as games w11erei11 the c;tate/owner docs not have n stake in the 
outcome ofthe g m e  of chance; and 
s. WHEREAS, both the Tribes and the State acknowledge that these are legal 
jssues thal should he resolved. Xn recopirion of this. the Tribes and the S~ate  a p e  in 
this Colnpact to resolve issues ll~ar can be agreed upon and agree lo estnbllsh a process 
for resolving the disputed matters. 
NOW. THEREFORE. in consideration of the mutuaf undcflakings and agreements 
l~ereinailer set forth. the Tribes and the State enter inio the Soilowing Compact. 
4. Autlrorized Cfass i l l  Gaming 
Class III Gaming shall be authorized consistent with the following: 
a. Galnine Authorized. Foilowing approval of this Compact as provided in 
rhe Act. the Tribes may operate in its gaming facilities iocated on lndian Lands. any 
gaming activity rhar the State of Idilbo "permils fbr my purpose by any person. 
organization. or entity." as the phrase is. interpreted in the contea of'fhe Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act. Tile Tribes rnny not operate any ori~cr form of Class 111 gaming activity. 
b. &ation ol' Class 111 Garnine Ac~ivitiec. Class TI1 gaming activities shall 
only be conductcd on Indian Lmds locatcd within the cxterior boundaries oi'tlte Fort Hall 
Indian Reservation as ii existed as of the date of ewactment of the InCLian Gaming 
Regulatory Act or upon other ir~dian Lands as defined in the Indian Gaming Re~alatory 
Act with the approval ofthc Governor. Nothing herein shall he interpreted as precluding 
a Governor from deciding whether lo concur with The findjngc of the Secretary of the 
Irtlericrr thal gami~ig on newly acquired lands tvouid be in the best ititerest of the 
Shoshone-Bannock'rribes and not detrinental to the sl~rrounding community. 
c. C.ertificalion. Subseyuenr to a final non-appealable jud-ment in fhe inirial 
Deciaratory .Judgment Action pursuant to Section 5. no gamjng device shall he placed in 
Lhe gaming ihcilitj [or use until approved by the State. The Tribe shall make a good faith 
" L 1  /"-' , 8 r ' \  
Case 4:Ol-cv-90052-BLW Documenr 1 filed 01131R001 Page 19 of44 
effort ro re~novc any dovices thgt we in play u the rime of the final non-?ppea!able , . 
judpenr  thaz do nor comply with the Declnntory Jud3menr. ':"he State sllall ln,&e a 
good f'aitli effon lo certify those games that are in play at the time of'tlle non-appealable 
,judgmen! Jhat do comply with The Declaratory Judgment. If the parties disagee over 
, 
prneslhar'.sre~n"pl&mf he~~imeee~Pt1ip:Ryia~~6~ppc'd~~6~~j~Bgiiii:~i~h~-Tr'ibs may 
continue to operate the g m e s  pending dispure resolution pcr Section 18. 
d. Forms of Pavment. AII payment for wagers made in gaming conducted by 
the Tribes in their caming operation shall be made b j ~  cash. chips or tolcens. The gaming 
operation shall nol wtend credit. Chips or tokens may only he purchased using cash. 
chech or travelers chcctcs. 
e. Prohihited Activities. The Tri'ies shall limit their Class 111 gazing activities 
to those permitted by this Compact. in the even1 a dispute arises after the completion of 
the declaratory,judgnent action, and the implementation thereofas ctgreed to in Section 5, 
ovcr whether an acrivip is or is nor pennitted under this Compact. tho dispute shall be 
resolved pursuant to Section 18. 
i'. Advertising of Authorized Cinmins. 'The Tribes may advertise their 
authorized gaming activities within the State of Idaho in an honest and truthful manner 
pursuant to federal law. 
5. lnitial Declaratory Judgment Action 
The Tribes md ttw Slate agree thal issues of what garnin2; the 'Tribes may conduct 
undcr the Act and what restrictions on the operations. if any, may be imposed by the 
State. are ultiin.atcly questions of' law. However. the parties beiieve that presentation of 
facts regarding the actual gaming activity thal does occur in the State and on Indian Lands 
and the machines that are at issue is necessary for the Coun to resolve tile quesiions of' 
law. 
a. Posi~ions of Parties as to Jurisdiction 
[ 1 )  I1 is tbc Tribes' position t11al the Act has vesled exclusive jurisdiction 
in the L;~lited Stales Uistric: Courts to resolve disputes under the ,. .. Act. 
. . 
(21 1 he $rare does no1 consent to jurisdiction of the  federal courf ov& 
any claims under 25 LtSC 3710(d)(7)(A)(i). 'l'lle State does reserve the right to consent to 
federal courl Jurisdjction over claims arising under this compact on a case-by-cafe basis. 
h. .4.flcement to Particinate in Initial Dcclaraton, Judmenl Action. 
Notwithstnnding Lllese positions, the Tribes and the State agree ihat either or both purties 
nri$y file suit for declaratoy jud&ment in the IJnited States Districr Court for che District 
oi'ldaho naming the other as a defendani und seeking a declaration o f t h e  legal issues 
disputed in this Section. In pursuing this acrictn: 
(1) Both parties agree thal they have obtained the necessary legislative 
and legal authority to bring the initial declaratory jud-pent action. merge declaratory 
jud*pent actions. or talce other steps as map he necessary to participate in sucii an action 
on ifs merits, This agreement shall not in any way prejudice any right to appeal or seek 
ornenl. review tit'nny jud, 
(3)  Rotti parties agree to expedite the proceedings and any appeal or 
revie\+, of any final order or,judgment entered in such inilia1 declaratory judgnsnr action. 
( 3 )  Should the 'I'ribcs refuse lo consent to jurisdicrit)n as provided 
above. this Compact shall be nu11 and void. 
(4) Should the State rcfuse to consent to jurisdiction us provided above. 
any issue relating to the provisions of this Compact presented by the Tribes in their 
compluint o r  pleading shall he deemed to have been decided in favor of the Tribes' 
position on the issue. 
(5) The 'Tribes agree to limit the scope ol'their gaming aclivities lo those 
sel forth in Section 4. 
( ( 5 )  This provision shall not be construed as a consent by the Stele to 
iederal courtJurisdiciion in any action brought pursuam to 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(A)('i). 
. . . , . . : , ' . .  : .. . 
. . ("' 
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c. Imnlernentation .. . . of' Initial Decliiraton2 .Tuda,meril Decision. LJpon tile 
. - . . ,- ,  ..:,, .., . . . . ,  . . :  , .  , .,.,,. > . . , ;, i : (  : , ,  ' . ' . .. , . .  . . . 
conclusion of all legal , prote+dings . , in [be initiil d@ckaralo~ ,judgment action broughl 
, 
pursuanr to Section 5. including the uonciusion of' all appeals or rcview, the appropriate 
provisions below sl~all apply: 
(1) In the event the court(s) detennines Ulat cenain gming auivities are 
nor "pcrmined" in the context of '  the Act. the Tribes shall be precluded frotn offering 
Illose gaming activities in any yamingkcilities on indian Lands. 
(2) in the Event the court(s) detennines that cenain gaming activities are 
'.!,enniilcd gaming" in the contexr ol' the ACI. lhe Tribes shall be entitlcd to cxpcdiled 
iinple~nentation ol'such games i s  consistent with the ,judgnent. For this purpose. the 
'Tribes rnqv conduct such games as arc consisken! with lhat jud-mcnt upon conclusion of 
the cxpediled negotiations andlor arbitration sct forth below. 
(A) The parties agree to expedited negotiation of any issues which 
are proper subjects of' negotiation under the Act consistent wit11 fhe judicial resolulion. 
Sucir issues shall be negotiated for thirty (30) days. For purposes of this section. "dqy" 
shall incall calendar day. A$reemenls reached i n  inedialion shall have dxc same ci'iect us 
ifti part ofthis Compact. and are incotporated in full hcrein. 
!B) if apoelnenr cilnnol bc rencl?ed. sucii issues shall be 
submittecf to binding iirbiira~ion as follows: 
c i )  Either party shall scrve writren notice of intent to 
arbitrate on the other puny on the final day of negotiation. The party serving notice ol' 
intent to arbitrate shali identie the specific provisjon(s) of this Compact andlor issues. 
which shall he suhrnitted ibr arbitralion. 
( i i )  Both parties shall wihin live ( 5 )  days of noiice oi' 
intent 10 arbitratc provide a 1is1 of five ( 5 )  names of individuals availableas prospective 
;nbitriltors. Each p3rN shall. within five !5)  days of the receipt ofthe other party's list. 
seleci a person from that list as an arbitrator. Within ten ( 10) days of lhcir selection. 
. . 
-1 .. '. \ . . , 
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thesa DVO individuals shall select a third arbitrator from a list of not less t h q  Qve (5) 
nominees &orna;u, ir~dependcnr. arbiaazors' or alternative dispute rcsolutioo orgtgi~&tion. . , 
11' the iptiividuais do not a&?e,?ec upon such organization. il shall be the American 
Arbitration Associa~ion. Tile Statc and the Tribes agree that the arbitriltors shall be 
required lo submit their decision within ninety (90) days of'the selection of the third 
arbitr:itor. 
iiii) The arbitrators shall iteve authority to issue such orders 
and decisions us shall be reasonably necessq  or desirable to bring about an expeditious 
decision consistent with the ,judicial decision madc in the initial declaratory judgment 
action brought pursuant lo Saction 5. 
(iv) Except as provided by Section 4, t.he 'Tribes apee not 
to conduct games pursuant to Section 4 unfil t.he completion of arbitmtion. flowever, if' 
conclusion of'thc arbitration process is delayed Tor ;my reason. thc arbitrators permit 
gmiog on such tcrms as tl~ey determine pending conclusion of arbitratjon. 
(v) .&biv+tion wpenses will be billed equally to the 
respective parties. 
(v i )  if,iudicial review of an ilrbilration decision is soughl, 
thc arbitration decision shall be effective unless and uiltil dctemined olhenvise by a 
federal court. 
(vii) Except as may be determined by a federal court, 
arbitration decisions shall have ihc sunc elTecl if a part of this Compact. and are 
incorporated in full herein. 
(viii) Nofhing herein shall preclude thc pturties from agreeing 
to an altcrnatc ibnn ofdispute resofution. 
(C) To ensure inlegrity, l'he Tribes agree that il'nddiliond games 
are pern~itted pursuant lo the inixial declara~orjl judgment action, such games shall be 
conductcd in sccordtce with the operational. security, casli control and other srandards 
, . , . 
/.  
. , 
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established in ll~is Coinpact together wit11 pdditionaf negotiated stan$mds a restrjcliveus . . 
those o r  h e  Nationill Indian Oaming Commission as set ibnh ai 15  CFR 547 as 
in the 2:ederal Register. i an i~a~y  5. 1099. or the Nevada Gaming Comnission for thai 
par~icular game. Such restriclions shall be negotiated and/or arbitrated in the manner 
provided in Section j(c!, 
6. Regulations rnd Ordinances Regulating thc Opemtion and Management of the 
Gaming Operation 
Thc Tribal Ciming Commissjon or the Businass Cou~lcil may, itom time to Lime. 
ndopt. mend  or repeal such r~gulations or ordinances consislcnt with the poljey. 
ohiec~ives. purposes and tcrms oi' this Compact as ir may deem necessary or desinble in 
the interests of' the Tribes i111d the State in carrying out the policy and provisions of this 
Colnyacr. 'The 'Tribes have enacted an ordinance re$ulating !.he operalion and 
management of the Gaming operation. 
7. Baclcground 6nvestigations of Gaming Employees 
a. Raol~mund.~~nvcsrianrion.Prior,ro..Emnlovme~:llt. 
( ' I )  Prior Lo hiring or licensing n prospec~ive gaming employee. the 
Tribnl Gaming Commission shall obtain sufficieul informalion and identification from the 
applicant on forms to be iurnishcd by the Tribal Garning Commission ro pennil a 
thorou+gh background investigation, together with such fees as may be rcquired by the 
Tribes. The information obtained shall iilclude. &I a minimum. name [including any 
aliases). current address, ddte and place of b i ~ ,  criminul arrest find convic~ion rccord. 
social security number. two sets of fingerprjnts, sex. height. weight. and two current 
photographs. Upon written request by the State. m e  and corrccr copies o.f illis 
information shall h e  provided to ihc designated Slate agency. whicl~ may conduci an 
independent background investigation ar  the Statc's own expense and provide a written 
report to the Tribal Gaining Co~nlnission regarding eqch application. 
(31 The Trilxtl Gluning Commission may license on a temporary . . ,  , hasis 
. . 
rtny prospeclive Gaming employee. cxcept case and counting room p~rsoDnel. vfho 
represents in writing that fir or she does not fall within my of the criteria set forth below 
and who has passed a preliminag~ criminnl background investigation by the Tribal 
(;tuning Commission. until such time ns i l~e final written report on the applicant's 
hackpound investigntion is completed. For purposes of lhis paragaph. the Tribal gaming 
investigator. in conjunctjo~, with the designated law enfbrcement agency, shall notify the 
Ganiiig operation in writing of' the preliminmy criminal background check within fen 
I 10) d,1>1s ofsubmission of such requcst. 
(3)  The Gaming Operation shall not hire (17 conxinue ro employ 
Gluning employee. arid sIi&Il terminaie ,an\, probationary Gaming employee. if the Tribal 
(faming Commissjm determines that the applicant or employee: 
(A)  has been convicted of any offense related l o  gambling, fraud, 
misrepresentation. rlcception or thefi. within the past icn i 10) years: 
( B )  has providcd tna~erially false sratenlents or infonndio~i on his 
or lier employment application or misstated or otherwise atternpled lo inislcad ihc Tribes 
or ihe Slote with rcspect to any inaterial hct conrained i n  the eniployrncnt applicarion: 
(C1 is u member or ossociale ul'org~mizcd crirnc or is of notorious 
or urlsavory reputation: or 
(D) has a reputation. habits or associations t h a ~  might pose a 
threat to the public interest or 10 the effective regulation and control ofgaming, or create 
or enhance the dangers of unsuililble, unfair. or illegal practices, rnetliods and activiries in 
the conduct of' gaming or thc c;mqing on 01' tjle business und tinancia1 arangemenIs 
incidental i;hercto. I t  is intended tliai applicanis and e~nployees have Lhe continuing 
burden ttr satisQ 811 doubts as to their fitness. Where doubt remains, an applicnnl or 
employcc is not eniitlcd to be hired or to relnnin employed. 
. .  . 
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h. Raak~wound Investirations oSGamine Ermnlovees. During ~ m p l o  
, ;, :,,,.. . . I .  . .  . . . . 
Tribes and the State Gaining ,4gency shall retain the right ro conduct s 
hac@gound invc$tiga~jons of any Gamjng employee at any tirne during the :.. renn of that 
person's employme~~t, A1 any time, any Craming employee who does not establish that he 
or she satisfies all ofthe crilerin set forth above shall be dismissed. 
3, On-sitc Regulation of Gaming Operation 
2.. Tribal Gamins Coinmission. The primary responsibility fbr the ondsile 
regulation. control and security of the Gaming operation and faeiiiiy negotiar~d fhrough 
this Cc~mpaci shall be thnt ol'the Tribal Gaming Commission. Tile Srilte Gaming Agcncy 
rnay panicipate in replatory obligations of the Ciming operations and may work closely 
with the Tribal Gaming Commission, iiowwer. this shall only occur after the Tribal 
Gaming Cornmissiorl requests in writing that the State Gaming .4gency participate. or the 
State Ciming Agency provides written rationale ro thc Tribal Gaming Commission as to 
the need for the Stm Gamins Agency to pmicipale in the regulatory obligations. Such 
stale assistance shall not include rraditiorial securily and law enlbrcctnent functions. 
As parl of its responsibilities, the Tribal Ciaming t:omrnissinn shall ensure 
tllai tilt Oiuninf operation and manages will: 
( I )  Comply with all relevant 1a.n'~: 
(3)  I'rovide tor the physical safety of personnel employed by the 
Ciaming operation: 
(3) Provide for the physical safety ($,patrons in the Gaining facility: 
(4) l'rovide for the physical safeguarding of assets triinsponcd to and 
kom the Gaming facility and cashjer's cage d~panment: 
( 5 )  Provide Lor the protection of the pauons nnd the Gaming facility's 
property fiom illegal activity; nnd 
( 6 )  Ensure the integiry of ibe gaming operation. 
f l q  . . ' ~. . .  . . . 0' . . *. , . . 
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h. Oarnine . . Manager. .... , . * ,  . . 'The Business Council shall empIo:? the (3pping 
.,1 >,. ., ;,, . , * :  , . ... , . 
mangger. Tile gaming ~ n a n ~ g e r  shall serve at rhe pleasure of the Business Council grid 
, , , , , , . 
shall have overall responsibility Sor the adminislralive hnctions of the 'Tribal gaming 
operarions. 
C. Identification Cards. The Tribal Gaming Commission shall require all 
(3nming e~nployees to conspicuously wear identification cards issued by the Tribal 
Ga~ning C!txnmission which shall include the employee's photograph, first name. 
e~nplovec number. Tribal scal or signature. and a date of expiration. 
d. Insneaions. 'The Tribal Gaming Commissio~) shall retain qualified 
inspectors or agents under thc authority of ~ h c  Tribal Oaming C~omtnission as needed. 
Said inspectors o r  ngenls shail be independent oi' the Chning operation and shall be 
supervised and accountahlc only to the Tribal Caning Commission. 
e. Renortine of Violations. During ail hours of Gaming operation, the Tribal 
Gaming Commission shail ensure hot its systems of' internal control are in full rorce m d  
.* 
ef&cl. Tribnl gaming inspcc~ors . .. .. or ~ g ~ n r s s h a l l  have unrestricted access to ihe Gaming 
fbcifiiy during a11 t~ours of(inming operalions and shall bavc inimedizlte and unrestricted 
access lo any and all areas oj.'lh~ Gaming facility for the purpose of ensuring complimcc 
with the provisions of this C:o~npacr and the ordinance, Tile Tribal Gaming Commission 
shall require that all inspectors, agents and Gaming employees repor[ immediately to the 
T~ibal Gaming Conmission any suspec~ed violation(s) of the provisions of this Compact 
or of'lhe C)rdinance or regulations. Upon written request which shall he submitted not 
more frcquenrly then quarterly. Ihe Tribal Gaming Commission shall submit to the Skate 
Gaming Agency 8 list of C i t i n g  employees who have been found lo have commirled 
acn~al violations while ibey were employed Tor the Gaming operation and norification ro 
the State as to nny ii)rmal action taken by the Tribal Gaming Commission, m.d any civil 
or crimind actions thal were Laken against the employees 
. . .  . . 
' . . c7.T . . (-, , . 
/ 
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f , R w s  df the Grimes, Thc Tribal Guming Commission shal~ notifytht?:s@te 
. , , , , . '. 'I:,il -, .. , ...: . . #  ,.>;;+. , . , . ' .  , , .  . 
Oaming , ., ~ n i n i i l  -: .. of the rules , . ofeach Knme operated by the Tri l l~s , . und o f ' k $ c h a ~ g e , i n  ,. . . , 
such rules. ~umlnaries of the rules of each ggme relevant &>.the , , , ,  r n c ~ o d o ~ ' , ~ i a ~  , .  and.ndds , 
paid to winning hels shall be visibly displayed or availtitile in panphiel lbrm in the 
Gaming facility. Betling li~nits itpplicable lo any gaming station shall be displayed at 
such yarning srtion. Rules for games identified in Section 4 oPthis Compact or changes 
to sucli mles shall be based upon such games a colnlnoniy practiced in other ganing 
,iurisdictions in the Uniied'Stutes with such variations in the manner of wagering or play 
as do not fundamentally alter (he narure of the game :IS rhe Tribni Gaming Cornmission 
may approve. Rulcs for g m e s  identified in Secdon 4 oi'tllis C~>mpact or changes to such 
rules o r h i s  Coxnpact shall be submit~edc~o the State Gaming Agency for review. in the 
event the Slate Gaming Agency has concrms in regard to a change in the mles. it sl~ali 
submit such concerns lo the Tribal CSuming Commissioll Tor its review and comment. 
The Tribes will provide the Sratc Gaming Agency with ten (10) days' advance notice of 
the rules or  each ga,me. .., and . . any . , . . inodificptioll . . thered and will providc adequue notice to 
patrons ofthe Gtiming'lkcility to advise rhem of the applicable rules in effect. 
, Annual Meeline. In order lo Sosicr a posilive anti effecrive relationship in 
carrying oul iu,d cnforciig the provisions of this Compact. represcn~atives or the Tribes 
(including the X b a l  Gaming Commission and the Craning manager) and the Srate 
Gaming Agenq shall meet, nor less than on an annual basis. to review past practices and 
exalnine methods to improve the regularory progzam created by this Compact. Th t  
meetings shall rake place or a locatjon ~nutually agreed upon hy r11e Tribal Gming  
Commjssjon and the State Gaming Agency. The Srate Gaming Agency and the Tribal 
Cituning (:ommission shall disciose 10 h c h  other at such tl>eetings any and all suspected 
activities or pending mallers reasonably believed to constirute violations of this C:o~npact 
by any person or enterprise. 
9. Gaming License Procedure 
. . . . . . r\ r 3  
:, , 
, . > 
., 
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n. .Gamin: ii ... , . Operations. The qaming operarions negotiated bhy 'this Compact 
. .  ,. .~ ., . . , . : , . , ,  . 
sllall be licens,dd by the Tribal Gaming, Commission pursuant to thereqyjrcni~nts of the 
~unling licensing procedures of lliis C o m p a ~ ~  privr to tile ccirnn~ence~nent , . of . operations. ...: 
Thelicensing of' the Gaming operation shall include thc lioensing of each principal and o f  
each 1:ey employee. 
I). Manufacturers and Distributors of (iunli~ir Devices. Each n1anufacturer 
and distributor of gaming devices permitted and defined under this Compac~ n d  their 
principals shall be required to he licensed by the Tribal Gaming Co~nmission pursumt Lo 
Lhe requirements ofthis Compact prior to the distribution of any gaming device for use or 
play in the Gaming licilirp; provided. however. illat the 'T'ribal (.kilning Co~nrnission may 
determine suitability o f  u n~anuracrurer or distributor througk verification of' its good 
standing in axnother jurisdiction where ga~abling is legal. 
c. Persons Fumishlne Craminn Services. The Tribal Gaming Commission may 
require a finding of suitability or require the licensing of' any other person o r  enti~y who 
furnishes gaming services. property or an exrension of credit to the Gaming operation or 
who has other material invnlvernenl with the Gaming operation. Any agreement between 
the Gumins operation and a person or enterprise that has been found unsuitable. has been 
ticnied n license, or has had a license revoked by tile Tribal Ciaming Coxnmissio~~ si~all be 
i~nrnediat.ely rendered null and void without liability to the Tribes. 
d. m. All npplications for each principal, key omployee. vendor. 
manufacturer and distributor ol'gaming devices shall he made on Corms furnished by the 
Tribal Ga~ning Co~nmission and shall he accompanied by the application and 
investigative fees ser forth in the 'Tribes' published schedule of' fees. Such application 
Soms shall require. but not be limited lo. complete infinnation and deta41s with respect lo 
the applicant's habjls, characrer, crimi~ial record, business activities. financial affsirs and 
business associutes. covering at icasr a I 0-ycir pcriod immediately preceding ihe date of 
filing of the applicalion. 
. . .  . . . . .  . . 
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e. ~6ti%cation ::_. :_ .. lo State of Ciamine En~piovees. 'Re Tribal Gaining 
:.,; 
. ,:..,. .,.< , ..' , ,  , , .  . 8 , ' .  
C:oinmission shi l l  . . submit :i ]is\ ol' the licensgd and tviq?orarily licensed zad2i?,g 
, ,  I , .. 5 .  
c1nl7ioyces LO rhc Slate Ciaming Agsncy on a inonthly basis. The Tribal Chninb 
Cynmission allull include tile iicensce's co~nplete name. A.K.A.. social security number 
and dale oi'birrli in its .submission to the Statc Gaming Agency. In the event the State 
Cioming Agency has il concern aboui a particular temporarily licensed gaming empioyce. 
t11e State Gaining Agency shall submit in writing to the Tribal Gaming Commission a 
requesl for the licensee's epplicaiion so rl~ar the State Gaming ' ~ g e n c y  may complete irs 
ow11 hackgro:rortnd investigation on 21 paniodar individual. Tl~e Tribal Gaming 
Commission shall submit the requcstad applicatio~~ withir) ten (10) business days of 
reccipl of' the request. The State Gaming Aiency may. at its sole ens1 and expense. 
commence an investigation and ir i( tloes so, the results of the investigation shall be 
sublnitled to the Tribal Gaming Commission in a timely manner. The 'Tribal Gaming 
~oinmission m q  grant. deny. condition. limit or revoke ally license or finding of  
s u i t & i d i , ~  for r y  cause i t  . ,  deems , reasonable. 
1: Notification of Appiicant. The 'Tribal Gaming Cotlunission shall establish 
reasonable time lines in regard LO rrotificmion to an appIilic<m~ ol'the action taken in regard 
~o a licerlsing decision rnade by rile Tribal Gaming Commission. The applicanl shall nor 
he entitled lo receivc a copy of the Stale Gaming Agency's invesliptive report or m y  
repons c!r material developed by thc Tribal Gaming in conneclion wilh the 
application. The Tribal Gaming Commissior~ shall not grant an application for a license 
or n iinding of sui~abiliry unless it is salisfied that: 
( I )  The applicant is of good chwucter. honesty and i n ~ e ~ t y :  
(2) ' h e  applicant's prior activities, criminal record (if' any), rcputatiun. 
habits and associa~ions do not pose 11 threat to the public interest oftile Tribes or the State 
or thc clTective regulation and control of' gming pursuanl lo this Compttct. or create or 
cnliance the dangers o f  unsuitable. unfair or illegal practices. metlmds and activities in thc 
. . . . ,  
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conduct of $pxj.in$ or tlic carrying or1 of the t)usiness and lipancial arriiq@nenrs .. < ., ,. : ? 
incidental tilereto: 
5 )  In all other respects. Lhe applicant is quafifiod lo be iicensed or found 
suitable with the provisions and policies set fitrth in this Compact: and 
(4)  The nppiictdnl has adequate l,us~ness probity, competence snd 
experience in gaming. 
g. Renorl oSChanm. Afier an entity is licensed and found suitable. it shall 
file a report of each change of its corporale officers m d  mcmhers ofits board of directors 
with the Triha! Gaming Commission. ..Use, the enrity shall maitltain wilh thc Tribal 
Ciarning Commission a1 all times a list of ail persons holding or owning 51 icasl Len 
percenl ( 10%) oi'th'e equity of the entip and lenders or credirors trwed tlz least len percent 
(10%) of the book value of the entity. The same process shall kc i'ollowed that i s  listed 
above at "e" for changes in-corporate oficers and ~narnbers of its hoard of  directors in the 
event there is a change. 
1U. ,Gon~~nt ja I i fy .o f  In ormation: ,.*.. Privilege 
a. Conlidentialjrv. The Tribal Galmius Commission and the SliLle Gaming 
Agency shall mainiain it file of' licknsed ilppiicanrs obtained pursuant to and in 
co~nplicmce with [hc provisions of' this Colnpaci. including iindings of suirztbility and 
employmnt under t11is Compact. together wilh a record ofall action taken with respect ro 
those applications. Such file shall include. but not be limited lo information: 
(1) Required by the Tribal Gaming Cormnission or the Stale Gaming 
Agency to be furnisl~ed lo then] under this Compact or the regulations or wl~icl~.may he 
otherwise obtained relative to the finhnces. earnings or revenue of a manager or any 
applicant. person or enterprise that is employed. licensed or round suirabie: 
( 2 )  Pertaining to m applicant's criminal record and background. whjch 
bas been funxished to or obtained by t!~e Tribo! Gaming Co~mnission or the State Gaming 
Agency from a q  source: 
. . . .  . 
. . .  . , . . . , ' , r .' , . ' . \  
. ,  P ., 
Case 4:01-cv-03052-BLW Document 1 Filed 01/3'/2001 Pqge 30 of 44 
(3  j l'rovided lo the. members of the Tribal Churning Copn"iissi0n or the 
Stale (iaming Agency o r  the (jamling mtjna,ger by a ~ovcmmentai qg!ncy. ail iriformcr. or 
,. . 
on the :Issurance that the idormation will he held in co~ifidence and treated as 
confiden~ial: and 
14) Obtained by tile Tribal Gaming Colnmission or rhe Stale Gming  
Agency Oom a ~nanufslclurer or distributor relating la the manuftlcturing of gaming 
devices. 
h. Sharing of Inl'omation. The 'Tribal Gaming Commission and the State 
(,-iainln~_. Age~lcjl may reveal such inSonnation and d a t ~  lo an authorized tigent. oi' any 
agency of the united Stnles government. any authorized Stute agency 1)T any other duly 
aulhorized regulatory or law enforcemen1 agency of another stare or tribe. 
c. Noticc or Relc:~se. Notice oi' the release of ini\)rrnation pursuant to the 
above provisions may be given to the applicant. person or enrevrise prior lo being 
Iicenscd or being hand  suirable. 
d. ,Files. - The files. records and repons concerning the Tribd G@n?.i.ne 
Cornmission and the Slate Gaming Agency shall be open during regular business hours to 
inspeclion b>i each agency.s authorized agents. 
c. Absaiutc I'rivilege of Required Communications and Docun~ents. Any 
conununiculjon or document of n managy. an applicant or a licensee which is required by 
this i:hmpact or the Ordinance to he made or truns~nitted to the Tribal Gaming 
Coinmission or the' S r m  C'riuning Agency. or  any ol' their agents or employees. is 
absolulely privileged and does not impose liability for defunlalion or constitute a ground 
for rccovery in  uny civil itction. If sucll a docurnel~l or com~nunication conrains ;my 
infonnorion ihat is privileged pursuant to the laws ol'the State. rhat privilege will not be 
waived or lo s~  because the document or com~nunication is disclosed to thc Tribal Gaming 
Cwnmission or State Gaming Agency. or any or their agents or employees. 
Norwifhstnnding the provisions ol' this subsection. the Tribal Gaming Commission and 
the S6~i.e Cjamigg .Agency shqll ,n@intain ?I privi1c~d:idf~malion. do.cumex~ts , . and 
c~qmnnications , .  , in a ,gecure . .  ., piice accessible ..:. onf)) to members : >  of the 'Tribal , Cxmnh~g . :. 
~. . 
" 
Commission and the Sfate @o~n& ". ,.: Agency , . and [heir. nuthari,z?d agents and employees. 
i. I - ~ l i c a i l  . . .  cif Statc Puhlic Disclosure Laws. All infbrmation 
, , r ,  , ,> . . . . '  . . . . .. , 
provided hy thi Tribes to the $rate pursuant lo tlie remx or this Compact is provided in 
confidence and is LO be kept stricily confidenvial unless disclosure is specifically aqecd lo 
I? the Business Council. The State will seek to protect the coniideniiality of such 
informa$ion. To rlie extent the State is unable to protect the confidentiirlizy of such 
inibnntuion. the Tribes' obli$atjori ro provide such infonnation under ihe ternls of this 
Co~npacl shall he voidable the Tribes until suc11 lime as the State is able to protect ihc 
11. Management Contract 
The Tribes have no intenlion of hiring an outside management company to manage 
the Gulning opwaric)n, in inhe even1 the Tribes choose to engage an ouuide manageme1:llt 
campany. the :I%bes and the, $,@!? sh,ali negotiate nmendme~lts ro this Compnct in good 
faith pursunnL to the AcL. 
12. Operational Requirements 
a. Internal Control Svstern, in addition lo coinpiiancc with the Qrdinance. 
regwlntions and the provisions of this Compact. the Gaming facility shuti be operated 
pursuant to an internal control system approved by the Tribal Gaming Commission. The 
internal control system shall he designaled ro reasonably ilssure iha~: 
( I )  Assets are saf'eparded: 
(2) Fjnsncial records are accurate and reliable: 
(3) 'l'ransactians are performed only in :iocordance with the 
rnanapernent's uuthorizntion: 
(4) Access to assets is permined only in accordance with management's 
authorization: 
(5) Record~d acc?untabili(y for qscts , ,  is compared with uctvgl assets at 
. . 
reasonuhle intervais at16 uppropriate ,,,. , . action , is laken with respect to +ny discrepancies; md 
( 6 )  Functions. duties and responsibiIities are appropriately segregared 
and performed in uccordancc with sound practices by conlpctel)l, qualified personnel. 
h. Required Provisions oi' Internal Control Svstcnl. T l ~ c  internal control 
system shall include: 
i 1 )  An organization chart depicting appropriate segregation of functions 
and responsibilities: 
( 3 )  A description of the duties and responsibilities ol' cach posili~)n 
shown on the organizational chart: and 
( 3 )  A detailed narrative descriplion of the udrninistrativt: and accoun~ing 
procedures desiped to satis& the rcquiremcnts of'subseclion (a). 
13. Public Health and Safety; Fees and Psyments in Lien of Taxes 
a. C:ornnliance. The consrruction. maintenance and opcrillion of the Ciaming 
f'acility sl~ali comply with ail federal cmd Tribal codes. laws and regwlations governing 
buildings, safety, maintenance. plumbing. firc safety. electricity. cnleriainmcn~. :11cohol 
and handling oil food and beverages. The applicable federal nnd Tribal o?ficials charged 
with enforcement ot'such codes. lmzs and reguliltionu rnusr he provided access Lo inspect 
and ensurc compliance. 
in. Eniergcncy Service Accessibilitv. The Tribes m d  the .l'ribal Gaming 
Co~nmission shall make provisions ibr adequaLeemergency accessibili~y and service of 
rite Gaming facility. 
14. Tribal Reimbursement for Expenses incurred by the State Canting Agency 
ti. -s. The Tribes shill1 reimburse the Statc Sor 
only iltose expcnses the Stnte incurs as the result oS CullilIing a wrjttcn request of the 
Tribes relating to currying oui the responsibilities under This Compact. The Tribes shall 
IIOL . l7.c , responsible , , , ; . .  ibr , cqpqnses (Jlc $late ma? incur in conneciiori wifh this Compact tliar 
. . . .  . . , , . . 
. . , , :  
have no1 been r.~qocsted hy the Tribes. , .. 
11. Siate'Sha~lSl~bmit , ,. Slatement . ,  . ol'Expenses. 'i'lle State shall submil a dctailed 
statememenl of expenses on it monthly basis lo the Tribal (;timing C?ommission. The Tribes 
shall reimburse the Stute within thin? (30) days afier llle receipl o f  the statement of 
oxpenses 
c. Notice of Obiection ro Expenses. if the Tribes believes that i t  has been 
assessed a charge for services that llavc no1 been requested by the Tribes in writing. or 
dial they have heen :lsscssed a charge for services that are not related to the Tribes' 
gacning or tha~ the charges are not rcasonablc or necessary, they shall notify the State lhat 
it ol>,jects to the chase, if rhe parlies are aoi able LO resolve such a dispute. (hey inay 
resort to ;~rbitration as provided in Section 18 of ' this  Cornpact and tile arbitrator may 
allow or disallow the disputed charge. 
d. lnf'on~lulion Regardin., the Stare Budgetine Process, T11s State Gaming 
Agency sl~all advise the Tribcs of its.requ&sts fbr appropriations dealing spmificnlly with 
tribal gaming. Excepr where impracticable due lo exigent circumstances. such 
inli)rma~ion shall he provided at leasr two ( 3 )  months prior to sub~nission of 21 proposed 
.4t Llle close orthe iiscal yem (commencing with the current Tribal fiscal year), the 
Tribes shall engage an independent certified public accountam to audit the books and 
records oS all Gaming operations conducted under this Compact. The audit shall he 
completed within one hundred twenty ( 120) days after the close of the fiscal year. Upon 
completion of the audit. the Tribes sf.itlll lorward copies ol' any audit reports and 
manqement letters to the State Gaming Agency and shall make. copies of all current 
internal accounting nod audit procedures available lo the State upon wrjtten request. 
16. State Oversight of Compact Provisions 
11. ./, Monilorine ..., . .. and inspection. . 'The State Craming Agency. pursuant to thc 
. ' i 
< ,. 
provisions of this C:ompact. has the limited :~uthority to monitor qnd inspect the Gaming 
operation to ensure thai tl~e i j a m i ~ g  operation is conduclod in co~npliance with the 
provisions of this Compact. the Ordinance and applicable rcylations. In order 10 
prope~.iy monitor the Cxa~ning operation. no more than two 13) agents of' rile State (>aming 
.4gency on any given day tilong wirh at feast one member of the 'Sribai Oarning 
Cornlnission or ott~er tribal designee shall review and exa~ninc any area of the Gaming 
operaljon that is directly related to Class 111 p ~ n i n g .  Said review and examination shall 
no1 interfere wit11 the normal functioning of'thc Gatnjng operation. Said smze agentts) 
sl~all he previously identified as suc11 in writing to rhc 'Tribal Gaming Commission and 
shall provide proper identification :IT the time of.' inspection to the appropriare Tribal 
represen~atives. 
b. Review and Exmination of Reed, lJpon the completion of any review 
nr~d examination by lile Tribal Gaming Commission or the State Gaming Agency. copies 
of'the findings shall he maintained hy both pm'ies and shall be shared iFsn requested. 
c, indewendent Comniiance .4udit. The Srate Gaming Agency shall be 
supplicd with the federally required lndepet~denr .Compliance Audit annually as is 
submiutd to the NIGC hy the Tribes. In the event rhe State Gaming Agency has a 
concern with the I'ederully required Independent Compliance Audit, the Slate Gaming 
Agency shall noti* the Trihui Gaming Commission in wriring and then a j~ jnT cffnrt 
hetween thc State C.?arninp Agent:' and thc Tribal Gaming Commission shall take place in 
the selection of' an independent audilor. Copies ofthe results of the Compliance Audir 
shall he submitted lo both gsrning agencies within ten ( 10) days of' completion if possible. 
d. Good Faith. The State shall exercise its rights under this Compact in good 
faith und in a manner ihat does not interfere with the day to day operations of the Gaming 
facili~y. 
17. Criminal Jurisdiction 
a. Tribiil Criminal . . .iurisdiction. Except as $limited by subsection (c) below. in 
:, > >:, 
enforcing the terins find provisions ol'this.Compect and any ordinance imilementi~g the 
C:ompact. the Tribes shall exercise exclusive criminal Jimsdiction over Indians. 
b. State Criminal Jurisdic~ion. Except as limited by subsection ic) bclow. tn 
cnfi)rcing rhe negotiated terms and provisions of' this Con~pact. the SLatc shall exercise 
exclusive criminal ,jurisdiction over non-Indians. Tile 'i'ribes ugee to cooperalc with the 
State in any criminal investigatioi~ being conducted pursuant to this suhsecrion and to 
provide any infonnalion in the Tribes' posserrsion ~.elative to n crilnjnal proceeding being 
conducted i ~ y  tile State. For purposes of' State cnrorccment. all State crilninal laws and 
such laws as hereafter amended pennining LO the liccnsing, regulation or prohibititm ol' 
gallling and gambling which are not incortsis~ent with this Compact. including the 
sanctions associated with such laws. are adopted and incorporated herein by reference. 
c. Federal Criminal Jurisdiction. Nothing contained herein shall bc deemed in 
modi@ or  ljlnjt existing federal criminal jurisdinion over the Ganing ctperarion 
negotiated under this Compact or over individuals who commit gaming-related offenses. 
I,$. General Dispute Resolution 
'Thc I'ollowing resol~~tion process. iucludi~lg b u ~  not limiied to the judicisl 
resolution irrocess. si~all apply exclusively for the resolntion of issues {arising under the 
pn~visions of Illis Compact. 
a. Com~iiance. If eitllkr party believes the designated rcprcsentarive of' the 
orher party hus ihiled to comply wit17 any of the provisions ol' this Cornpdct, it shall 
invoke the following procedure: 
( I )  Informal Dispute Resointion. 
(.4) The pwty asserting noncompliance sllall serve wrinen norice 
upon the other party. Tlle party asserting the noncotnpliance shall identi& the specifk 
provision of this Compact alleged to have heen violared and shall specif), the factual basis 
thereof. 'Phc: Stare and the Tribes shali thereafter meet withill ren I::] 0) days in an efton to 
. . 
rcsolve tho dispute. 
iB) IS the dispute i s  nor resolved to the satisfaction of the parties 
within thirty (30) days atier the service ol'tile notice set forth above, either party may 
pursue the remedies below: 
(3)  .bbirration, 
If'ageement canno1 bc reached. such issues shall he submitted to 
hinding arbiuation us follows: 
(A) Either party shall serve written notice of inient lo arbitrate on 
the olbcr parry on the final day of negotitltion. The party serving notice of intent to 
arbitratc.shal1 identi8 the specific provision(s) of this Compaci and/or issues. which shall 
bc submitted for arbit~ation. 
(B) Both parties shall witllin five (5) days of' notice of intent to 
arbirate provide :I list of five ( 5 )  names 0.l' individuals svailable as prospective 
arbitrators. Each party shall. within five ( 5 )  days of the receipt of the other party's list. 
select 3 person from that list as an arbitrator. Within Len (10) days of their selection. 
hese two individuals sl~all selecl a third arbitrator from a iisl of not less than five (5) 
nominees kom an independent arbitrators' or alternative dispure resolution organization. 
If the individuals do not i lpte upon such organization. i t  shall he tlte American 
Arhitrarion Association. The State and the Tribes agree that rhe arbitrators shall be 
required to submil their decision within ninety (90) days of The seidction of the third 
arbitrator. 
(C) The arbilrators shall have authority lo issue such orders and 
decisions as shall he reasonably necessary or desirable 10 bring about an expedirious 
decision consisran1 with the judicial tlecisior~ made in the initial declaratory jud-ment 
action brougl~t pursuant to Section 5 ,  
('D) Except as provided by Seclipn 4. ttie ~ r i b e s  POL to 
,, ., ., ... 
conduct. ga~oes pursuanl to Secrion S(c)(?) until the completion of&bitra~6n. However. 
if coaclasion ol' the. arbitration process is deiilyed for uny reason. the arbitrators !nay 
permil gaming on such ierms as they determine pending conclusjon of' arbitration. 
IE) Arbitration expenses will be billed equally to tile respective 
parties. 
(F) Except as may bc delcrmined by a federal court. whitration 
decisions shall have the silme effect ns if a part of this Cotnpact. and are incorporated in  
full herein. 'They sI1u1l be in effect unless and until detortnined otherwise by a federal 
coun. 
(G') Nothing herein shall preclude the parties S~om agreeitxg to an 
alternate I'onn of dispute resolution. 
(3) &ial Resolution. 
(A) Ilpon completion of the informal dispute resolution process of 
suhseclibn ( I )  and (3). both the Sfate and ~tlre Trihes consent lo  the Jurisifiction [if fhe 
LJni~ed Slates Federal Court. District of Idaho. Ibr the resolutjon of any dispute arising 
rrom waivilies governed by this C O ~ ~ B C I .  
(B) I f  the Tribes do not consent lo Sederal court jurisdiction with 
respect to any ac~ion brought by the State of Idaho to enforce the provisions of this 
Compact. tile State shall notifv the Secretary of the Interior of that fact and shall mdil a 
copy of'said nolice to the NTGC and the Tribes. This Co~npilct shall be nufi md void five 
(5) business drys afler the Tribes' receipt of sucli notice. unless the Tribes consent to 
federal courtfurisdiction within thwt time. 
(C) IS the State refuses to consent to federal cowl jurisdiction 
wid) respect to any action hrought by the Tribes to enforce the provisions of this 
Cornpila. the Tribes shall notify the Secretary of the lnterior of that fact and sllall mail a 
copy ol'such noticc' to the Natiorlal Indian Gaming Co~nmission and to h e  Staee. Unless 
the Starc c$nses?ts . , . . ) I  to . ,federal . ,  coun juripdjctkjp ,within five f Sj days o.f7, r$,Gcipt . .  g qf such 
.. .. .. , 1 . . .  . ,,. .*. _ 
notice. lilt reiief requested by the Tribcs h i ls  ~om$ia in~  tiled with the iizd$&i:courtshall .,, . ... 
be dcerned frdnled ilnd incblp6rilted inlo this , .. C~np t i c t  as iSfuilp set. ibrth herein. 
i 
! 
(4) No ~ h i r d  Pnflv &hts. Nothing hercin shail be inf&pyeted as i 
1 
providing standing to any person or enliy other ihan the Tribes. thc State, or the Uni~ed i 1 
States to bring an nclion for enforcement. ol'the terms ol'this C:omnpact. ! j 
(5) Post Compact Meetinxs. The Trihes and the Statc a p e  lo Ineel 
periodica~l~ as may be needed in an eeffor~ to enhance good relations and to facilitate [he 
orderly.operarion ctl'lbe nlatlers addressed in this Compact 
1'9. Reservation of Rights ilader the Act 
a. Status o f  Class 11 Gaming. Nothing in this Compacr shall he deemed to 
affect the operation by r.he Tribes ol'any Cluss il gaming as defined in the Act. whether 
conduc~ed within or without the Ganing fhcilit), or gaming facilities. or  to confer upon 
the Stale any Jurisdiction over such Class II gaming conducted by the Tribes. 
b. No Aulhorixation to Tax. Except 8s provided in Section 14. nothing in this 
Compact shall be deemed to authorize the Sate or any polilical subdivision thereof' to 
irnposc cny tax. fee. chnrge or assessmen1 upon the Tribes or the Gaming operarion. 
Nothing in this Compact shall authorize or pennit the colleclion and pdymenl ol' any 
Idnho tax. or contrihulion in lieu of'taxes or fees on or measured by gaming rransaclions. 
l~arninp devices permitted under this Compact. gross or net Gaming revenues. or the .2 
Trihes' nct incoinc. Nothing in his  Scction is intended co affect the State's right lo lax 
income as perrnittcd hy law. 
c. Preservatjon or Tribal Self-Government. Except as set forth in this 
Compact. nothing shall be deemed to authorize the State or any political subdivision 
thereol' to regulate in any manner thc govcrnnlent of the Tribes, including the Tribal 
Gaming Coinmission, or to interfere in any manner with dte Tribes' seleclion of' its 
cvovernlaent ol'iicers. including n~embers of the Tribal Gaming Commission. C 
20. ~ ~ * r g $ i n  ,,.. , of S ~ t e  ~0tter-y 
? . ..: ., . ,,. 
Tile idhho ~tnte ~htrery. .,, .., which includes Idaho State Lofiery vendois. nigy operate 
, . ,  , .  . . .  
. ,  , 
., . ,. 
within tlie Fort ililll Indian i';~s'enration subject to the terns and conditions listid beiow: 
a. The ldallo Statc Lottery tnay operate only with tlic Tribes' permission, and 
the Tribes inay rescind permission aL the sole discretion of the Tribes: 
b. The Idaho State Lottery must honor any requirements or conditions that the 
Trihes may require: and 
c. The Tribes will provide the Idaho State Lottery thirty (30) days' wrinen 
notice ol'any requirements. condilions. or withdra~val of permission io opernte in order lo 
allow the ldaho Stake Lonery adequate time to fully coinply with any 'Tribal requirements. 
21. Consent does rot constitute a waiver' 
Consent by either ptrty to jurisdiction of the ikderal courts in any one action shall 
not constitute a waiver offuture ri-ghts to assert a lack of.jurisdiction in any other action. 
2 .  Severability 
Each provision. section und subsection of this Compact shall stand separate and 
independent of evcv oilier provision. section and subsection. In the cvenr that a federal 
court finds anv provision. section or subsection ol' this Cornpact to he invalid. the 
remaining provisions. sections and subsections of this Compact shall remain in full force 
and eficc~. 
23. Notices 
All notices requiced or authorized to hc served under this Co~npucr shall be served 
by certified mail. rcturn receipt requested. by co~nmercial overnight courier service or hy 
personal delivery at the foliowing addresses: 
Statc: State Gaming Age~eecy 
c/o Director. Idaho State Lottery 
1199 Shoreline Lane. Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tri h:s: ($l~airm&n, i;orl I.lal1 Busir>ess i'cluncii 
.$l~iisf&& , . . '. . . , , .:,:. ,J&&iifiock Trihes 
,?:dl . I 3 2 ) ~  306 
FO;~ I-r*lf. ID 83203 
Chairman. Shosl~one-L3annock Gaming Com~nission 
P.O. Box ion1 
I:oflri. l-iall. 1U S3'03 
54. Effective Date and Duratio~l 
a. Efi'eclivc Date. This Compact shall hecome effective upon execution hy 
the C+:i-avernor of the State snd the Chairman of the Tribes. and upon certification by the 
Governor !ha( the legislature has n~tiiied lhc compacc and authorized waiver of tbc State's 
Eleventh Amcndmcni immurlify. upon cenificarion hy the 'Tribal Chairman t11al Ihe Tribes 
have adopted a resolution authorizing wajver of sovercigc i~nmonity and upon approved 
hy rhe Secretary oi' tile Interior and puhlica~ion in the Federal Register pursuant lo thc 
Act. 
. 
I .  Renerolimion. 'I-he Slate and the Tribes may, by appropriate itnd lawful 
means. request nego~iations to mnend or repiace this C:omp:~ot. in the cvenr of a request. 
Sor rcnegotiation:tliis Con~pacl slitill rem:~in i n  erect  until renegotiated or replacod. Such 
requesn shall he in writing itnd shall be sent by certified mail lo the Governor oi'ihe Siate 
or the Chaimai  oSthe'Tribcs al the appropriate goveminental office. 
c. Chanresin Fcderal E~IM'. 111 the .event federal law resarding guming on 
Indian Lwds shall ci~dnge~ any provision of'this Cornpila which may be inconsistent with 
such changc s11nli be void only to ihc extent necessary to confhrm to said change. 
d. Garncs Conducred hv Orher Trihes irr Idaho. 111 t l~c  event my other Indian 
tribe is permitted hy compact. or li~lal courf decision lo conduct iiny Clms 111 games in 
Idaho in nddition lo those famcs perrnincd by ~rlis Compncr. this Compact shall be 
amended to pennir tile 'l'ribcs lo conduct those same additional canes. A final courl 
decision sl1qj1 lileon,s , . ,  . linnl ,.., , dqcision . . ,  of a Scderai coun or Idaho court once i t  is no longer 
. . 
c@p$ble of ch~nge by recon'sidetation. appeal. rtrvieu..or rcrciorc~r;. 
: ? .: 
25. .4meniIments 
This Compact cannot he amended excepl in writing by the State and the Tribes as 
provided in Secticm 23. 
2 .  Entire Agreement 
'This Compact contains the entire agreemen1 ol' the paflies hereto with respect to 
rhe matters covered by this Compacl and no other statenlent. agreement or promise made 
h!. any party. officer or agency of any party sl~all he valid or binding. 'rile Tribes and the 
Stale sliall not enter irito any other coinpact affecting ihe Gaming operation. excepl as 
a~nctiried to this Cornpiict us provided hereinabove. 
27. Governing Law 
This Compact shall be governed by and construed in accctrdance with the lnws of 
the Ilnited States 
28. Triplicate Originals 
This Co~npac~ shall bc cxecuted in triplicale originals. ol~c for cach of the 
s i p n ~ ~ ~ r e s .  [Tach and ail are equaliy valid. 
29. Authority to Exccutc 
Each ot'lhe undersigned represents that 11c or she is duly authorized and 11% the 
aulhorji? LO execute this Compact on belrr~lf ol'lhe pany for whom he or shc i s  signing. 
IN WTTNESS WHEREOF. the parlies have executed this Co~npiict on the day and 
year set forth hclow. 
SHOSHONE-BANNOCIC TIUBES 
Daicd: F e b r u a ~ ~  18. 3000 Dated: I'ebrt~ant 18. 2610 
. , . .  , , ' ' .  . . . . . . . . .  ' . , . ,  . . .  . . . . . .  . . *  . . .  . . 
I,, 
, , 1% '1 
Case 4:Ol-cv-00052-BLW Document "Filed 01/31/2001 Page 43 of 44 
Dated: ?'ebruanr 18,3000 
CERTIFICATION OF AI.ITHORIZATION TO 
WAIVE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
1 I-IEREBY CERTIFY the( the Tribes have adopted a rcsolutio~l authorizing waiver 
oi'sovereign immurti~ as contcmpla~ed in this Colnpact. 
Dated: Februiw 111.3000 
CERTIFICATION OF I,EGlSLA'ITVE IWrIFICATION 
AND 
AUTHORIZATION TO WAIVE ELEVENTI4 AMENDIUIEN'I' IMMUNITY 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY dial the Legislalrrre of the State oi'ldaho has cnactcd u 
statute rati%ing this Compact iutd authorizing the waiver oS Eleventh Amendmen! 
immunity as conletnpiated in this Compact 
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Pending before the Court are Plaintiffmefendant Shoshone-Bannock 
Tribes' ("Tribe") and DefendantsIPlaintiffs the State of Idaho's and the Idaho 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1 
.$he jsjuetd;be . . .  decide$ .,: ,, in this. .. case . is wh@&r:the . . .. ( ~rib,e:@fidth$:Stateiof . . . . ; . .  ,:. . . . .  : . .  
. , ,  
: .. . 
Jd.&o must reegotiate their existing ~ribai-~t~te'~~m~~~t.(~~o~pact") , . before the 
Tribe is permitted to operate tribal video gaming machines, as defined by 1.C. -$ 
67-429B. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the Compact does not 
require. the Tribe and the State of Idaho to enter into renegotiations before the 
Tribe is authorized to conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines. 
Therefore, the Court will grant the Tribe's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and deny the State of Idaho's Motion for P~artial Summary Judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1Yg8 ("IGRA"), 25 U,S.C. $5 2701- 
2721, provides a comprehensive Eramework for regulating gaming on Indian land. 
The IGRA divides Indian gaming into three classes, each subject to varying 
degrees of tribal, state and federal regulation, Class I gaming is defined as social 
games for prizes of minimal valuc?, and traditional forms of Indian gaming 
conducted as part of tribal ceremonies and celebrations. 9: 2703(6), Class I gaming 
i s  within the exclusive jurisdiction of Indian tribes and is not subject to state or 
federal regulation. $271 0(a)(l). Class I1 gaming includes bingo and related 
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gaming or class U gaming." 2703(8). Class I11 gaming activities may be I 
conducted on Indian lands only ifit  is conducted in conformance with a Tribal- I 
State compact. 5 27XO(d)(l). 
On February 18,2000, the Tribe and State of Idaho entered into a Compact I 
pursuant to the IGRAq2 The Compact governs "the licensing, regulation and I 
operation of Class I11 gaming conducted by the Tribe[] on lndian Lands located I 
within the State [of Idaho] . . . ." Complaint Ex. A at 5 (Docket No. 1). The I 
parties "agreed that the conduct of Class I11 gaming under the terms and 
conditions set forth [in the Compact would] benefit the Triben and protect the 
citizens of the Tribe[] and of the State [of Idaho] . . . ." Id at 4. 
Section Four of the Compact authorizes the Tribe to conduct: any Class I11 I 
gaming activitjl "that the State of Idaho 'permits for any purpose by any person, I 
organization, or entity,' as the phrase is interpreted in the context of the Indian I 
' The parties do not dispute that the tribal video gaming machines at issue in this case fall 
under the definition of Ciaas 111 gaming. 
On September 8,2000, the Compact was approved by the Secretary of the Interior as 
required by $2710(d)(8). See 65 Fed. Rog. 54541 (Sept. 8,2000). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3 
specifically, I&hotook th c gaming [i.e. Class I11 
gaming] currently conducted by the Tribe[] in Idaho is an imitation of casino 
games and prohibited under Idaho and federal law . . . ," See id. at 6. The Tribe 
disagreed. See id As a consequence, the parties included in the Compact a 
provision allowing either party to seek a declaratory judgment to determine the 
types of Class TI1 games authorized by the Compact. See id at 8. Accordingly, on 
January 3 1,2001, and on April 18,2001, the Tribe and the State of Idaho 
respectively filed suit in this court seeking declaratory relief. See Shoshoute- 
Bannock Tribes v. Idaho, CV-01-52-E-BLW, Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 
CV-01-171 -E-BLW. On May 4,2001, the Court consolidated the two cases 
pursuant to a stipulation between the parties. See Scheduling Order (Docket No. 
12). 
Shortly aRer the Tribe filed suit, the parties notified the Court that if Idaho 
Senate Bill 121 1 (2001), then pending, was passed, the Court could either dismiss 
this case or stay the action, Senate Bill 121 1 would have allowed Indian Tribes to 
operate "tribal gaming devices" if the Tribe had a valid Tribal-State Compact in 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4 
focus of this case, Compare S .  121 1 jj 4,56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2001); with 
1.C. jj 67-429B. The pasties stipulation to dismiss the case if Senate Bill 121 1 was 
passed included a provision requiring the Tribe to limit the aggkgate number of 
tribal gaming devicesJmachines to that of certain other Idaho tribes. This 
ageement never came to fruition however, as Senate Bill 121 1 was defeated by a 
vote of 15 to 20 in the Idaho Senate on March 26,2001. See S .  121 I, 56th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2001); see also Declaration of Scott Crowell, Ex. D (Docket No. 
32). 
A little over a year later, on June 26,2002, the parties again informed the 
Court that pending legislation could render this entire action moot. See 
Stipulation at 3 (Docket No. 15). On May 9,2002, the Idaho Secretary of State 
certified a voter initiative that included a provision authorizing Indian Tribes to 
conduct gaming using "tribal video gaming machines." The initiative was placed 
on the November 2002 ballot and was referred to as "Proposition One." Section 
Two of Proposition One, the findings and purposes clause, noted that Tribes have 
suffered from a disproportionate amount of unemployment and poverty and that 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5 
reservations." 
(November 5, 
See Proposition One, Indian Gaming and Self-Relimce Act, 
2002), available at 
http://www.idsos.state.id.ua/electlinits/02init01 .htm; see also Declaration of Scott 1 
Crowell, Ex. F at 1-2 (Docket No. 32); Stipulation Att. A at 3 (Docket No. 15). 
I 
I 
Section Two went on to state that: 
Due to differences in opinion over the interpretation of 
Idaho law, , , , tribes face legal uncertainties about the 
types of gaming machines they can operate on Indian 
lands. This uncertainty threatens the future of lndian 
ga~l~g1~~.d~6~-d.th't?"abilit.Y~~rF.tfie8e~~ibes-to continue 
their progress toward economic self-reliance. 
Attempts by the tribes and the governor to resolve these 
legal uncertainties have failed, jeopardizing the future of 
tribally-funded education, health care, and social service 
programs. Therefore, the citizens ofIdaho desire to secure 
the future of tribal gaming on Indian lands in Idaho 
themselves through this ballot measure. 
This ballot measure clarifies that it is the public policy of 
the State of Idaho that Indian tribes can continue to operate 
the types of lottery-style gaming machines currently used 
at Indian gaming facilities on Idaho reservations under the 
terms of this act. 
Id. As is evident by Clause Two of Proposition One, voters were aware of the 
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Section 429B of Title 67 of the ldaho Code allows "Indian Tribes , . . to I 
conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines pursuant to state-tribal 
gaming compacts which specifically permit their use." I.C. ij 67-429B(1). This 
section also defines what a "tribal video gaming machine" is. See id. Section 
429C of Tifle 67 of the Idaho Code provides a mechanism for Tribes to amend 
their Compact to lLspecifically" permit the use of tribal video gaming machines. 
See 1.C. $ 67-42%. Shortly after Proposition One was passed the Coeur d'Alene 
Tribe, the Kootenai Tribe, and the Nez Perce Tribe, followed the procedures 
outlined in 4 429C in order to amend their Tribal-State Compacts to specifically 
authorize the use of tribal video gaming machines, See Affidavit of Miren E. 
Artiach, Exs. 1-3 (Docket No. 36). Those tribes' compacts now provide that the 
tribes may conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines. See id; I.C. 8 
' Shortly afier Proposition One was passed, it was challenged as unconstitutional under 
the Idaho State Constitution. The Supreme Court however, declined to rule on the matter 
holding that it did not have original jurisdiction to hear the case. See Bell v. Cenurrusa, No. 
29226 (Idaho Junc 5,2003), available at http:!/www.isc.idaho.gov!opinions/29226.pdf 




, . , . 
e d f  &aho:no<longer takes the 
ly precludedfi~m using 
tribal video gaming machines. Rather, the State says that before the Tribe may 
utilize such machines the Tribe must submit to renegotiations concerning the 
terns of the Compact, Presumably, the State of Idaho would like to amend the 
Compact to provide more regulations that specifically address tribal video gaming 
machines, The State of Idaho relies upon Section 24(d) of the Compact to support 
its argument. Section 24(d) is a "most favored nations" clause that states: "In the 
event any other-Indian-tribeis-pemitted~by compaot or-final court  decision?^ 
conduct any Class 111 games in Idaho in addition to those games permitted by this 
compact, this Compact shall be amended to permit the Tribes to conduct those 
same additional games." See Complaint Ex. A at 30 (Docket No. 1 )  (emphasis 
added). The State of Idaho argues that Section 24(d) requires that the Compact be 
amended before the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe is authorized to use tribal video 
gaming machines. The State also argues that the amendment process necessarily 
The Shoshone and Bannock Tribes is a single federally recognized Indian Tribe; hence, 
the reference to "Tribes" although plural at first glance, is a reference to a single entity. 
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, ., . .. 
any other tribe in the State #Idaho is allowed to conduct. Therefore, the Tribe 
argues that, regardless of Section 24(d), no amendment is necessary given the fact 
that other tribes located in the State of Idaho are permitted to usetribal video 
gaming machines, Alternatively, the Tribes argue that even if Section 24(d) I 
requires the Compact to be amended before the Tribes are allowed to  offer tribal 
i 
! 
video gaming machines, it does not require the Tribe to submit to renegotiations. 
1 
! 
Rather, the Tribe argues that at most, Section 24(d) requires a brief amendment 
clarifying that the tribe is authorized to conduct gaming using tribal video gaming 
machines. The Tribe asserts that such an amendment should be adopted 
automatically and is not contingent upon renegotiating other pafls of  the Compact. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the afidavits, if 
any, show that there i s  no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This 
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A tribal-state compact is ehujvalent to a contract. See Texas v. New Mexioo, 
I 
482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) ('"a Compact is, after all, a contract") (quoting Petty v. 1 
Tennessee-MissouriBridge Comm 'n, 359 U.S. 275,285 (1959)); Crow Tribe of 
Indians v. Racicot, 87 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying contract law to 
tribal-stat0 compact), Summary judgment is an appropriate device for resolving 
the issues presented by the parties as issues relating to contract interpretation are 
generally questions of law, See DiamondFruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 
F.2d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir. 1986). Only if the contract in question is ambiguous, 
does it present a question of fact. See Nat '1 Union Fire IBS. Co. of Pittsburgh 
Penn, v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95,97 (9th Cir. 1983). "The fact that the 
parties dispute a contract's meaning does not establish that the contract is 
ambiguous; it is only ambiguous if reasonable people could find its terms 
susceptible to more than one interpretation." See Klamath Water Users Protective 
Ass 'n v, Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 121 0 (9h Cir. 2000). 
Section Twenty-Seven of the Compact contains a choice of law provision 
that states: "This Compact shall be governed by and construed in accordance with 
the laws of  the United States." Hence, the Court finds that federal law governs the 
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Unitedstates, 880 F.2d 1018, 1032<(9th Cir, 1989). 
"Contract terms are to be given their ordinary meaning, and when the terms 
of a contract are clear, the intent of the parties must be ascertained &om the 
contract itself,'' See Klumuth Water Users Protective Ass 'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 
1206, 121 0 (9th Cir, 2000). In addition, "'[a] written contract must be read as a 
whole and every part interpreted with reference to the whole."' See id. (quoting 
Shakey 's hc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426,434 (9th Cir. 1983)). "[Aln interpretation 
which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is 
preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawhl, or of no 
effect." Restatement (Second) of Contracts 6 203 (1981). However, "when 
provisions are inconsistent, specific terms control over general ones." S. Caf. Gas 
Co. v. Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,891 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts S; 203 ( 1  981) 
As was stated above, the issue presented to the Court is whether the Tribe 
and the State of Idaho must renegotiate their existing Tribal-State Compact 
("Compact") before the Tribe is permitted to operate tribal video gaming 
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dispute the fact that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe,the Kootenai Tribe, and the Nez 
Perce Tribe legally operate tribal video gaming machines within the State of 
Idaho. Hence, both parties agree that Section Four authorjzes the Tribe to also 
operate tribal video gaming machines. The real dispute centers upon Section 
24(d) of the Compact. Section 24(d) states: 
Games Conducted by Other Tribes in Idaho, In the event 
any other Indian tribe is permitted by compact or final 
coirt decision to conduct any Class 111 games in Idaho in 
. . @ d d ~ ~ i @ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t k ~ ~ ~ ~ g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ x ~ ~ & ~ # ; ~ Q . ~ ~ p & ~ ~ , .  t i i s  
Compact shall. be amended to permit the Tribes to conduct 
those same additional games. A final court decision shall 
mean a final decision ofa federal court or Idaho court once 
it is no longer capable of change by reconsideration, 
appeal, review or certiorari. 
Complaint Ex. A at 30 (Docket No. 1). The State of Idaho argues that this 
provision explicitly requires the Compact to be amended prior to the Tribe being 
authorized to operate tribal video gaming machines. In response, the Tribe argues 
that Section 24(d) is moot in light of the Ninth Circuit's recent ruling in Artichoke 
game dffered by another tribe located in Idaho regardless if the TGRA was 
interpreted such that thephrase "any person, organization, or entity" did not 
include an Indian tribe. The Tribe asserts that ifArtichoke Joe's had been 
decidedly differently, Section 24(d) would have provided the Tribe with the means 
to amend their Compact to offer any Class III gaming offered by other tribes 
located in Idaho. However, given the decision in Artichoke Joe's, the Tribe argues 
that Sectibn 24(d)is moot. 'Hence, tfie Tribe argues that Section'Fdur'is the only 
provision relevant to the present issue. 
The Court, however, cannot accept the Tribe's argument in the absence of 
evidence that this was the meaning attached to Section 24(d) by the parties. See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts fj 212 Comment (b) (1981). As a consequence, 
the Court must decipher the meaning of Section 24(d) from the text itself. See 
Klamath Water Users Protective Ass 'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 121 0 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
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lass 111 gaming conducted by 
o'fher tribes in the State oFIdaho, why would an amendment ever be necessary 
under Section 24(d)? The Court can decipher no reason other than that the parties 
intended that any enlargement of Section Four be expressed in writing. Section 25 
of the Compact provides that the "Compact cannot be amended except in writing 
by the State and Tribe[] as provided in Section 23." Complaint Ex. A at 3 1 
(Docket No, I), Section 23 provides that "all notices required or authorized to be 
tEig,co mpa6 .gh&IIII be.SeNc,,, upoh .sKe'.18~ State Cariiihg Agemy 
and the Chairman of the Fort Hall Business Council. Complaint Ex. A at 29-30 
(Docket No. 1). Section 23 does not outline any other procedures for amendment. 
See id, Noticeably absent from Sections 23,24(d), and 25, are any requirements 
that, prior to an amendment, the parties must renegotiate any part of the Compact. 
Therefore, the Court finds that Sections 23,24(d), and 25, are merely 
administrative provisions requiring the Tribe to serve upon the Idaho State 
Gaming Counsel a brief amendment clarifying that the Tribe is authorized to 
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certainty as to the type of gaming allowed under the Compact. This interpretation 
is consistent with $ 203 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as  it gives 
meaning to every provision of the Compact. 
Furthermore, the Court finds that Section 24(d) is not ambiguous such that 
the Court would be required to consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent 
behind this provision. Rather the Court finds that, because Section 24(d) states 
that an amendment "shrall" be made and there being no language to the effect that 
such an amendment is conditioned upon renegotiation, Section 24(d) clearly does 
not require the parties to enter into negotiations prior to adoption of a Section 
24(d) amendment. As a consequence, the State may not decline to accept the 
amendment on the grounds that the amendment was not negotiated. Had the State 
of Idaho desired that amendments pursuant to Section 24(d) be conditioned upon 
negotiation, it could have easily inserted langaage to that effect. Inasmuch as the 
State of Idaho invites the Court to write such a condition into the Compact, the 
Court declines the offer. 
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The Court must also disagree with the State of Idaho's argunlent that 
Seciion 24(b) of the Compact requires the parties to engage in negotiations prior 
to adoption of a Secrion 24(d) amendment. Section 24(b) provides Piat either the 
. . . . 
, , .,.I , . # ... , .. 
$tit6of;@&o . . :~ or the:Tribeniti$:.r$tji,.kst nqgGtlat;&s to miend or ekplwethe 
. ., , .. 
Compact. Nowhere in Section 24(d) is there a reference to Section 24(b). Section 
24(b) addresses only those situations where either the Tribe or the State of Idaho 
would like to mend  the Compact, not where they must amend the Compact. 
Pursuant to Section 24(b), the State may request that the Tribe negotiate additional 
regulations concerning the tribal video gaming machines, but the State may not 
delay adoption of a mandatory Section 24(d) amendment because negotiations 
entered into under Section 24(b) are ur~resolved.~ 
CONCLUSION 
After carefully reviewing the record and the law, the Court concludes that I 
no genuine issue of material fact exists which precludes entry of partial summary I 
judgment on behalf ofthe Tribe. In sum, the Court finds that as a matter of law 
the Compact does not require the Tribe and the State of Idaho to enter into 
" Interestingly, the Court's interpretation of the Compact is similar to that of the Idaho 
Attorney General's initial review of this matter. See Declaration of Scott Crowell, Ex, G at 4 
(Docket No, 32). The Cow however, disavows any reliance upon tho Attorney General's initial 
assessment for purposes of the Court's decision. 
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t . ,  
arlthbfiied . . tb operate "tribal video gamingm&chi&3" 's:th&errn is '&flr&din 
1.C. $ 67-429B. 
ORDER 
NOW TWEREPORE IT IS HEMEBY ORDERED that the ghoshone- 
Bannock Tribes' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 29) is 
GRANTED. j 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of Idaho's and the Idaho State 
A Dated this day of April, 2004, 
tates District Court 
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Attorney for Plaintiffs I 
IN THE DISTRICT OF TEE! SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
AND FOR THE C O N Y  OF BINGHAM 
I WENDY KNOX, and RICHARD 1 Case No. CV-2008-GG7 
I 1 DOTSON, 1 
Plaintiffs, 1 1 
1 
v. NEMORANDLM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFEIWANTS' 
STATE OF JDAHO, ex rel. MOTION TO DISMISS 
Governor; BEN YSURA, 
and LAWRFBCE 
General, 
Defendants. I 1 
COME NOW Plainti , by and through counsel of record, and submit the following to the "a 
Court i n  respoilse to the Def dants pending Motion to Dismiss. 
I 1 INTRODUCTION 
In November 2002, th cltizens of Idaho passed an Initinrive known as Proposition One, or j' 
the Tribal Gaminglnitiative. he Initiative allowed "tribal video gaming machines" to be operated 
I 
must therefore be dismissed. 
However, the tribes not necessary or indispensable parties to this action. In their 
Amended Complaint the Plai do not request relief in the form of compelling rhe Defendanrs 
to tnke any siecific action nor cchaenging or seeking to invalidate any tribal-state compact, 
but are merely seek a 
The tribes are not part@ and will not suffer direct prejudice from 8 declaratory judgment. 
Ifthe tribes beliere that the/? intarest my be inpalred then tky have Br ability to petition 
! 
I 
2 - ~ O R A N D L J M J N  OPP~SITION TO DHFENDANTS' MOTIONTO DISMISS 
Jun 02 7008 4:3?PM HE L R S E R J E T  3330 ,*--, p - = - - - - .  1 ,  I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I 
I 
v. Dep't. u f ~ a t e r  A ~ S O ~ ~ W J ,  /19  Idaho 676, 677, 809 P,2d 1155, 1156 (1991). The grant of a 
1Z(b)(6) motion will be affirmr/d where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the case can 
be decided as amaner of law. eeM0.r~ i? Mid-Anaerjcun Fi redMur ine lns ,  Co., 103 Idaho 298, 
302,647 P.Zd 754,758(1982); Eliopu!os v. IdahoSrateBank, 139Idaho 104,107-08,922 Pq2d401, 
404-05 (Ct. App. 1996). Wh -reviewing an order of the district cok t  dismissing a case pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. lZ(b)(d), thc non- owng patty is entitled to have all inferences from the record and t ' pleadings viewedinitsfavor;afld only chen may the question be asked whether aclsim for'relief has 
bwn stated. See ~duho'Schs. or Equal Educ., 123 Idaho at 578, 850 P:2d at 729; Miles e Idaha i Power Co., I16 Idaho 635, 63 ,778 P.2d 757,759 (1989). "The issue is not whether the plaintif[ 
i 
3 - M E M O W U M  IN OPPOSITION TO UEFbNDANTS' MOTION TO DIShllSS 
I 
J u n  0 2  2008 4:33PM 3 3 3 0  6 
--') P- -- 
ARGUMENT 
the matter must be dismissed I 
1 
Whiteit is true that d e s  are generally immune from unconuentedsuit and cannot bejoined 
I. even if they are necessary pqles,  m the present case the tribes are not necessnry or indispensable 
parties. Because the Plaintiff j are requesting a declaratory judgment, the standard found in LC. 6 
I 
10-1211 is the applicable stohkd forjoinder of pnrtiesmdmabriallyaffects the inquiry under Rule. 
I 
I 
19. Under the language of 10-1211, the tribes are not necessary or &idispensable parties. 
I 
Additionally, even assuming for the purpose of argument only, that Rule 19 is the applicable I 
standard, the tribes are still no1 necessary or indispensable parties. 
i 
The Plaintiffs seek a &claratory judgment that LC. 54 67-4293 and 67-429C violate the 
I 
i 
Idaho State Constitution, Conpequently, Idaho Code Title 10, Chapter 12, Declaratory Judgments, 
is the applicable statutory stanlard. LC. 5 10-1201, which authorizes the Court to issue declaratory 
! 
judpen ts, states: j 
i 
under a dqd, will, written cont'r&t.or , , , other , .,:.* , . wbtinb . .., .. . 
or any ord conkact, orw$ose,rigbts, shtug,~r , . . . other ., . 
statutg,m~icipal,or$nance, contr4~t:or 
any question of bonq@cfj6n, bF.i~6dity 
ordinance, c o & ~ c t k  fp$ichise and 
of rjghts, s'tatus or other legal relationsthereunder. 
The Plaintiffs' rights, status id Iegalrelations are affected by the statutes listedaboveandtherefore 7 
are permitted to bring this d e ~  aratory action. LC. 8 10-121 1 describes the parties asainst whom a t 
declaratory judgment action u der the statute may be brought: i 
reliefis sought, all persons shall be made parties who have 
which would be affected by the declaration, and no 
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties lo theprocoediqg. 
I 
Thus, the Act requires 'oinder only of pallet2 "who have or claim my interest which would i 
be affected by the declaration"/ not those whose interests are mereiy uncertain or  speculative. This 
I 
action is directed ar the Stare s/lr the unconotitut~onal rurutes enscied. and seeks only a declaration 
that thestatutes are unconstitn di ona!. Theeffects oofsuch.adeclaration are not addressed by or apart 
I 
of che Amended Complaint. ?T/le tribes' interesz in their compact righis are not effected as they are 
I . . .  : 
not parties and "no declaration sllall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to  the 
I 
proceeding." 1 
I Furthermore, the abov statute, unlikeRule 19, ensures thatthis acrion"shal1 [not] prejudice "i 
I the rights ofpersons not parties, to the such as Idaho Indian Tribes. Thus, bystatute m y  
Indian tribe's rights, rights under an IGRA compact with the State of Idaho, cannot 
i be prejudiced .If they are not jotned. Consequent1y;even if such trjbes were necessary parties, as a 
I 
matter of Idaho Statute they 4 not "indispensable" within the meaning of Rule 19. 
i 
5 - MEMORANDUMIN OPP&~~T~QN TODEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
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11. ASSUMING THAT' I.R.C.P. 19 IS APPLICABLE. THE TRIBES ARE NOT 
NECESSARY OR INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. 
Evenif the Court wer to ignore the plain language and effect of Idaho Code 5 10-121 1, the i 
j. . tribes are still not necessary o rndrspensable parties. 
I 
I 
k me Cwes ~ i t k d  Bv The Defendants Are Inau~licable. 
In their supporting b 'ef, the Defendants rely on two cases regarding necessary and I i 
indispensable paties in suppofl of their argument. These cases an: clearly di stinguishable from the 
present rase. First. the clefendints rely on WNbyrv b i k e ,  423 F.3d 1105 (PY Cir  ZOOS). I. Witbur 
a the plaintiffs sought toenjoin c impiemcntation of a cigarette tax compact with a tribe. The A-inth 
I 
Circuit found that the tribes w41e necessary parties becauge of the fundarnentidl principle that a party 
1 
i 
to a contract is necessary and indispensable to litigation seeking to void the contract. The present 
1 
case is distinguishable. ~ n l i $  in Wilbur, the Plaintiffs are not asking the Court to prevent the 
I 
government or any other entiiy from forming a compact with a tribe nor are they attacking the 
i 
compwt entered into between &e and the tribe. The Plaintiffs Knox andDotson sinlpi'y 
seek a declmatoryjudgment th t certnin Idaho statutes are unconstitutional, Whether ornot the State i ! 
of Idaho chooses to abide by ik tzibaJ compacts if Plaintiffs are successful is not at issue here. 
1 
The same analysis and reasoning applies to the second case cited and heavily relied upon by 
the Defendants, American ~ r ~ j ~ h o r r , t d  ~ a r i r ~ ~ ,  Inc. rr .Hull, 146 F. Supp 2d 1012 (D. Ariz. 2001). 
I 
h Americmz Greyhound, the p[aintiffs challenged a starute which empowered the Arizona governor 
1 
to negotiare new, orextendexi$ting class a, gaming compacts with various tribes. Thedistrictco~ut 
found that the statute embodie an unlawful delegation of legislative power and that various types b 
of casino gamingwere unlawd,ui under Arizona law and enjoined the governor from engaging in 
i 
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either action. 1 
On appeal, the Ninth dircuit concluded that the tribes werr: necessary patties underRule 19. 
I 
I 
The court found that the injudction orbred by the district court required the governor to terminate 
; 
the present compacts and shuf down virtually the entire Indian gamingindustry in Arizona. In the 
: 
I 
present case, Plaintiffs are nof seeking injunctive relief nor will a declaratory judgment require the 
j 
termination of any particularaompact or have the immediate effect of shutting down tribal gaming 
i . . 
activity, They seek only a ded~aration that aforesaid gaming statutes are unconstitutional. 
! 
B, The Tribes ~ d e  Not Necessarv Parties. 
I 
Applying the factors if I.R.C.P. 19, it is clear that the tribes are not necessary parties. Rule 
I 
I 
19(a)(l) discusser joinder of+ons if feasible. It states: 
' A p ~ o ~  who !suaject a ser&e oipmies8 ahdl be joined a8 apanym the 
aofion if (1) i j  the person's abseacecomp1ete relief cannot be accorded 
among those alpeady parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to 
e action and is so situated that the disposition of the action 
may (i) as a practicnl matter impair or impede the 
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already . .  - 
partiessubject 6 a~ubstantial riSkof i ~ c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ n g d ~ u b l e ,  multi$e, ~ r o t b e r w i ~  
inconsisrcnr obligations by kason of the c l a h c l  interest. 
In the present case, co&ete relief can be accorded among those already parties in the tribes 
absence. The Co&t3s declaralory judgmint would afford Plaintiffa everything they seek in their 
I 
amendedcomplaint, and &'deci/iion denying such ajudgment wouldgive the State ofIdaho precisely 
what they seek by their motioi, which is as "complete" as can be. 
i 
Plaintiffs simply see; a judgment declaring that LC. $$ 67-429B and 6 7 4 9 C  are 
"nco~titutional. ~he,dis~osi$on f the instant action in the tribes' absence would not impair or 
/ 
impede W tribe#' ahuity to p[otect their interest in their l G M  compacts with the state ofdaho. 
Plaintiffs .are not seeking injunctive or mandamus relief. They are not directly challengirig, 
i 
attacking, or seekingto resci(d any tribal compact. No declaratory judgment would immediately 
! 
endanger or threaten tribal compacts. The defendants' postulatal threats a l l  involve future action 
i by the state authorities. Plaintfffs do not, in the Amended Complaint, seek any such relief, nor are 
the Plaintiffs empowered to dd so. Plaintiffs arenot the government authority. It is at best unclear 
I 
whether the state of Idaho w b l d  be successful in a possible future attempt to avoid the tribal 
i 
compacts if this Court grants )?laintiffs their requested declaratory judgment. However, if some 
authority otherthanPlaintiffs doestake some action, the tribes wouId obviously have the full ability 
. . 
toproLecttheirownjntemst in a court of law at that time and would not beprejudicedundertheplain 
I 
I 
terns of the Declaratory Judg@ent Act. 
! 
In addition, the defendnts who are aiceady partjes to the action would not be subject to a 
substantial riskof incurring, d&le, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations. The defendam 
i 
argue that any declaratovjud&ntbY ,, ... .... : the court that 88 67-429B and 67-429C are unconstiNtionel 
wouldimpose obligations on them which would conflict wi& &Ninth Circuit'sjudgmentinSrate 
i 
of Irlaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095 (9" Cjr. 2006) authorizing the tribes to add 
i 
tribal video gaming machine@ to its IORA sanctioned class Ill gaming compact. This creative 
1 
interpretation of Rule 19 fails !For several reasons. First, this Court lacks authority to impose my 
obligations inconsistent with &e Ninth Circuit's decision cited above. The reason is that Plaintiffs 
i 
have not requested that the C~LU? impose any obligations at all on the defendants; the amended 
complaint seeks only declara&ry relief, not mandatory relief. Anotha reason is that there is a 
serious qucstiori whether mandamus relief js even available, as Plaintiffs am unawnre of any statute 
orr&gu$ti.w imposing a clear4 affirmative legal duty on the ,&fendants tor 
with Indian tribe$uddercircu+tances likc thosepresent here. Saviers v. 
I 
529 P.2d 1285,1287 (1974) ('iA writ of Mandate will issue to a party whohas R c l e ~ l e g d  ght  to 
have an act perfonnedif the 04ficcragainstwhorn the writ is sought has acleardutyto act and if ihe 
act be ministerial and not regiire.the exercise of discretion"). 
Second, contrary to t h ~  defendants' representations, the Ninth Circuit in the above case 
imposedno obligation at all upbn the defendants. The court simply interpretedthe exi8ting compact 
between the State and the tribd as allowing the tribe certain gaming privileges given to other rribes 
I 
without having to renegotiafi, rheir current compaci The decision does not address the 
constitutionality of LC. $8 67-429B and 67.429C, nor was that an issue in the case. 
Third, the defe'endanw' argument confuses Rufe 19 with the doctlineof resjtuz'iccata. In order 
to obtain thepreclusiveeffect t8ey seek from the Ninth Cinuit'sdecisioncitedabove, the defendants 
must establish all the elemen& required by the doctrine of claim praclusion or issue preclusion, 
which the defendants have not snd cannot. See A.R., inc. v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141, 144,997 P.2d 
602,605 (2000) for a clear statiment of the legal requirements necessary to obtain preclusiveeffect 
from a priorjudgment under both doctrines. The effcct ofprior judgments on current proceedings 
: 
is the subject of Rcs judicata; Rule 19 addresses the likelihood that a future judgments or 
i 
obligations will conflict. . 
B. Assumine the Tiibes are Necessarv Parties, They are Not Indisnensable Parties. 
Assuming for the purposes of argument only that the tribes are necessaryparties, underRule 
19(d)(2) the tribes are not indispensable parties. Rule 1P(a)(2) stares: 
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After considering the factors listed above, the Court, in equity andgood conscience, should 
determine to poceed with parties beforeit. With respectto the first Factor, no party already involved 
in the instant cnse wjll suffer any prejudice if a judgment is efitered in the absence of the hibes. As 
sit forth above, pursuant to t& language in LC. § 10-1211, it i s  legally i&ssiblc for the tribes' 
. . 
rights to be prejudiced. A decl&atoryjudgment entesedin the tribes' absence will not preclude them 
from protecting their interest: even if any future action is brought da t ing  to such declaratory 
judgment. As a matterof law they sfill maintjin the &iiijty nndright to defend.thdiiidtet'eSt3 bEfbre 
a court of law, and are not bodlld as parties in this action. 
The second. f ~ t o r  under Rule 19(a)(l) disoussea avenues by which the prejudice can be 
lessened or avoided. By simp]) asking for a declmato jjudgmeat and not injunctive or mandamus 
relief, prejudice to tribii interells haye been lessened and avoided. unlike injunctive or rnandiunus 
relief, the tribes will sdffer minimal orno.direct prejudice because a declaratory judgment will not 
immediately or directly threaten the tribal oompaots; it willnot void my compact and the tribes still 
maintain the ability andright to'protect any interest in theircompacts in thefutture if the need arises. 
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As to rhe lhird factor, a declaratory judgmentrendered in che tribes' absence clearly will be 
ffs are not seeking my specific prohibition or mandatory action on the part of 
ment offtcials, Thus, a declaratory judgment findiqg thatSg67-429B and 67- 
429C are unconstitutional will afford the Plaintiffs ail the relief they seek. 
The fourth factor weighs heavily in the Plaintiff's favor. If the hibes are considered 
jndispcnsable parties, all the Plaintiffs' rights as Idaho citizens to seek a declaration are effectively 
closed off, if the tribes' conibnt is somehow required to adjudicate the matter of the statutes' 
constitutionality under Idaho :law. In essence the State is arguing that the matter of Idaho's 
r Constitution and its applicatidjl to these statutes is nor, a matter for the Idaho Courts and is now 
I 
1 exclusively in the hands of the'tribes (an assated separate non-Idahonation) who must consent to 
adjudicate the matter. This is absurd. This Court has the full and unrestrained right and ability, Iy 
indeed &&, to declare the conbtitutionality of Idaho statutes. See Powers v. Canyun Coz~nnty, 108 
Idaho 967,982,703 P.2d 1342, ;1357 (1985) ("Under the Constitution, our courts'havethe authority 
to interpret legislation or to deblare unconstitutional those legislative acts which do not meet the 
,., \.... .,,, , .....,., >. . . ,.., . 
standards of the state orfederaliconstitutions,'3. This is a well-established and cherished prjnciple 
of American jurisprudence sidce See ~ i r b t r ~  v: Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). A declaratory 
. . 
judgment by the Court declaring the statutes unconstitutional is the only remedy available to 
Plaintiffs. This Coun cannot abd should not eliminate that right. 
Moreover, if the Courli determines that the hibes are indispensable parties, it will have 
undesireable and absurd practical, policy, and constitutionaI implications. It will amount to a 
determination that the tribes' cumpact rights take precedence over the Idaho Constitunon and snip 
the Idaho judiciary of its constitutional duty to determine the constitutionality of ac$ of the Idaho 
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Legislature. According to the,defendants, Idaho statutes that violate the Idaho Constitution cannot 
be challenged in the Idaho Courts without the tribes' consent, and citizens of Idaho who have 
suffered particularized harm have no means of challenging the constitutionality of such statutes. 
Such a result wouldrender theIdaho Constitution meaningless in this context. Constitutionalrights 
andproscriptions that cannot be enforced might as well not exist, 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court deny the defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and toadjudicate the matters on the merit8 as requested in the Amended Complaint. 
DATED this a day:of June, 2008. 
THOMSEN STEPMEIVS LAW OFFICES. PLLC 
hf, 
J u n  02 2008 4:36PM ' '9 LRSERJET 3330 -- p. 15 
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) AMENDED COMPLArNT FOR 
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C. L. O m ,  ) DECLARATORY JUDGGMEv 
Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of State: ) 




COME NOW the Plaintiffs above-named. and for cause of action against the defendants, 
aUege as follows: . .  . 
1. ThePlaintiffs in this actionchallenge theconstitutionalityofIdaho Code 5s 674298 
and 67-429C, enacted by Proposition One during the November 5,2002, generd election. Plaintiffs 
contend ha t  Idaho Code 88 67-429B and 67-429C violate the Idaho Constitution, ~rticle a, $ 20. 
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"Dotson") are and at atl times material were residents and citizens of the Bingham County, Idqho. 
3.  Defendant C. L, Otter, the Governor of the State of Idaho, is charged with upholding 
the Idaho Constitution and faithfully executing the laws of the State of Idaho, including Article a, 
f 20 of theIdaho Constitution andIdaho Code $6 18-3808 and 18-3810. Mr. Otter is sued solely in 
his Official capacity. 
4. DefendantBen Ysura, theIdaho Secretary of State, ischarged with theadministration 
of elections in Idaho pilrsuant to Title 34, Chapter 18, Idaho Code. His predecessor cnnvwsed the 
voting on Proposition One and concluded that Proposition One received a majority of the votes at 
theNovember5,2OOZelec~on,resultinginIdaho Code $6 67-4298 and67429C. Mr. Ysurais sued 
solely in his official capacity. 
5 .  DefendantLawrence Wasden, Attorney General forthe State of Idaho,is also charged 
with u&.nl&.ggA&e Id_aho,C,on~!i.~tion,.an~faithfu~ly , , cxeouting and prosecuting the laws of the State 
of Idaho, including ArticleIU, # 20 oftheIdaho Constitution and Idaho Code $E 18-3808 and 18- 
3810. Mr. Wasden is sued solely in his official capacity. 
6 ,  The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Idaho's Unifom Declaratory 
Judgment ~ c t ;  Title 10, Chapter 1'2, Idaho Code, and.Article V. 20 of the Idaho Constitution. 
7. Venue is proper pursuant to LC, $5-402(2) because this cause, or  some pan thereof. 
arose in Bingham county. Venue is also proper pursuant to I.C. 8 5-404 because the State of Idaho 
is not a resident of any particular county m the State of Idaho. 
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8. Plaintiffs have standing to bring this aotio 
in fact, because there is a substantial likelihood that the 
redress their jnjudes, and because their injuries are djfferent from those suffered by the general 
public, as established by the following facts, interalia: 
a. After enactment of Idaho Code $ 5  67-429B and 67-429C and subsequent 
instaliation of slot rnnchines at ghe Fort Ball Casino near Blackfoot. Idaho, both Plaintiffs became 
cornpul@ive gamblers, driving the short distance from their homes to gamble on the slot machines 
(euphemistically called a "tribal video gaming machine") at theFoa Hall Casino, about 3 to4 times 
per week. 
b. . Plaintiffs gambled almost exclusively at Fort Hall Casino because of its very 
shm distnnce from their respective residences, compared to the next nearest places to gamble, 
hundreds of miles away. 
c. Of qll the ., different ..., ",,,. . .. .. types ., of gambling available at the Fort Hall Casino, 
Plaintiffs played only the slot machines. 
d. Because of Idaho Code gp67-429B and 67-429Cand subsequentinstallation 
of slotmachines at the Fort NBlk Casjno, Plaintiffs bbth developedclinical anddevastatingaddictions 
to gambling at the Fort Hall Casino. Plaintiff %ox estimates her slot machine losses at Fort Ed1 
Casino at about $50,000.00, and Plaintiff Dotson estimates his slot machine losses at Fort Hall 
Casino at about $30,000.00. 
e. Because of the slot machines allowed at the Fort KdI Casino in violation of 
Jdaholaw and Idaho Constirution and their consequent gambling addiction, both plaintiffs suffered 
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convicted of the crhne of forgery in order to obtain gambling funds, all because of his gambling 
addiction precipitated by Proposition One, Idaho Code 88 67-429B and 67-429C and subsequent 
installation ofslot machines at the Fort Hall Casino. 
g. . Both Plaintiffs have sought, obtained, and continue to receive treatmenr for 
their destructive gambling addictions, &rough Gambler's Anonymous. Dotson has also obtaincd 
counseling from a private licensed counselor forhis gambling addiction. 
f, ff the defendants had originally upheld the Idabo Constitution and statutes 
prohibiting slot machines against Proposition One and Idaho Code B# 67429B and 67429C, slot 
machines wouldnothave been installed at FortHall Casino andneitherPlaintiff wouldhave suffered 
the harm set forth above. 
g. H this Court declares Proposition One and LC. 67-429B and 67-429C to 
bein violation oftheIdaho ~onst i tut ion,Fart~a~ Casino maybe forced to removeits slot machines, 
andauch casino stylegamblingwillbemuchlessreadily availabletoPlaintiffs. This will make their 
recovery much easierand will prevent or minimize further harm to the Plaintiffs of the kind set forth 
above. 
5). Plaintiffs have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to halt the harm they are 
suffering, otherthan'tbe remedies sought herein. 
10. The cbnstitutional issues raised in this proceeding conccm Idaho State law only. 
11. stitution, as amend 
gambling in Idaho. It provides, inter alia: 
(1)  Ganrbling is contrary topuhZicpoEcy and i s  stricL'lyprohibifedexcepl 
jbr the faaowitrg: 
a. A state lottery which is authorized by the state if conducted in 
conformity with enabling legislation: and 
b. Pari-mutyeI betting if conducted in conformity with enabling 
legislation; and 
c. Bingo and raffle g m s  that are operated by qualified charitable 
organizations in the pursuit of charitable purposes if conducted in 
confonriity with enabling legislation. 
(2) Noactivitiespermitted by subsection (1)shall employ anyformofcasino 
gambling including, but not limited to, blackjack, craps, roulette, poker, 
baccarat, keno and slot macfalnes, or employs any alffeftonic or 
~l~cfromechanicalimitutim orsinrulation of any form afmssino gambling. 
((Fhnphasjs added). 
12. The IdahoLegislature has, bystatute, likewiseprohibitedgambling,makingit acrime, 
seeLC. 1 18-3801 and18-3802, and prohibited slot machines in p d c d a r .  See LC. (j 18-3810. 
13. Idaho Code $5 67-429B and 67-429Cpurport to authorize gambling onIndian lands 
in Idaho in violation of Article IJI, 5 20 of the Idaho Constitution. 
14. The gambling activities ostensibly authorized by I.C. f 8 67-429B and67429C do not 
fall with~n any of the three exceptions in subsection (L) of Article LI, Section 20, Idaho Constitution. 
15. Idaho Code $8 67-429B and 67-429C purport to authorize forms of casino gambling 
which subsection (2) ofArtic10 IJI, $20  of the Idaho Constitutim, expressly prohibits. 
16. Maho Code # 67-429B, enacted pursuant to Proposition One, pnrportr. to authorize 
the use of "tribal video gaming machines" on Indian lands. 
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17. The Attorney General's Certificate acknowledged that the tribal vide g 
machines as defined by LC. 67-429B "would be construed as slot machines or imitations or 
simulations of forms of cssinogambfing." 
18. Piaintiffs agr& with the ~ t t & e ~  .~eneral's statement quoted above, and further 
allege that the, aforesaid "tribal video gaming machines" are "electronic or electromechanica1 
imitations or simulations of any form of casino gambling." 
19. Idaho Code $5 67-429C, enacted pursuant to Proposition One, authorizes Ule 
uniiarerai amendment of state-tribnl gamiqg compacts between the State of Idaho .and thc various 
tribes, to incorporate and permit the illegal gambling purportedly authorized by LC. 9 67-429B. in 
violation of Article III, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution. 
20. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that LC. @ 67-429B and 67-429C are 
unconstitutional and i n  violation of Article a, # 20 of the Idaho Constirution. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs respeotfully pray the judgment, order and decree from the Court 
declaringthatIdaho Code $8 67-429B and 67429C are unconstitutional, unlawful. andinvalid under 
Ihe prohibition on gambling contained in Article JII; 5 20 of the W o  Constitution: 
4 
DATED.this 2day of June, 2008. 
THOMSEN STEPKENS LAW OFFICES, put 
By: 
J : U ~ U I \ C R W ~ W L M D I N O S W  Aminhd ComplilLilwpd 
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v. 1 REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
1 DEFENDANTS' 
STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel. C. E. OTTER, ) MOTION TO DISMiSS 
Governor; BEN YSURSA, Secretary of 1 
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN, 1 
Aaorney General, ) 
1 
Defendants. i 
Plaintiffs respond to the motion to dismiss in two ways. First, they filed an amended 
oornplaint. It is subsfmtively identical to the original except for modifying the title from 
"Complaint for Declaratory a d  Other RelieP' to "+banded Complaint for D~eelaratosy Relief," 
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- 
Con~titution.~ Second, plaintiffs argue in a memorandum opposing the motion that they "are not 
seelung injunctive reIieEnor will a declaratory judgment require the termination of any particular 
compact or have ~e immediate effect of shutting down tribal gaming activity" but, instead, that 
"[tjhcy seek only a determination that [§# 67-429B and -429CJ are unoonstirulional," Nem. in 
Opp'n to DefsPr Mot. to Dismiss ("Opp'n Ma.") at 7. They stress the limited nature of the relief 
sought throughout their memorandum. Eg., id at 2 ("[iln their Amended Complaint fhe 
Plain~iffs do not request relief in the form of compelling the Defendants to take any specific 
action nor are they challenging or seeking to invalidate any tribal-state compact, but are merely 
seek [sic] a declaratory judgment'l); id. at 6 (I1Plaintiffs are not asking $his COW to prevent the 
government or any other entity from forming a compact with a tribe nor are they attacking the 
compact entered into between the government and the tribe"); id. at 8 ("Plaintiffs are not seeking 
injunctive or mandamus relief. They are not directly challenging, attacking, or seeking to 
rescind any tribal compacts''). 
PlainMs' tactical maneuveriag, which is aimed at attempting to negate the status of the 
several Idaho gaming tribes as indispensable parties under I.R,C,P, 19, places them in no more 
defensible position than before, The limited relief that hey seek does not redress the injury-in- 
fact alleged in the amended complaint-the proximity of ''slot machines'' at the Fort Hall Casino 
to their residences-since a mere declaration of Tribal Gaming Initiative's constiNtionality will 
not remove those machines. Plaintiffs thus advance, at most, a "generalized" and quite academic 
claim that a conflict exists between Article U[11, Section 20 and the Initiative. No jusiiciablo 
14 8 
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emphasis added)-vividly underscore their inability to satisfy the redressability prong of 
standing through the declaratory relief sougllt. 
Even were standing present? however, plaintiffs' claim still would Ebunder on M e  19. 
The Uniform Declaratov Judgment Act, Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 to -1217, does not dilute that 
rule's rquirements, and no legitimate question exists that Idaho tribes have an interest in the 
constitutionality of an initiative that was adopted to authorize a specific form of gaming in which 
only they could of& to the public, Pow tribes, including the Shoshone-Bannock, have benefited 
from that authorization, and no doubt exists that plaintiffs have as an ultimate objective 
prejudicing their ability to oontinue such gaming. Their interest, together with plaintiffs' 
unvarnished hostility to it, leaves no doubt that the gaming tribes are necessary parties which, by 
virCue of immunity from suit, cannot be joined and should be deemed indispensable.' 
I. PLA.WTIFBS LACK STANDING TO MAINTAIN A CLAIM LIMITED TO A 
DETERMINATlON CONCERNING TEE TRIBAL GAMING INITIATIVE'S 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
The Idaho Supreme Cowt has held repeatedly that the Declaratory Judgment Act does 
not dispense with ordinary standing requirements, h fie fountainhead decision concerning the 
I Although rhe motion to dismiss was direoted to the original oomplaint, plaintiffs respond with respect to the 
allegations in tho amended complaint. Dofendants believe that approach IS appropriate for judicial efficiency 
pUrposes because the amondmenrs do not alter in any significant manner the fundamentd iSsues before this COW: 
the proper application of Rule 19 and the availability of relief rhat will redress plaintiffs' allogcrl injuiy-h-fact. The 
moiion therefom should be deemed as addressed to the amended colnplainr insofar as it supersedss the original 
oomplaint. It is the understanding of defendants' counsel rhat plahiffs concur in so proceeding. 
P 4 9 
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danding dookine generally, Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989)- 
which is discussed in the defendants' opening brief at pages 8 and 9-the Court also leff no doubt 
tbat these general princjples apply with frill force to declaratory judgment actions, since lh only 
relief requested there was declaratory in nature, See 116 Idaho at 6319, 778 P.2d at 759 ("[tlhe 
appellant . . . filed a declaratory judgment action on behalf of himself and all similarly situated 
ldaho Power ratepayers, seeking to have part of the implementing legislation declared 
unconstitutional"). Most recently, while obsewing that "the Declaratory Judgment Act provides 
authority for the courts to render declaratory judgmentsG1" tl~e Court cautioned that the Act 
n4e "does relieve a party &om showing that it has stananding to bring the action in the first instance." 
Schneider v. Wbwe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006). Schneider simply 
exknded a long line of decisions adhering to Miles on tlzis central proposition. Van Valkenbzdrgh 
v. Citizensfop Term LinaEts, 135 Idaho 121, 124-25, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132.34 (2000); Sebkirk-Priest 
Basin Ass'n, Inc, v, Srate ex rel. Bart, 128 Idaho 831, 834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996); Selkirk- 
Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc, v. State ex rel, Atzdm, 127 Idaho 239, 245, 899 P,2d 949, 955 (1995); 
see also Harris v, Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513,516,691 P.2d 988,991 (1984). 
PlhtifYs ask tl& C o w  to ignore Miles and its progeny insofar as they seek declaratory 
relief that does not redress their alleged injury-in-fact, So, for example, even ifthey prevailed on 
their contention that Idaho Code $8 67-429B and -429C are inconsistent with Article Dl, Section 
20, plaintiffs would secure a determination of a legal issue but no effective redress; ire., the legal 
challenge advanced by plaintiffs i s  entirely academic because it does not provide any relief 
against the "casino style gambling" at the Fort Ifall Casino that they contend is the source of 
their injury-in-fact. Am. Comp. 'fi 8.g. It is, again, the ready availabiliTy of such gaming, 
together wirh plaintiffs1 alleged gambling addiction, that tms a "generalized grievance1'-a 
950 
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belief that the Tribal Gaming Idtiative is unconstitutiwsl-into a particularized injury-in-fact 
for standiig purposes. See Lance v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194. 1196 (2007) ("Article ID ofthe 
Pnited States] Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 'Cases' and tControversies.' 
One component of f e case-or-controversy requirement is standing, which requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate the now-f~ l ia r  elements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. . . . We 
have consistently held that: a plaintiff raising only a generally avaiIabIe grievance about 
govemment-clairning only harm to his and every oitizen's interest in proper application of the 
Constitution and laws, and seelcing reIief that no more d'ieotly and tangibly benefits him than it 
does the public at large--does not state an Article III case or controversy1'). Plaintiffs must seek 
reliefthat will redress this particularized injury to establish standing. 
The Miles Court additionally made clear that the redressability prong of the standing 
d o c ~ n e  cannot be satisfied by speculation or hope. Rather, "litigants generlly must allege or 
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will 
prevent or redress the claimed injury." 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (emphasis added) 
(citing Duke Power Co, v, CaroZiMa Envrl Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978)); accord 
Troutner v. Kempthoune, 142 Idaho 389,331, 126 P,3d 926,928 (2006); Noh v. Ceerrararsa, i3'9 
Idaho 798,804 53 P.3d 121 7,1219 (2002); Phinney v. Shoshovle Med. Cdp., 13 1 Idaho 529,532, 
960 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1998). Here, however, the four tribes offer video gaming machine activity 
pwsuaat to a federal law-sanctioned compact and will not be bound by any determination 
concerning the constitutionality of &$ 67-429B and -429C. Plaintiffs properly do nor suggeg, 
therefore, that the declaratory relief itself, if granted, will requi1.e the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes 
to cease suoh gaming activity at the Fort Hall Casino, They also do not suggest &at the 
requested declara1:ory relief will have as its likely consequence, through some chain of events 
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independent of this litigation, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes1 being required to terminate video 
machine gaming, ladeed, the amended complaint meekly suggests that, through the Tribal 
Gaming Initiative's invalidation, the Tribes "may be forced to remove [their] slot machines" 
(Am, Comp. 8.g (emphasis added))---a material change &om the originaI conlplainrs allegation 
that the Ziibes !'will be forced to remove [their] slots machines" (Comp. 7 8.g (ernphis added)), 
The opposition memoraadum, as discussed above, is no less equivocal on this point, admitting 
that "at best" it is "unclear" whether a llpossible future attempt" to void the tribal-state compacts 
would be "successful." Opp'n Mem, at 8; see also id. at 8-9 (mandamus relief is not sought 
because "Plaintiffs are unaware of any statute or regulation imposing a clear, affirmative legal 
duty on the defendants to rescind gaming compacts . . . under the circumstances like those 
present here"). Given the claim preclusion attendant to tbe Ninth Circuit's judgment in Idaho v. 
Shoshone-Bannock Dr'bes, 465 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2006), plaintiffs' equivocation is amply 
 plaintiff^^ in sum, have first pled and rhen argued themselves out of court. See L4an v. 
Defenders of WiZdI~, 504 U.S. 555,568 (1 992) ("The most obvious problem in the present case 
is redressability. Since the agencies funding &e projects were not p d e s  to the case, the District 
Court could accord relief only against the Secretary: He could be ordered to revise his regulation 
to require consultation for foreign projects, But this wouId not remedy respondents' alleged 
injury unless the funding agencies were bound by the Secretary's regulation, which is very much 
an open question1'). 
' Plaintiffs conxend that defmdam' re8 judioata analysis improperly expaads rhe Ninth Circuir's decision because 
the constitutionality of the Tribal Gaming Initiative was nox litigated. Oppb Mem, ax 9. Their criuciam fails to 
recogniza that part and pawl of claim preclusion under federal common law is the binding quality of a judgmam as 
to any ulaim that wuld have been raised in the proceeding, E.g., Rivet v. Regions Ba~k,  522 US, 470,476 (199%). 
Idaho, hod it been deemed appropriate, could have questioned cho consistency of #§ 67-428B and 429C wih Anisle 
111, Section 20 in rhe Shoshone-Bahnook 7Pibef litigation. 
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11. IDAHO GAMING TRIBES ARE NECESSARY A m  IMIISPENsAftLE 
PARTIES 
Plaintiffs &vote much of the opposition memorandum to the Idaho gaming tribes' sZatus 
as necessary and indispensable parties under LR.C.P. 19. They begin by positing that the 
Declaratory Judgment Act provides a more lax standard for determining such status than Rule 
19, Opptn Mem, at 4-5. They spend the remainder of the memorandum distinguishing the 
authority relied upon by defendants in their opening brief and arguing that the tribes are neither 
necessary nor indispensable parties. Id at 6-12. Oiven the absence of a justiciable controversy, 
the Rule 19 issue neither need nor should be addressed. See, e.g,, Steel Co. v. Citizeas for Better 
Envt., 523 U.S. 83,94-95 (1998) (Article IIl justiciablity issues must be resolved as a threshold 
matter). Tne Rule 19 issues neverthe1ess addressed in the event rbat this Court f i d s  subject 
matter jurisdiction, 
First, plaintiffs marshal. no decisional or other support for their contention that the 
Declaratory Judgment Aot, through Idaho Code 5; 10-1211, supplies the appropriate necessary- 
and-indispensable party standard, Section 10-121 1 provides in part that "[wlhen declaratory 
reliefis sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be 
affected by the declaration, and no declaration s h d  prejudice the rights of persons not parties lo 
the proceedings." This language was part of the Act as adopted in 1933. See 1933 Idaho Sess. 
Laws ah, 70, $ 11. The Supreme Court subsequently promulgated the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, including LR.C.P. 57 whioh specBcd1y governs declaratory judgrncmts and whose 
opening sentence states I1[t]he procedure for ob-g a declaratory judgment pursuant to the 
sktutes of this smell sh& be in accordanoe with these rules." Rule 19 &erefore controls the 
question whether ?he Idaho gaming tribes are necessary and indispensable parties, The 
comparably worded Fed, R, Civ. P. 57 has been so applied. See generally 10B Charles Alan 
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W&ht et GI., Feder~I Practice atzi~uocedure $2768, at 664-65 (3d ed. 1998) ("the 
requirements of compulsory joinder of {hose needed for a just adjudication set out in Rule are 
fully applicablet' to actions seeking declaratory relief). 
Second, plaintiffs1 Rule 19 neoes i a~~-~a r t~  analysis pivots off a single, and often-sated, 
rationale: The amended complaint seeks! no relief that will affect Idaho gaming tribes' oompact 
rights. Plaintiffs nonetheless do seekla detezminarion tbat the Tribal Gaming Jnitiative is 
unconstihltional, and no dispute exists bat  the Initiative laid the foundation for the compaot 
i 
rights now enjoyed by the tibes, Evmiifthat determination would have no practical effect- 
and on this score defendants agree with' plain&-the tribes have a substantial economic and 
! 
legal stake in the validity of contractual undertakings with the State and a corresponding interept 
in protecting that shke against any cf$m intended to cast a shadow over t h ~  propriety of 
compact-authorized gaming, They, no less than orher entities engaged in complex oommercial 
and governmental activities, cannot prebct with certainty the eventual irnpclct of a declaration 
that $4 67-429B and -429C are unoon~itutional could have on their gaming enterprises. The 
tribes, in short, have a corlcrete and important interest in any claim tbat suggests, directly or 
I, 
indirectly, that they are engaging in gm$ng activity not permitted under state law. 
Third, plaintiffs dispute each of , ~ l e  19(a)(2) indispensable-party considerations. Their 
assdon that "it is legally impossible &r the tribes' rights to be prejudiced" (Opp'n Mem. at 
10)-the firs1 consideration-is no make persuasive with respect to inclispensablc party status 
than to necessary party status. The suigestion that no remedial "shapiag" is required given the 
limited relief sought simply re-packakes the lack-of-interest theory advanced by plaintiffs. 
Conversely, a declaratory judgment thafis not binding on the tibes serves no practical end; it is 
l a mere academic exercise. Lastly, defendant? reaIize-and acknowledgad in their opening 
I 
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brief-that dismissal of the complaint oh indispensable party &rounds yriU. leave plaintiffs dth 
no forum to litigate their oonstitutional c&Eiallenge to the Tribal G d g  Initiative. Thc: absence of 
t 
such ability means only that pl&tiff~i must look eliwwhere for relief against any discrete 
I 
prejudice they suffer from the operation bf the Port Hall Casino. No Idaho citizen, however, has 
the ability to chaUe11ge the Initiative sh$ply because of a pertreived inconsistency with Article 
Ill, Section 20. To the extent plWiff3 maiatain just such s challengp-and Uley do so by virtue 
of the limited relief sought and its fail* .to redress the purported injwy-in-fact-my claim of 
i 
f 
prejudice cannot be given significant wei&t under Rule 19(a)(2)is fourth considemtioa 
Defendantsi motion to dismiss shbuld be granted. 
DATED this 5th day of June 2008, 
LAWRENCE Q. WASDEN 
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Governor; BEN YSURSA, $ecrehy of 1 
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Defendants respectiidly notify the COW and counsel that the sentence on page 4 of the 
Reply Brief in Support gf Defendantsr Motion to Dismiss beginning with "Most recently" 
inadverte~tly dcleted the word "notr' from rhe quoted portion of Schraeider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 
767, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006). The sentence should read: Most recently, wkile observing that "the 
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Declaratory judgment Act provides authority for th.e courts to render declaratory judgments[,]" 
the Court cautioned that the Act "does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to 
bring the action in the fust instance" (emphasis added to refieot omission)). 
DATED this 5th day of June 2008, 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF LD-0 
STEVEN OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
M I C W L  S. GILMORE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Civil Litigation Division 
DAVID F. HENSLEY 
Counsel to the Governor 
Ofice of thc Governor 
By: 
 LAY B. SMITH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Natural Resources Division 
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Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of 
State; and LAWRENCE WASDEN, 
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MINUTE ENTRY 
Defendants. I 
This matter came before the Court the 6th day of June 2008. 
Mr. T. Jason Wood, Esq., appeared telephonically on behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr. 
Mr. Clay Smith, Esq., appeared telephonically on behalf of the defendants. 
Counsel informed the Deputy Court Clerk that the parties had stipulated to vacate 
the June 9,2008 hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
Mr. Smith shall file a notice to vacate with the Court, and the matter will be reset 
for hearing at a later date. 
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COME NOW Plaintiffs, by and through counsel of record, and with the stipulation of 
defense counsel, and submit the following supplemental points and authorities in opposition to the 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and particularly in response to the Defendants' Reply Brief. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Defendants have filed a Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss inwhich 
they argue for the first time that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek a declaration of the constitutionality 
of I.C. $$67-429B and -429C because the relief requested by Plaintiffs does not redress an injury-in- 
fact. Defendants also again argue that the absent tribes are necessary parties. These arguments are 
without merit. The prior history of the unco~~stitutional initiative as related to the State precludes 
the defendants from asserting a lack of standing or justiciable controversy defense. There is also a 
substantial lilcelihood that the reliefrequested will redress plaintiffs' injuries as theDefendants have 
a positive duty to uphold and enforce the Idaho Constitution as part of their oath of office and 
constitutional responsibilities. The tribes are not necessary parties as their interest are not directly 
affected. They are not indispensable because Rule 19 cannot be applied to bar the Court from 
discharging its duty to interpret the Idaho Constitution, and because Plaintiffs seek to vindicate 
public rights. Finally, thestatutes in question are palpably unconstitutional, a fact acknowledged by 
the Defendants in prior dealings with the initiative, and therefore the tribes have no "interest" 
recognized by Rule 19. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING. 
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment finding that LC. $$ 67-429B and -429C are 
unconstitutional. The Defendants contend for the first time in their reply brief that Plaintiffs lack 
standing to maintain a claim limited to determining the constitutionality of LC. $$ 67-429B and - 
429C. TheDefendants donot argue that Plaintiffs lackparticularizedinterests and a direct, concrete 
injury-in-fact which sets them apart from the general public, and they apparently concede that 
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Plaintiffs would have standing to bring this action from that perspective. Defendants simply contend 
that even though the Plaintiffs have suffered a concrete, particularized injury, this action will not 
redress the issues raised and Plaintiffs should not be allowed to proceed, in essence because there 
is no controversy which can be adjudicated by these Plaintiffs. The issue is thus not really one of 
standing, i t  is a question of justiciability. 
A. Past Litbation Precludes Defendants from Asserting a Lack of stand in^ 
Defense. 
A prerequisite to a declaratory judgment action is an actual orjusticiable controversy. Harris 
v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P.2d 988 (1984). Justiciability is generally divided into 
subcategories -- advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, 
political questions, and administrative questions. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho,635, 639 
(1989). Defendants' standing argument is, in essence, an argument that this case lacks a justiciable 
controversy. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has found otherwise. 
Noh v. Cerzarrusu, (in Re Action to Determine Constitutionality of the Indian Gaming 
Initiative), Proposition One, 137 Idaho 798 (2002), is the first case in which the Idaho Supreme 
Court first faced the constitutional challenge to the initiative that would create I.C. $5 67-429B and 
-429C. The State was the named defendant and raised defenses of lack of standing, ripeness and 
justiciability - the very same defenses they raise here. In Noh the petitioners initiated their claim 
directly in the Idaho Supreme Court, seelung to have the Indian Gaming Initiative declared 
unconstitutional on the same grounds as asserted in the instant case. The Court found no 
controversy existed because petitioners did not meet traditional standing and ripeness requirements. 
Thepetitioners did not allege acurrentparticularizedinjury in fact such as those alleged by Plaintiffs 
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ICnox and Dotson. Instead they alleged only a possible generalized future injury. Id at 800. The 
Court further concluded that the case was not then ripe because "there [was] not a real controversy 
at this point because Proposition One is simply a proposal . . . If Proposition One does not pass, there 
will not be a need for an adjudication as to its validity." Id at 800. The Court concluded by stating 
that "This is a statewide initiative on a subject in serious controversy . . . If tlze initiative passes 
there will most certainly be ajusticiable controversy." Id at 803 (emphasis added). 
Clearly the initiative passed and was codified. However, unlike Noh, Plaintiffs ICnox and 
Dotson case have alleged a particularized and direct injury in fact from the initiative statutes. The 
harm to Plaintiffs is not a possible future harm, but has already occurred and will continue to occur 
without the relief they have requested. Thus, a present controversy and need to adjudicate the 
constitutionality of I.C. $5 67-429B and -429C exists. Plaintiffs have therefore passed the standing 
and ripeness tests and, as unequivocally stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, there is most certainly 
a justiciable controversy. 
Defendants are collaterally estopped from asserting a lack of standng or justiciable 
controversy defense by Noh. Collateral estoppeI may be applied to prior judgments, estopping a 
person from disputing a finding or verdict that has already been rendered. Navurro v. Yonkers, 173 
P.3d 1141, 1144 (Idaho 2007). The tests of when collateral estoppel should apply are: (1) whether 
the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (2) whether the issue decided in the 
previous litigation is identical to the current issue presented; (3) whether the issue was actually 
decided in the previous litigation and whether the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; (4) 
whether the final judgment was on the merits; and (5)  whether the party against whom the prior 
judgment is asserted was a party or in privity with those subject to the priorjudgment. Id. 
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In Noh, defendants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the justiciable controversy and 
standing issues, and didso. Whether a justiciable controversy existed was a necessary issue to the 
suit and was clearly decided in Noh; the lack of standing and ripeness was the sole reason the action 
was dismissed. Defendants have already addressed and lost on the issue ofjusticiability. There was 
no claim by the State that the tribes were necessary or indispensable parties in the Noh case. 
B. Plaintiffs' Reauested Relief will Redress Their Injury-In-Fact. 
The Defendants contend that Plaintiffs requested relief "would secure a determination of a 
legal issue but no effective redress . . . [that] the legal challenge advanced by plaintiffs is entirely 
academic because it does not provide any relief against 'casino style gambling' . . . that they contend 
is the source of their injury-in-fact." See Def. Reply Brief, p. 4. In order to satisfy the.case or 
controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact 
and a substantial likelilzood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed 
injury. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,641 (1989) (emphasis added). 
In this case, although not an absolute certainty, there is a substalztial likelihood that the relief 
request by the Plaintiffs will redress their injury. A statute declared unconstitutional confers no 
rights, creates no liability, and affords no protection -it is void (subject to certain exceptions not 
applicable here). Snzith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205,209, 290 P.2d 742, 744 (1955); State v. Garden 
City, 74 Idaho 513,524,265 P.2d 328,333 (1953); Vale~zle v. Mills, 93 Idaho 212,215,458 P.2d 
84,87 (1969). Defendants have each sworn to uphold and enforce the Idaho State Constitution 
when they took office. If the Court were to find that LC. $ 5  67-429B and -429C violate the Idaho 
Constitution, the Defendants would have no authority or ability to enforce or effectuate the void 
statutes, and they would be duty-bound to enforce the Court's constitutional declaration. It is highly 
5 - REPLY MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
1 6 6  
doubtful, if not absolutely certain, that the Defendants would refuse to uphold and enforce the 
Constitution in violation of the law and their oaths of office. A declaration by the Court that the 
statutes are unconstitutional is therefore substantially likely to redress Plaintiffs' injuries. 
11. T i B  TRIBES A R E  NEITHER NECESSARY NOR INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. 
A. The Tribes Not Necessary Parties Under Rule 19. 
The Defendants alternatively argue that if there is a substantial likeiihood of redressing 
Plaintiffs' concrete injury-in-fact, then the tribes are necessary and indispensable parties under 
I.R.C.P. 19, and because the tribes have sovereign immunity and cannot be joined, this case must 
be dismissed. The Defendants thereby attempt to throw Plaintiffs and the Court on the horns of a 
dilemma, making it literally impossible for the Court to address the constitutjonality of the Indian 
gaming statues uizderany circumstarzces. The defendants' efforts to bar the courthouse to any and 
all lawful plaintiffs seeking redress for the unconstitutionality of the Idaho Indian gaming statutes 
must necessarily fail. 
I .  As u vractical matter this action will not inz~air th.e hesent Tribes' abilitv to 
protect their interests. 
The Idaho tribes are not necessary parties under the first prong of Rule (19)(a)(l), which 
requires joinder of a party if "(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among 
those already parties." The tribes are not necessary parties because if LC. 5s 67-429B and -429C 
were declared unconstitutional by the Court, Plaintiffs would receive all the relief for which they 
have prayed. The tribes are not necessary in order for the Court to declare the statutes 
unconstitutional. 
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Neither are the tribes necessary under the second part of I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), which requires 
joinder of a party if "(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair 
or impede the person's ability to protect that interest." As noted in Plaintiffs' initial Brief in 
Opposition, the amended complaint seelts no relief that will affect any tribal gaming rights. A 
declaration by the Court that LC. $5 67-429B and -429C are unconstitutional will have no direct 
effect on any tribes' ability to protect their interest. The viability of the tribes' compacts with the 
State of Idaho is an entirely separate issue to which Plaintiffs Knox and Dotson are not parties. 
The Defendants admit in their reply brief that a determination of unconstitutionality by the 
Court would have no practical effect on the tribes' ability to protect their interest. See Def. Reply 
Brief at 8 ("even if that determination would have nopracticaleffect - and on this score defendants 
agree with plaintiffs . . ."). Defendants then proceed to argue that despite there being no practical 
effect, "the tribes have a substantial economic and legal stake in the validity of contractual 
undertakings with the State and a corresponding interest in protecting that stake against any claim 
intended to cast a shadow over the propriety of compact-authorized gaming" and they "cannot 
predict with certainty the eventual impact of a declaration that $$ 67-429B and -429C are 
unconstitutional could have on their gaming enterprises.'' Therefore, as stated by Defendants, the 
tribes at most only "have a concrete andimportant interest in any claim that suggests . . . they are 
engaging in gaming activity not permitted under state law." Def. Reply Brief at 8. 
While the tribes may have a "concrete and important interest" and may not be able to predict 
the effect a finding that I.C. $5 67-429B and -429C are unconstitutional will have on their gaming 
activities, this is not sufficient to satisfy the rule and make the trjbes necessary parties. Rulel9(a)(l) 
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requires that, as apracticul matter, the ability to protect this interest not be impaired or impeded. 
As plaintiffs argued in their Brief in Opposition and as agreed by defendants, any determination 
of unconstitutionality will not, as apractical matter, impair or impede the tribes' ability to protect 
their interests. As aresult, the tribes are not necessary parties underLR.C.P. 19(a)(l), and therefore 
need not be joined. 
2. The absenr tribes have izo interest reco~nized bv Rule I 9  because I. C. .6,6 7- 
429b and -429c which created the interest are palnablv unconstitzitiorzal. 
The tribes are not necessary parties because they have no protectable interest in a compact 
that is based upon an obviously unconstitutional statute. The Defendants postulate that the tribes 
have a protectable interest within the meaning of Rule 19 in their gaming compacts, which in turn 
derive from LC. 55 67-429B and C. However, such an interest based upon the, clearly 
unconstitutional Indian gaming statutes is not the type of interest qualified for protection under Rule 
19. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed interests based on palpably unconstitutional 
statutes in Shermoen v. United Slates, 982 F.2d 1312 (9" Cir. 1992). Shermoen invol,ved 70 
individual Native Americans and a community of Yurok Indians who sought review of a judgment 
from the United States District Court for the Northern Distr-ict of California, which dismissed their 
suit seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act, violated their 
constitutional rights, because the Hoopa Valley and Yurok tribes were necessary and indispensable 
parties pursuant to Rule 19. The Ninth Circuit stated: 
We do not hold, of course, that a district court would be required to find a 
party necessary based on patently frivolous claims made by that party. But 
such is clearly not the case before us; the absent tribes have an indisputable 
interest in the outcome of appellants' suit, and the Act, which has created that 
interest, is not so palpably unconstitutional that we could readily say the 
absent tribes' claims are fatuous. 
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Idat 1318 . See also Aladree v. Ashla~zd County, 818 F.2d 1306, 1313 (7" Cir. 1987). Because the 
Act at issue was not nearly so obviously in violation of the Constitution as the statutes at issue in the 
instant case, theNinth Circuit found the tribe had a protectable interest under Rule 19. 
In contrast, the interest of the tribes in the present case as postulated by the Defendants 
derives fromI..C. $5 67-429B and -429C which are in fact palpably unconstitutional, a fact admitted 
and certified by the Idaho Attorney General. Idaho Code $$ 67-429B and 67-429C purport to 
authorize forms of casino gambling on Indian lands in Idaho. Specifically, Idaho Code $ 67-429B 
purports to authorize the use of "tribal video gaming machines" on Indian lands. Flowever, Article 
m, 5 20 of the Idaho Constitution, as amended in 1992, expressly prohibits gambling in Idaho. It 
provides, inter alia: 
( 1 )  Gambling is contrary to public policy and is strictly prohibited except 
for the following: 
a. A state lottery which is authorized by the state if conducted in 
conformicy with enabIing legislation; and 
b. Pari-mutual betting if conducted in conformity with enabling 
legislation; and 
c. Bingo and raffle games that are operated by qualified charitable 
organizations in the pursuit of charitable purposes if conducted in 
conformity with enabling legislation. 
(2) No activities permitted by subsection (1) shall employ any form of 
casino gambling including, but not limited to, blaclijack, craps, roulette, 
poker, baccarat, keno and slot maclzines, or employs any electronic or 
electromechanical imitation or sir~zulation of anv form of casirzo ganzblirzg. 
(Emphasis added). 
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The Idaho legislature has, by statute, likewise prohibited gambling, making it a crime (see 
1.C. $4 18-3801 and 18-3802), and prohibited slot machines in particular. See I.C. § 18-3810. The 
gambling activities ostensibly authorized by I.C. $5  67-429B and 67-429C do not fall within any of 
the three exceptions in subsection (1) of Article 11, Section 20, of the Idaho Constitution and which 
subsection (2) of ArticieDI, 9: 20 of the Idaho Constitution, expressly prohibits. For these reasons, 
the Defendants have admitted that the tribal video gaming machines as defined in I.C. 5 67-429B 
"would beconstruedas slot machines orimitations or simulations of forms of casinogambling," that 
"in light of idaho's blanket restriction on the use or possession of slot machines, it is unlikely that 
attempts to distinguish Tribal Video Gaming Machines from slot machines or imitations thereof 
under Idaho law will succeed" and "the argument that such a gaming statute or initiative is 
permissible be premised upon an assumption that such gaming is permitted by the Idaho 
Constitution." See Attached - Attorney General's Certificate of Review: Proposed Initiative 
Regarding Tribal Video Machine Gaming (emphasis added). 
In this case, the asserted tribal interests stemming from LC. §$ 67-429B and -429C are 
based solely on palpably unconstitutional statutes. The very existence of the asserted absent tribes' 
interest depends on the legality and presumed constitutionality of these plainly unconstitutional 
statutes. As such, any claims of the absent tribes asserted by the Defendants are frivolous, fatuous 
and inconsequential; therefore, this Court is not required to find that the tribes are necessary parties. 
B. The Tribes Are Not Indispensable Under Rule 19. 
Analysis under I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2) is required only if a party is necessary under Rule 19(a)(l). 
Because the tribes are not necessary parties under Rule 19(a)(l), any analysis under Rule 19(a)(2) 
as to whether the tribes are indispensable is not required. However, assuming urgue~zdo that the 
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tribes are necessary under Rule 19(a)(l), they clearly are not indispensable within the meaning of 
R U I ~  19(a)(2). The tribes are not parties and will not suffer direct prejudice from a declaratory 
judgment and indeed they are protected from such prejudice by LC. 5 10-121 1 ("no declaration shall 
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. ' I ) .  If the tribes believe that their 
interest may he impaired then they have the ability to petition this court to intervene under 
Rule 24. This would require the tribal authorities to participate in and consent to the adjudication 
before this Court. Whether to participate is a decision for the tribal authorities, but their deliberate 
unwillingness to participate is not a consideration for this Court as related to a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 19. 
1. Tile Tribes' voluntary absence does not render them indimensable uizcler 
Rule 19 nor does it relieve the Court o f  its d u ~ ,  to i~z ter~ret  the Constitution. 
The cases cited by the defendants on Rule 19 are fatally distinguishable. They lack facially 
unconstitutional statutes upon which the tribes' interest is based, lack plaintiffs who advance truly 
public rights, andlor involve prayers for relief directly requesting that the tribal compacts be 
nullified. On the other hand, Saratoga County Ckanzber of Conznzerce, Iizc v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 
1047 (N.Y. 2003) is directly on point. In that case the plaintiffs, citizens and legislators opposed to 
casino gambling, alleged that a compact between the Governor and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe 
allowing electronic class EI gaming violated the New York constitutional ban on gambling. Initially, 
the trial court dismissed the case for plaintiffs' failure to join the tribe as an indispensable party. 
However, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court, holding that the tribes were not 
indispensable, and remanded the case for proceedings on the merits. The trial court subsequently 
granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, declaring the gaming compact unconstitutional, and 
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defendants appealed thedecision, arguing the case should have been dismissed for failure to join the 
Indian tribe as a necessary and indispensable party. The Court disagreed: 
The Tribe is not a party to this action. Although its interests are certainly 
affected by this litigation, the Tribe has chosen not to participate. Unless 
Congress provides otherwise, Indian tribes possess sovereign immunity 
against thejudicial processes of states. [citations omitted]. As a result, New 
York courts cannot force the Tribe to participate in this lawsuit. The State 
claims that the Tribe's absence requires us to dismiss this action. We 
disagree. 
The Court went on to discuss the rules governing joinder of necessary and indispensable 
parties under New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). CPLR 1001(b) is similar to Rule 
19(a)(2), setting forth nearly identical factors for the court to consider when deciding whether to 
dismiss an action where '7ulisdiction over [the necessary party] can be obtained only by his consent 
or appearance." CPLR 1001(b) states these considerations in relevant part: 
1. Whether the plaintiff has another effective remedy in case the action is 
dismissed on account of the nonjoinder; 
2. The prejudice which may accrue from the nonjoinder to the defendant 
or to the person not joined; 
3. Whether and by whom prejudice might have been avoided or may in the 
future be avoided; 
4. The feasibility of a protective provision by order of the court or in the 
judgment; and 
5. Whether an effective judgment may be rendered in the absence of the 
person who is not joined. 
NY CPLR 1001(b); Id at 1058. 
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Like the instant case, the defendants in Pataki "relie[d] principally on paragraph (2), and 
argue[dJ that the prejudice to the Tribe caused by a judgment eviscerating the authority under which 
it operates the casino should be sufficient to dismiss the action. In contrast, plaintiffs rely on 
paragraph (I), arguing that there can be no remedy for the alleged constitutional violation if the 
Tribe's absence requires dismissal." The Court concluded that "Plaintiffs' arguments are on firmer 
ground," and explained: 
Not only will these plaintiffs be stripped of a remedy if we hold that the 
Tribe is an indispensable party, but no member of the public will ever 
be able to bring this constitutional challenge. In effect, the Executive 
could sign agreements with any entity beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Court, free of constitutional interdiction. The Executive's actions would 
thus be insulated from review, a prospect antithetical to our system of 
checks and balances. 
There are two principal purposes of requiring dismissal owing 
to the absence of an indispensable party. First, mandatory joinder 
prevents multiple, inconsistent judgments relating to the same 
controversy. Second, joinder protects the otherwise absent parties 
who would be "embarrassed by judgments purporting to bind their 
rights or interests.where they have had no opportunity to be heard". 
[citations omitted]. 
Neither purpose applies here. The Tribe has chosen to be absent. 
Nobody has denied it the "opportunity to be heard"; in fact, the Oneida 
Indian Nation, which operates the Turning Stone Casino, has appeared as 
amicus curiae making much the same arguments we would expect to be made 
by the Tribe had it chosen to participate. While sovereign immunity 
prevents the Tribe from being forced to participate in New York court 
proceedings, it does not require everyone else to forego the resolution of 
all disputes that could affect the Tribe (see Keene v Chambers, 271 N.Y. 
326,330,3 N.E.2d 443 119361; Plaut v HGH Partnership, 59 A.D.2d 686, 
398 N.Y.S.2d 671 [lst Dept 19771; 3 Weinstein-Korn-Nliller, NY Civ Prac 
y[ 1001.10 [citing cases]). While we fully respect the sovereign 
prerogatives of the Indian tribes, we wilt not permit the Tribe's 
voluntary absence to deprive these plaintiffs (and in turn any member 
of the public) of their day in court. 
13 - REPLY MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
We conclude that the alleged constitutional violation will be without 
remedy if this action is dismissed for the Tribe's nonjoinder. We further 
conclude that to the extent the Tribe is prejudiced by our adjudication 
of issues that affect its rights under the compact, the Tribe could have 
mitigated that prejudice by participating in the suit (ct United States ex 
rel. Steele v Tunz Key Gaming, Inc., 135 F.3d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir 19981). 
The Tribe's nonjoinder is therefore excused, and we proceed to discuss the 
meri Is. 
Patuki, 798 N.E.2d at 1058-59 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Pazner v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 2004), overruled in part on otlzer 
grounds, Dafryland Greylzound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 2006), the Majority 
Leader of the Wisconsin Senate and the Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly, fiIed an action against 
the Governor of Wisconsin and the Secretary of Administration, contending that they viqlated the 
Wisconsin constitution in agreeing to certain amendments to a gaming compact entered into with 
the Forest County Potawatomi Tribe. The defendants moved to dismiss the action on grounds of 
standing and failure to join an indispensable party, namely the Indian tribe. The Wisconsin Supreme 
rejected both arguments for reasons similar to Patuki: 
The Tribe's decision not to participate as a party cannot deprive this 
court of its own core power to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution and 
resolve disputes between coequal branches of state government. The Tribe 
has been aware of this litigation from its inception. This court would have 
welcomedits intervention. We will not venture the delicate balance of shared 
power among our three branches of government on the chosen absence of a 
potential party. 
The upshot of accepting the Governor's invitation to dispose of this 
case on procedural technicalities would be to insulate this agreement and 
any future agreement between a governor and a tribe from the powers 
of state judicial review. For over 200 years, it has been the province of the 
judiciary to interpret the constitution and say what the law is. See Wisconsin 
Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 436 (citing Marbury v. Madisorz, 5 U.S. ( 1  Cranch) 
137, 2 L. Ed. 60, (1803)). We are responsible for resolving legal disputes 
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among the three branches of our state government and, therefore, we proceed 
to the merits of the case. 
Icl at 683 (emphasis added). 
Other jurisdictions are in agreement with the Wisconsin Supreme Coun and the New York 
Court of Appeals that a tribe's absence due to sovereign immunity should not result in dismissal of 
the actlon. See, e.g., Kurzsas v United States, 249 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir 2001); Sac and Fox Nation 
ofMo. v Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir 2001) (later superseded by statute); Artichoke Joe's v 
Nortorz, 216F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1090-1091 (E.D. Cal 2002). 
The logic and reasoning of these cases are unassailable and applicable in the present case. 
Sovereign immunity prevents involuntary joinder of the tribes. However, it does not require the 
citizens of Idaho to forego resolutions of all disputes that could possibly affect the tribes, especially, 
as in this case, where there is a clear and blatant violation of the Idaho Constitution. Nor does it 
requireorpermit this Court to abdicate its constitutional duty toresolvecases and conCroversies over 
the constitutionality of an Act of the Idaho legislature. This Court cannot and shouid not allow the 
tribes' voluntary absence to deprive Plaintiffs of their day in court. Dismissal of this case on such 
a procedural technicality would be the equivalent of ruling that any and all acts of the Idaho 
Iegisiature pertaining to Indian gaming and indeed to Indians in general, are forever insulated from 
judicial review, regardless whether the act is in clear violation of the Constitution, barring the 
courthouse doors to citizens of Idaho suffering concrete injury as a result of such unconstitutional 
acts. As recognized in Pataki and Parzzer, this is entirely antithetical to our constitutional system 
of checks and balances and must be summarily rejected. 
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2. The Tribes are not "indisvelzsable" under Rule 19 bv applicatio7z o f  the 
"public riphts" doctrine. 
Even under the distinguishable line of cases cited in the Defendants' briefing, the tribes in 
the instant case are not indrspensable under the "public rights doctrine," concerning "litigation .... 
[which] transcends the private interests of the litigants and seeks to vindicate a public light." Wilbur 
v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101,1115 (9" Cir. 2006). Under this exception the absent party's interests may 
be impaired but will not be allowed to destroy those interests in the party's absence. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit first applied this doctrine in Comer v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012, 109 S. Ct. 1121, 103 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1989). In Corzrzer, an 
environmental group challenged the issuance of oil and gas leases by the BLM on the ground that 
an adequateEIS had not been prepared. On appeal, several lessees claimed that they were necessary 
parties under Rule 19, but the Ninth Circuit held the public rights exception applicable: 
Subsequent courts have also refused to require the joinder of all parties 
affected by public rights litigation -- even when those affected parties have 
property interestsat stake -- because of the tight constraints traditional joinder 
rules would place on litigation against the government. [many citations 
omitted] . . . Like the cases cited above, this case is amenable to the 
application of the National Licorice public rights doctrine. The appellees' 
litigation against the government does not purpot? to adjudicate the rights of 
current lessees; it merely seeks to enforce the public right to administrative 
compliance with the environmental protection standards of NEPA and the 
ESA. 
Id. at 1459-60. 
Likewise, Plaintiffs Knox and Dotson do not purport to adjudicate any rights of the parties 
under the tribes' compacts wit11 the State of Idaho. They seek to enforce the public right to State 
compliance with the Idaho Constitution. The fact that they have suffered particuIarized injury does 
not somehow convert this issue from a public to a private matter. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has 
i 
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recognized that "[tlhe general subject of gaming [is] of great public interest." Am. Greyhound 
Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305F.3d 1015, 1026 (9'Cir. 2002). As the defendants recognize, the court in 
H~d1  refused to apply the public rights doctrine only because "[tlhe plaintiff sought th[e] injunction 
to avoid competitive harm to their own operations," and therefore "the rights in issue between the 
plaintiffs in this case, thetribes and the state are more private than public." D e f s  B& p. 14 (quoting 
Hull, 305 F.3d at 1026). But unlike Hull, Plaintiffs Knox and Dotson are not competitors of the 
tribes seeking to share in the spoils of casino gambling. They seek to vindicate the public's right to 
equal enforcement of theIdaho Constitution. If there is a public right in administrative enforcement 
of the procedural rules under NEPA and ESA as declared in Conner, then surely there is an even 
greaterpuhIic right of thecitizens of Idahoin enforcement of thesubstantive provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
Contrary to theDefendants' assertions, the tribes' interests arenot "destroyed" by proceeding 
in their absence. The public rights exception was first recognized in Nat'l Licorice v. NLRB, 309 
U.S. 350 (1940). In thatcase the Supreme Court 
restricted the applicability of the public rights exception to cases in which the 
third parties' interests at issue are not destroyed. That is, "the third parties 
[must be] left free to assex? such legal rights as they might have acquired . . 
. ." Id. at 366. While the National Licorice Court upheld the NLRB's 
termination of an unlawful "yellow dog" contract, it ordered the Board to 
revise its order by omitting language that the contracts were "void and of no 
effect." The Court also required the Board to state that the order was "without 
prejudice to the assertion by the employees [the non-parties to the action] of 
any legal rights they may have acquired. . . ." 
Coizizer, 848 F.3d at 1859-60 (quoting Nat'l Licorice, 309 U.S. at 367). Likewise, Plaintiffs Knox 
and Dotson do not request rescission or termination of the State's compacts with the tribes. They 
seek a declaration that LC. $5 67-429B and -429C are in direct violation of the Idaho Constitution 
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The Court can similarly craft its declaration of unconstitutionality to make it without prejudice to 
the assertion of the trjbes of any legal rights they may have acquired by compact with the State of 
Idaho. Consequently, the "public rights" exception applies here to prevent the trjbes from being 
deemed indispensable under Rule 19. TheDefendants' motion to dismiss must therefore be denied 
on this additional ground. 
CONCLUSION 
For the ibregoingreasons, theDefendants' motion should be dismissed and the Court should 
proceed to schedule this matter for final decision on the merits 
DATED this -.(!- day of July, 2008. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
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Governor; BEN YSURSA, Secretary of 1 
State; and L A W N C E  WASDEN, 1 
Attorney General, ) 
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DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY-PAGE 1 
Defendants hereby give notice of decisional authority that is relevant to disposition of the 
Motion to Dismiss set for hearing on August 18, 2008 and was issued subsequent to submission 
of their reply briefin support ofthe motion. 
On Jane 12, 2008, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bepzdbh'c of 
Philippines v. Pime~te2, 128 S, Ct, 2180 (2006). The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals abused its discretion in holding that the Republic of the Philippines was not an 
indispensable party under Fed. R Civ. P. 19 despite the PhiIippinesl entitlement to sovereign 
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1979,28 U.S.C. $ 1604, It found that 
the corn of appeals erred in considering the merits of the plaintiffs1 claim as part of the Rule 19 
decision-making process, See 128 S. Ct. at 2192 ("it was improper to issue a definitive holding 
regarding a nonfrivolous, substantive claim made by an absen$ required entity that was entitled 
by its sovereign status to hnmity from suitr1). * The Cowt further srared that while "[d]ismissal 
under Rule 19@) will mean, in some instances, that plaintiffs will be left without a forum for 
defitive resolution of their claims[,] . . . that result is contemplated under the doctrine of 
foreign sovereign immunity." Id. at 2194. These holdings are germane to arguments made in 
Plaintiffs1 Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at pages 
8-10 and 11-15. 
On August 8,2008, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Cachil D e b  Band of Vs'nran 
Indians v. California, No. 06-16145,2008 WL 3169486 (9th Cir. Altg, 8, 2008). The court of 
appeals held that the district cow erred in dismissing under Rule 19 a tribe's claims which 
challeaged, inter alia, the California Gaming Control Commission's calculatiop of the size of a 
" Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 became effective following the Ninth Cirouir's deoision. Most in~portantly, they 
replaced the term "necessary" in subparagraph (a) with rhe torrn "mqiiired" and deleted the term  ind dip ens able^' in 
subparagraph (b), 128 5. Ct. at 2184. These and anorher amendment, however, "were stytistic onlyl;]" i.e., "tho 
substance of and operation of the Rule . . . are unchanged." Id The federal rule chsrefore remains instfuctive with 
respemto propor applicazion oELR.C,P. 19. 
8 8 2  
DEFENDANTS'NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY-PAGE 2 
gaming-machine license pool. The lower court reasoned that the relief solzght might affect 
adversely the monetary interest of certain non-party tribes who had competed with the plaintiff 
tribe for the available licenses. The district court opinion, San Miguel Band of Mission Indians 
V.  CaZifPrnia, No. 06~~0988-LAB, 2007 WL 935578 (S.D. Cal, Mar. 20, 2007), is cited at page 
IS of the Brief in Support oZDefendmts1 Motion to Dismiss. The court of appeals stated, in part, 
that "[tlhe mere fact that the outcome of [the] litigation may have some financial consequences 
for the non-party tribes is not sufficient to make those tribes required parties!' under Rule 19(a). 
Id., at 95. Rather, "[tlhe absent iribes must have a legally protected interest." Id. Such an 
interest could exist "if it actually 'arises from terms in bargained contracts[,]"' but the gaming 
compacts in effect at the time of the license-pool determination "aXord[ed] no express or implied 
protection against competition per se." Id. (quoting Am. Greyhoufid Racing, Inc. V. Hull, 305 
F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Ninth Circuit's analysis is germane to atpents  made in 
the Brief in Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss at pages 10-17, 
DATED this 11th day of August 2008. 
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Governor; BEN YSURA, Secretary of 
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Attorney General, 
Case No. CV-2008-667 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Defendants. 1 
This matler came before the Court the 1 8th day of August 2008 for the purpose of 
Defendants' MOTION TO DISMISS, the Honorable Darren B. Simpson presiding. 
Ms. Sandra Beebe, Court Reporter, and Ms. Marielle Pratt, Deputy Clerk, were 
present. 
Mr. Curt Thomsen, Esq., appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr. Clay Smith, 
Esq., and Mr. Michael Gilmore, , Esq. . ,. '. appeared .. :... ,.:, . . on behalf of the defendants. 
'COurt and counsel discussed the status of the case. Discussion was heard 
regarding an amended complaint received by the Cow. The amended complaint will be 
considered filed as of June 2,2008. 
Mr. Smith presented argument. Mr. Thomsen responded, and Mr. Smith provided 
rebuttal argument. 
The Court took th matter under advi 
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BEFORE THIS COURT canle to be heard the Motion of the defendants, the state of 
Idaho, ex rel. C. L. Otter, Governor; Ben Ysursa, Secretary of State; and Lawrence Wasden, 
Attorney General (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "State"), to Dismiss.' The plaintiffs, 
Wendy Knox ~ u ~ d  Richard Dotson (hereinafter the "Plaintiffs"), oppose the State's Motion and filed 
briefs in support thereof.' 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Suppot'ting Brief to Be Submitted Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(C)), Knox v. Slate, 
Bingham County case no. CV 2008-667 (filed April 14,2008) (hereinafter the "State's Motion"). 
See: Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Knox v. State, Bingham County case no. CV 
2008-667 (filed June 2, 2008) (hereinafter the "Plaintiffs' Memorandum"); Supplemental Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion lo Dismiss, Knox v. State, Bingham County case no. CV 2008-667 (filed July 1, 
2008) (hereinafter the "Plaintiffs' Supplement"). 
- - . - - - -. - -. - - - --. . -- 
This Court held a hearing on the State's Motion on August 18,2008.~ Having reviewed the 
evidence, the arguments of the parties and the relevant authorities, this Court shall grant the State's 
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Plaintiffs failed to show a substantial likelihood that the 
judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. 
The Plaintiffs, citizens of Bingham County, allege they developed "clinical and devastating 
addictions" to gambling at the slot machines at the Fort Hall Indian Reservation Casino (hereinafter 
the ''Fort I-Iall casino")? They filed this lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of Idaho Code 
("LC.") 5 67-429B and 5 67-429C, which code sections were enacted upon the Idaho electorate's 
vote in favor of Proposition One during the November 5,2002 general ele~tion.~ 
Idaho Code 5 67-429B reads as follows: 
(1) Indian tribes are authorized to conduct gaming using tribal video gaming 
machines pursuant to state-tribal gaming compacts which specifically 
permit their use. A tribal video gaming machine may be used to conduct 
gaming only by an Indian tribe, is not activated by a handle or lever, does 
not dispense coins, currency, tokens, or chips, and performs only the 
following fmctions: 
(a) Accepts currency or other representative of value to qualify a player 
to participate in one or more games; 
(b) Dispenses, at the player's request, a cash out ticket that has printed 
upon it the game identifier and the player's credit balance; 
(c) Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, rather than on a 
paper ticket, the results of each game played; 
(d) Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, in an area 
separate from the game results, the player's credit balance; 
(e) Selects randomly, by computer, numbers or symbols to determine 
game results; and 
(f)  Mait~tains the integrity of the operations of the terminal. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of Idaho law, a tribal video gaming 
machine as described in subsection (1) above is not a slot machine or an 
electronic or electromechanical imitation or simulation of any form of 
casino gambling. 
3 Minute Entry, Knox v. State, Bingham County case no. CV 2008667 (filed August 19,2008). 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Knox v. State, Bingham County case no. CV 2008-667 (filed June 
2,2008) (hereinafter the "Amended Complaint"), at pp. 1,3. 
5 Amended ComplainT, at p. I .  
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Idaho Code 5 67-439C holds: 
(1) Any tribe with an existing state-tribal gaming compact may amend its 
compact throughout the procedure set forth in subsection (2) below to 
incorporate all of the following terms: 
(a) As clarified by this compact amendment, the tribe is permitted to 
conduct gaming using tribal video gaming machines as described in 
Section 67-429B, Idaho Code. 
(bj In the10 years following incorporation of this term into its compact, 
the number of tribal video gaming machines the tribe may possess is 
limited to the number of tribal video gaming machines possessed by 
the tribe as of January 1, 2002, plus 25% of that number; provided, 
however, that no increase in any single year shall exceed 5% of the 
number possessed as of January 1, 2002. Thereafter, the tribe may 
operate such additional tribal video gaming machines as are agreed to 
pursuant to good faith negotiations between the state and the tribe 
under a prudent business standard. 
(c) To the extent such contributions are not already required under the 
tribe's existing compact, the tribe agrees to contribute 5% of its 
annual net gaming income for the support of local educational 
programs and schools on or near the reservation. The tribe may elect 
to contribute additional sums for these or other educational purposes. 
Disbursements of theses funds shall be at the sole direction of the 
tribe. 
(dj The tribe agrees not to conduct gaming outside of Indian lands. 
(3) To amend its compact to incorporate the terms set forth in subsection (1) 
above, a tribe shall deliver to the Secretary of State a tribal resolution 
signifying the tribe's acceptance of the terms. Immediately upon delivery of 
such tribal resolution to the Secretary of State, (a) the tribe's state-tribal 
gaming compact shall be deemed amended to incorporate the terms; (b) the 
tribe's compact as so amended shall be deemed approved by the state in 
accordance with Section 67-429A, Idaho Code, without the need for further 
signature or action by the executive or legislative branches of state 
government, and (c) except to the extent federal govement  approval is 
required, the newly incorporated compact terms shall be deemed effective 
immediately. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to (a) indicate that any gaming 
activity currently conducted by any tribe is unauthorized or  otherwise 
inappropriate under Idaho law or the tribe's existing compact, or (b) prohibit 
a tribe from negotiating with the state for an initial compact or a compact 
amendment regarding tribal video gaming machines or any other matter 
through a procedure other than the procedure specified in subsection (2) 
above or which contains terms different than those specified in subsection 
(1) above. 
The Plaintiffs allege that these code sections violate Idaho Constitution, Article 111, § 20: 
whicl~ states: 
( I )  Gambling is contrary to public policy and is strictly prohibited except for the 
following: 
a. A state lottery which is authorized by the state if conducted in 
conformity with enabling legislation; and 
b. Pari-mutuel betting if conducting in conformity with enabling 
legislation; and 
c. Bingo and raffle games that are operated by qualified charitable 
organizations in the pursuit of charitable purposes if conducted in 
conformity with enabling legislation. 
(2) No activities permitted by subsection (1) shall employ any form of casino 
gambling including, but not limited to, blackjaclc, craps, roulette, poker, 
bacarrat, keno and slot machines, or employ any electronic or 
electromechanical imitation or simulation of any form of casino gambling. 
(3) The legislature shall provide by law penalties for violations of this section. 
(4) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following are not gambling and are not 
prohibited by this section: 
a. Merchant promotional contests and drawings conducted incidentally to 
bona fide nongaming business operations, if prizes are awarded 
without consideration being charged to participants; and 
b. Games that award only additional play. 
The State contends that the Plaintiffs' alleged injuries cannot be redressed without the 
joinder of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe (hereinafter the "Tribe")," which is impossible due to the 
Tribe's sovereign imm~nity.~ The State further argues that even if the action could proceed without 
the Tribe, this Court cannot enter a declaratory judgment because the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act, 25 U.S.C. 2710 elseq. (the "IGRA"), together with the "Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the 
State of Idaho Compact for Class I11 Gaming" (hereinafter the "Compact"), preempts this Court's 
jurisdiction over disputes regarding the ~ o m ~ a c t . '  The State also raises the issue of the Plaintiffs' 
standing to bring this suit on the basis that a declaratory judgment does not redress the Plaintiffs' 
6 Amended Coinplaint, at pp. 1-2. 
7 According to the honorable Lynn W h i l l ,  federal district judge, the "Shoshone and Bannock Tribes" is a single, 
federally-recognized Indian Tribe. &: Affidavit of Clay R. Smith, Knox v. State, Bingham County case no. CV 
2008-667 (filed April 28,2008) (hereinafter theL'Smith Affidavit"), at Exhibit 5, p. 8, footnote 4. 
Brief in Support of Defendndants' Motion to Dismiss, Knox v. State, Bingham County case no. CV 2008-667 (filed 
April 28,2008) (hereinafter the "State's Brief"), at p. I .  
State's Brief, at p. 2. 
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alleged injuries-in-fact." 
111. DISCUSSION 
The State initially alleges that the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint should be dismissed on 
three bases: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
("I.R.C.P.")12(b)(l); (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6); and (3) failure to join an indispensible party under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7). This Court shall 
discuss each of these bases seriatim. 
A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
In its Motion, the State argues this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate 
whether certain gaming machines operated by the Tribe comply with "state law requirements."" 
However, the Plaintiffs are not asking for an adjudication of whether certain gaming machines 
operated by the Tribe comply with state law requirements. Instead, they argue that certain state 
statutes, which concern tribal video gaming machines, do not conform to the parameters of 
Article 111, 5 20 ofthe Idaho ~onstitution.'~ 
Although the State, in its Brief, raises the issue of this Court's lack of authority to issue 
relief to the Plaintiffs, the State does not premise its argument upon I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) but on 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).13 Nowhere in the State's briefing does the State rely upon the standard of 
review applied to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1).14 Accordingly, this Court shall consider the State's lack of 
authority arguments under the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) standard. 
'"tate's Brief, at p. 9; Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Knox v. Stafe, Bingham County 
case no. CV 2008-667 (filed June 5,2008) (hereinafter the "State's Reply"). 
I I State's Motion, at p. 2. 
l2 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, atpp. 2, 7. 
l3 State's Brief, at p. 2. 
'" State's Brief; State's Reply; Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Authority, Knox v. State, Bingham 
County case no. CV 2008-667 (filed August 1 I, 2008) (hereinafter theS'State's Supplement"). 
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B. Failure to State a Cause of Action upon which Relief can be Granted. 
The standard for reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is the same as the standard for adjudicating a motion for summary judgment." 
In other words, the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record and 
pleadings viewed in his or her favor and only then may the question be aslced whether a claim for 
relief has been stated.lb Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would entitle him or her to relief.17 
However, this Court need not find that the Plaintiffs can only obtain the particular relief prayed 
for, as long as the Court can ascertain that some relief may be granted." 
The only facts which a court may properly consider on a motion to dismiss are those 
appearing in the complaint, supplemented by those facts of which the court may properly take 
judicial notice.lg If a court considers matters outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgment and the proceedings 
thereafter must comport with the hearing and notice requirements of I.R.C.P. 56." 
In support of its Motion, the State submitted the Smith Affidavit. The State argues that 
the exhibits attached to the Smith Affidavit are matters of pubIic record and therefore this 
Court's consideration of them does not convert the State's Motion to motion for summary 
Attached to the Smith Affidavit are the following: (1) Affidavit of Miren E. Artiach, 
filed in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, consolidated case nos. CIV 01- 
IS IdahoSchoolsforEqual Edncational Opportunip v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573,578,850 P.2d 724,729 (1993). 
l 6  Idaho Schools for Equal Jducational OpportuniQ, 123 Idaho at 578, 850 P.2d at 729; Miles v. Idaho Power 
Company, 116 Idaho 635, 637,668 P.2d 757, 759 (1989); Harperv. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347 
(Ct. A p p .  1992); Ernst v. Hemenway & Moser, Co., 120 Idaho 941,946,821 P.2d 996, 1001 (Ct. A p p .  1991). 
"Haraer. 122 Idaho at 536.835 P.2d at 1347: Ernst v. Hemenwav. 120 Idaho at 946.821 P.2d at 1001. ,. 
~ a k e r ,  122 Idaho at 536; 835 P.2d at 1347: 
19 Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. A p p .  1990); Owsley v. Idaho Indusirial 
Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455,459 (2005) 
20 Hellicluon, 118 Idaho at 276,796 P.2d at 153. 
2 '  Slate's Motion, at p .  7. 
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52-E-BLW and CIV o ~ - ~ ~ ~ - E - B L w ; ~ ~  (2) Order, Bell v. Ceflumsa, Idaho Supreme Court case 
no. 29226 (dated June 2, 2003);2~ (3) Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, Bell v Cenarrusa, 
Idaho Supreme Court case no. 29226 (dated October 16, 2003);" (4) The Shoshone-Bannock 
Tribes and the State of Idaho Compact for Class 111 ~ a r n i n ~ ; ~ ~  and (5) Memorandum Decision 
and Order, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho, United States District Court for the District of 
Idaho case nos. CV-01-052-E-BLW and CV-OI-171-E-BLW (filed April 12, 2 0 0 4 ) ~ ~  All of 
these documents, save for the Compact, reveal on their face that they have been filed (without 
qualification) with or by various state and federal courts and are, therefore, matters of public 
record.27 Although the Compact does not show, on its face, that it has been made a part of the 
public record in a previous state or federal case, the Plaintiffs do not dispute the authenticity of 
Exhibit 4 to the Smith ~ff idavi t .~ '  Neither do the Plaintiffs contend that this Court must 
consider this matter under the I.R.C.P. 56(c) standard of review.29 Accordingly, this Court shall 
not convert the State's Motion to a motion for summary judgment, despite the documents 
attached to the Smith Affidavit. 
22 Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit I .  
23 Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit2 
24 Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 3. 
Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4. 1 9 3  
26 Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 5. 
27 See: US.  v. 14.02 Acres ofLaizdMore or Less in Fresno County, 530 F.3d 883,894 (9" Cir. 2008). 
28 - See: Plaintiffs' Memorandum; Plaintiffs' Supplwnent. -: Lord v. Swine Pacjfic Holdings, Inc, 203 
F.sG.z~ 1175, 1178 (D. Idaho 2002). 
29 - See: Plaintiffs' Memorandum; Plaintiffs' Supplement. Again, the standard of review for an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss is the same as an I.R.C.P. 56(c) motion for summary judgment. Idaho Schools for Equal 
Educational Opportunity v. Evam, 123 Idaho 573,578,850 P.2d 724,729 (1993). 
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C. The Tribe is Nut an Indispensible Party to this Lawsuit. 
Initially, the State argues that the Tribe is an indispensible party to this litigation and, 
because it cannot be sued without its permission, this matter must be di~missed.~' Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) requires that the failure to join indispensible parties must be raised as an 
affirmative defense, after which the burden falls on the plaintiffs to join "all parties who have or 
claim any interest which would be affected by the dec~aration."~' Whether a party is 
indispensable to an action depends largely upon the relief 
The basis for the State's argument is the premise that the only means of effecting relief 
for the plaintiffs is by modification of the Tribe's Compact with the The plaintiffs 
respond that they are not challenging or seeking to invalidate any tribal compacts with the State, 
but are merely seeking ajudgment declaring I.C. $ 67-429B and 9 67-429C ~nconstitutional.~~ 
Declaratory judgments are authorized in Idaho under LC. § 10-1201, et seq. Relevant 
code sections under Title 10, Chapter 12 read: 
10-1201. Declaratory judgments authorized -Form and effect. - Courts of 
record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, 
status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be 
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either 
affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
" State's Brief, at pp. 10-17. Tribal sovereign immunity is "a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self- 
governance." Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 928 (7*' CC. 2008) (Ho-Chunk II) [&: Three 
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 894, 106 S. Ct. 2305, 90 
L.Ed.2d 881 (198613. Tribal sovereign immunity extends to suits for declaratory relief. Ho-Chunk 11, 5 12 F.3d at 
928 [a: Imperial Granit Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9" CC. 1991) and Santa 
ClaraPueblo s. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,59,98 S. Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed2d 106 (1978)l. Thus, suits against Indian tribes 
are barred bv sovereien immunitv without a clear waver bv the tribe or con~ressional abrogation. Ho-Chunk 11, 512 
F.3d at 928 'citing: ~Yklahoma T& Commission v. citizen ~ a n d ~ o t a w a t o m ~ ~ n d i a n  Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509, l l l S. 
Ct. 905,909,112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (199I)J. 
3 1  Hartman s. United Heritage Properly and Casualty Company, 141 Idaho 193, 198, 108 P.3d 340, 345 (2005) 
[m: LC. g 10-121 1; Tomchakx walker, 108 Idaho 446,449,700 P.2d 68,71 (1985)). 
32 Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Slate, 132 Idaho 559, 976 P.2d 913 (1998) b: Barlow v. 
InternationalHaarvester Company, 95 Idaho 881, 896, 522 P.2d 1102, 11 17 (1974)l. 
33 State's Brief, at p. 9. 
34 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, at pp. 2, 7. 
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10-1202. Person interested or affected may have declaration. -Any person 
interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a 
contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are 
affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have 
determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, 
statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status 
or other legal relations thereunder. 
10-1211. Parties to action - Municipal order or franchise. - When 
declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or ciaim 
any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall 
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding 
which involved the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such 
municipality shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if the 
statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney 
general of the state shall also be served, and be entitled to be heard and may 
intervene. 
10-1212. Construction of act. -This act is declared to be remedial; its 
purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with 
respect to rights, status and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed 
and administered. 
This Court has authority to render a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of a state 
This Court must then inquire whether the Tribe is an indispensable party to an 
/ 
adjudication of the constitutionality of I.C. § 67-429B and 5 67-429C. Under I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), a 
party shall be joined if: 
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those 
already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence 
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that 
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk 
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of 
the claimed interest. 
35 - See: Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 668, 115 P.3d 756,759 (2005) 
nnnnn m h n ? ~ ~ l \ i r  nw-onin*hi~r, b n n ~ r m   nleadrer 
This Court's decision regarding whether or not the Tribe is an indispensable party is 
di~cretionary.~~ This Court must therefore: (1) correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) act within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices available to it; and (3) reach its decision by an exercise of reason.37 
The Plaintiffs in this case do not seek to enjoin the Tribe from operating the tribal video 
gaming machines located in the Fort Hall Casino. The Plaintiffs do not seek, by this action, to 
enjoin the use of tribal video gaming machines by all of the Indian tribes in the state of Idaho. 
They are seeking a declaration that I.C. (i 67-429B and (i 67-429C are unconstitutional. 
Should this Court ultimately grant the relief the PIaintilfs request, such declaration will 
not invalidate the Compact between the Tribe and the Stale, which Compact the Tribe and the 
State executed prior to the enactment of I.C. (i 67-429B and $ 67-429~.~*  The Tribe's legally 
protectable interest in operating tribal video gaming machines flows from the Compact, not from 
I.C. $ 67-429B and $ 67-429C. The Tribe's ability to protect its interests under the Compact is 
provided for by the Compact, and, to a certain extent, by IGRA. 
Furthermore, a final adjudication that I.C. (i 67-429B and (i 67-429C are unconstitutional, 
should such outcome occur, does not necessarily result in the renegotiation ofthe Compact by the 
State and the Tribes. Although renegotiation is certainly a possibility, another alternative is for 
the Idaho Legislature to pursue alternative legislation, amendment of Article 111, (i 20 of the Idaho 
Constitution, arbitration under the terms of the Contract, or renewed litigation in federal district 
court regarding the scope of gaming allowed in Idaho. Interpretation of the Compact is not an 
issue before this Court. Neither can this Court speculate as to how the State would ultimately 
proceed upon an ultimate finding that I.C. $ 67-429B and (i 67-429C violate the Idaho 
36 Utter x Gibbins, 137 Idaho361, 366,48 P.3d 1250, 1255 (2002). 
37 Sun Valley Shopping Ce~te,; Inc. v. Idaho Power Co, 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (199 1). 
38 See: Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, pp. 31-33. The Tribe and the State signed the Compact on Februaly 18, 2000. 
i d a h o ~ o d e  6 67-429B and 67-429C went into effect in November of 2002. 
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Finally, this Court considers whether the absence of the Tribe from this suit leaves either 
the Plaintiffs or the State subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of the Plaintiffs' request for a declaration that I.C. 3 67-429B 
and § 67-429C are unconstitutional. Should this Court, and ultimately the Idaho Supreme Court, 
determine that I.C. 5 67-429B and 5 67-429C are inconsistent with Art. 111, 5 20 of the Idaho 
Constitution, that finding would be the same regardless of the party bringing the claim. Any 
additional action by the State, necessitated by a finding of unconstitutionality, would be 
consistent with the finding of constitutionality, rather than inconsistent therewith. 
Based upon these findings, this Court concludes that the Tribe is not an indispensable 
party to this lawsuit. 
D. IGRA doe not Preempt State Court Action Adjudicating the Constitutionality of 
State Statutes. 
The State asgues that the Plaintiffs' cause of action is preempted by I G R A . ~ ~  This Court 
notes, however, that IGRA confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts in three (3) 
instances: (1) for "any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a 
State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe . . . or to conduct such negotiations in good 
faith;" (2) for "any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a class 111 gaming 
activity located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact;" or (3) 
for "any cause of action initiated by the Secretary to enforce the procedures" prescribed in 
IGRA."' 
None of the instances set forth in IGRA are found in this lawsuit. The Tribe has not filed 
suit arising from the failure of the State to negotiate a compact or conduct negotiations in good 
39See: IdahoSchooL~ forEqualEducational Oppo~tunily v. Stale, 132 Idaho 559,568,976 P.2d 913,922 (1998). 
40 - State's Brief, at pp. 17-27. 
" 25 U.S.C. S) 2710(d)(7)(A)(i)-(iii); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nalion, 463 F.3d 655, 659-60 (7" Cir. 2006)(Ho- 
faith, neither the State nor the Tribe filed suit to enjoin class III gaming co~lducted in violation of 
the Compact, and the lawsuit was not filed by the Secretary to enforce the procedures prescribed 
in IGRA. 
For these reasons, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs' suit for a declaratory judgment is 
not preempted by IGRA. 
E. The Plaintiffs have Not Established that a Declaratory Judgment will Redress their 
Claimed Injuries. 
The question then becomes whether or not a citizen of this County, allegedly addicted due 
to the proximity of tribal video gaming machines, maymaintain a petition for a declaration that 
LC. S, 67-429B and § 67-429C are unconstitutional where such declaration does not necessarily 
rid the area of the offending gaming machines. 
As the State correctly asserts, the Plaintiffs must establish standing in order to maintain 
their suit for a declaratory j ~ d ~ m e n t . 4 ~  It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a 
person wishing to invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing!3 The doctrine of standing 
focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have ad j~dica ted .~~ 
In order to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must "allege or 
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will 
prevent or redress the claimed injury.'*5 Finally, a citizen may not challenge a governmental 
enactment where the injury is one suffered alike by all citizens of the j~isdiction.4~ 
Chunk 0. 
42 State's Brief, aipp. 7-9. 
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43 Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). 
44 Thomson v. City of Lewisfon, 137 Idaho 473, 477, 50 P.3d 488, 492 (2002) [w: Miles v. Idaho Power 
Company, 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989); Boundaw Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 
371,375,913 P.2d 1141,1145 (1996)l. 
45 . 1 g. 
46 Id. -
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Idaho Code 5 67-429B authorizes Indian tribes, in conjunction with a compact with the 
State, to conduct gaming using video gaming machines and defines the term "tribal video gaming 
machine." Idaho Code 5 67-429C describes how Indian tribes may amend their compacts with 
the State and includes the term "tribal video gaming machine" as defined in Idaho Code 5 67- 
429B. 
The Plaintiffs allege that after the enactment of LC. 5 67-427B and 5 67-427C, and after 
the installation of slot machines at the Fort Hall Casino, they became compulsive gamblers, 
driving the short distance from their homes to Fort Hall Casino three (3) to four (4) times per 
week.47 The Plaintiffs gambled exclusively at Fort Hall Casino, using only the slot machines.48 
The Plaintiffs have allegedly developed "clinical and devastating addictions to gambling at Fort 
Hall Casino and estimate their losses at $30,000.00 to $50,000.00.~~ They allege that they have 
paid additional sums they otherwise would not have incurred in seeking t ~ e a t m e n t . ~ ~  The 
Plaintiffs claim that had the State not enacted I.C. 5 67-427B and 5 67-429C, neither Wendy 
Knox nor Richard Dotson would have suffered the alleged harm." 
The State does not dispute these facts for purposes of its dispositive motion.52 Indeed, 
where standing is the issue raised by a motion to dismiss, this Court must construe Plaintiffs' 
claims as 
Instead, the State urges that a judgment declaring I.C. 5 67-427B and 5 67-429C 
unconstitutional would not prevent or redress the claimed injury.54 Indeed, should Plaintiffs 
receive the ultimate relief they request, a final adjudication that I.C. 5 67-427B and 5 67-429C 




so - Amended Complaint, at p. 4 
51 r r  
10. -
"State's Brief, at p. 9. 
53 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S. Ct. 2197,2206,45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) 
54 Id. -
are unconstitutional, their injuries would not be redressed. For the same reasons that the State 
cannot show that the Tribe is an indispensable party, the Plaintiffs cannot show that a favorable 
conclusion to their lawsuit would redress their injuries. 
Specifically, the Compact, which predates the enactment of 1.C. 5; 67-427B and 5; 67- 
429C, establishes that: (1) the State questioned whether the "electronic gaming currently 
conducted by the Tribes in Idaho" fell within the confines of Article 111, 5; 20 of the Idaho 
Constitution; (2) the Tribe interpreted lGRA to mean that the Tribe was entitled to offer any 
gaming activities "that is otherwise permitted by any person, organization, or entity for ally 
purpose;" and (3) the Tribe took the alternative position that if Article 111, 5 20 of the Idaho 
Constitution did prohibit electronic games currently conducted by the Tribe, then the Tribe was 
entitled to offer electronic facsimiles of any lottery game reasonably defined as owned and 
operated by government en ti tie^.^' The State and the Tribe agreed to resolve the dispute of what 
gaming the Tribes were allowed to conduct under IGRA by either or both parties filing a 
declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the District of ~ d a h o . ~ ~  The parties 
agreed to abide by the final judicial determination of the declaratory judgment  action(^).'^ 
Both palties filed suit for a declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Idaho, which suits were con~olidated.~~ During the pendency of the federal lawsuit, the 
parties notified the U.S. District Court of the passage of Proposition One and the resultant 
enactment of I.C. 5; 67-429B and 5; 6 7 - 4 2 9 ~ . ~ ~  Based upon the enactment of I.C. 5; 67-429B and 
5; 67-429C, the State (and consequently the U.S. District Court) 60 shifted i.ts focus from the types 
of games allowed under the Idaho Constitution, to whether or not the Compact required the Tribe 
55 Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, p p .  6-7. 
56 Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, pp.  89. 
57 Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, p p .  10-12. 
58 See: Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 5, p. 4. 
59 - Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 5, p p .  5-7. 
60 &: Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 5, p. 4. 
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to submit to renegotiation of the Compact in order to utilize tribal video gaming machines6' 
Thus, the U.S. District Court did not adjudicate the issue of and whether or not tribal video 
gaming machines fit within Micle 111, 8 20 of the Idaho ~onstitution.~' Likewise, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals adjudicated the parties' rights under the Compact and did not address 
the constitutionality of I.C. 8 67-429B and 5 6 7 - 4 2 9 ~ . ~ ~  
Under this factual scenario, should the Plaintiffs attain the ultimate relief they seek, then 
the Tribe and the State will fall back upon their Compact, which allows the Tribe to operate any 
gaming activity that the State permits for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.64 
Either the State or the Tribe may request renegotiation of the Whether or how the 
State or the Tribe might return to the U.S. District Court for a finding as to the constitutionality 
of tribal video gaming machines is a question of interpretation of the Compact, which is not 
before this Court. Whether or not the State will seek to pass other legislation, or to amend the 
Idaho Constitution, is highIy speculative. 
In order for this Court to determine whether a declaratoty judgment will prevent or 
redress the Plaintiffs' claimed injuries, the Plaintiffs must prove that the practical consequence of 
such judgment would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that they would obtain 
relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.66  his "significant increase in the likelihood of 
relief' is not present in this case. This Court cannot speculate as to the outcome of any 
relitigation or renegotiation of the Compact, or any efforts on the part of the State to introduce 
different statutes or even a constitutional amendment. A declaration that I.C. Ej 67-429B and 5 
61 See: Smitli Affidavit, at Exhibit 5, p. 8. 
62 See: Bell v. Cenarrusa, Idaho Supreme Court Order no. 29226 (dated June 2, 2003) wherein the Idaho 
Supreme Court declined to rule on the challenge to the constitutionality of Proposition One for lack of original 
jurisdiction. 
"See: Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095 (9' Cir. 2006). 2 0 . f  
See: Smith Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, p. 7 and p. 30. 
65 G t h  Affidavit, at Exhibit 4, p. 30. 
" Ufah v Evans, 536 U.S. 452,464, 122 S. Ct. 2191,2199, 153 L.Ed.2d 453 (2002) 
67-429C are unconstitutional does not, without other, intervening events, rid the Plaintiffs of the 
proximity of the slot machines to which they claim to be addicted.67 
For these reasons, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not established standing and 
this Court is compelled to grant the State's Motion to Dismiss. 
1V. CONCLUSlON AND ORDER 
Although this Court does not find that the Tribe is an indispensable party to this suit, the 
Court does find that the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the relief sought will redress their 
claimed injuries. Therefore, the Plaintiffs lack standing to maintain this action, and the lawsuit 
must be dismissed. The State's Motion to Dismiss is therefore granted. 
5T 
IT IS SO ORDERED AND DATED this & day of September 2008. 
" - See: McConnell v. FederalElection Commission, 540 U.S. 93,229, 124 S. Ct. 619,709, 157 L.Ed2d 491 (2003) 
('The relief the Paul plaintiffs seek is for this Court to strike down the contribution limits, removing the alleged 
disparate editorial controls and economic burdens imposed on them. But [Bipartisan Campaign Refonn Act of 2002 
"BCRA"] $ 307 merely increased and indexed for inflation certain FECA [Federal Electiol~ Campaign Act of 19713 
contribution limits. * * * Although this Court has jurisdiction to hear a challenge to [BCRA] 3 307, if the Court 
were to strike down the increases and indexes established by BCRA 3 307, it would not remedy the Paul plaintiffs' 
alleged injury because both the Iimitations imposed by FECA and the exemption for news media would remain 
unchanged. A ruling in the Paul plaintiffs' favor, therefore, would not redress their alleged injury and they 
accordingly lack standing."') 
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of September, 2008, and Judgment entered on the 25th day of September, 2008, Darren B. Simpson 
presiding. 
2. That appellant has aright to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the judgment or 
orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 1 l(a)(l). 
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